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Abstract: This paper builds on the analysis of the political settlement in Bangladesh 
in a companion paper entitled ‘The Political Settlement and its Evolution in 
Bangladesh’.  
 
We look at three critical sectors in contemporary Bangladesh, two of which were 
subject to significant learning-by-doing problems whose resolution was significantly 
affected by characteristics of the political settlement and the third where long-term 
investment faces institutional problems related to the political settlement. The first is 
the most successful sector in Bangladesh: its garments industry. This sector emerged 
during the clientelistic authoritarian period of the 1980s and benefited from the MFA 
that provided Bangladesh with ‘quota rents’ for a short time. The characteristics of 
the political settlement of the time allowed critical institutional innovations and the 
structure of the ‘financing’ for learning created strong incentives and compulsions for 
high levels of effort. This is a very useful case for understanding the importance of 
effective institutional solutions for financing learning-by-doing even in a low-
technology sector. As the political settlement evolved, sustaining technological 
upgrading in the sector has become more difficult though it is happening at the level 
of individual firms. Second, we look at the electronics sector whose takeoff in the 
2000s took place under a competitive clientelist political settlement. The external 
support provided to the sector was much less significant and the takeoff depended on 
the leading role played by a nationalist enterprise that absorbed the risks of investing 
in learning-by-doing. This example is interesting because despite the competitive 
clientelist political settlement, the government was compelled to play a follower role 
and policy evolved to support the sector. Nevertheless, progress was slower compared 
to garments. More can be done to support this sector by supporting specialization in 
components manufacturing and developing institutional support mechanisms that are 
compatible with the contemporary political settlement. Our final sector is the power 
generation sector. Poor power generation has seriously constrained development in 
the rest of the economy but successive governments have failed to raise power 
supplies in cost-effective ways. The problem here is not learning-by-doing but adverse 
incentives for investment that can be traced to the combined effects of the political 
settlement and an excessive reliance on private sector financing. This combination 
has resulted in adverse incentives that resulted in only a few politically connected 
players bidding and a focus on ‘procurement rents’ rather than production. 
Conventional reform strategies focusing on transparency, rule of law reforms and 
anti-corruption have not achieved results. Our analysis locates the institutional 
problems in the context of a specific political settlement and helps to explain both why 
conventional strategies have failed and also helps to identify alternatives that may 
fare better. In particular, the Indian experience suggests that a strategy of focusing on 
a long-term financing agency with a dedicated governance structure can change 
incentives sufficiently to enable improvements in power generation to be achieved 
even in the context of a competitive clientelist political settlement. 
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1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the challenges facing important growth sectors in Bangladesh 
in the context of our analysis of the evolution of the political settlement in that 
country. Attracting investment into growth sectors in developing countries requires 
overcoming market failures whose type and severity are different from those relevant 
for advanced countries. The very weakness of governance and institutions that 
characterizes what we describe as the clientelist political settlement implies that a 
range of market failures are likely to be endemic. The types of institutional solutions 
that are likely to be effective in solving particular market failures depends on the 
characteristics of the political settlement in that country and its evolution over time 
because the latter determines how effectively different types of institutions can be 
enforced, the types of informal modifications in these institutions that are likely and 
the contestation that particular institutional solutions will face from powerful 
organizations in society. In addition, we expect that the institutional solutions that will 
work will vary across sectors and over time in the same country because the relevant 
organizations and their relative power vary along these dimensions.  
 
We focus on three major sectors in Bangladesh spanning three decades of 
development. This enables us to look at a number of different types of market failures 
and how variations in the political settlement over time allowed or obstructed 
particular types of solutions to these market failures. In analysing these market 
failures we draw on our earlier work on political settlements and technology 
acquisition (Khan 2009, 2010). We also draw on our analysis of the evolution of 
political settlement in Bangladesh in a companion piece to this work1
 
. The first sector 
we look at has emerged as the most important sector in Bangladesh’s recent economic 
development, the garments and textiles sector. Today this sector alone accounts for 
three-quarters of Bangladesh’s export earnings and provides employment to well over 
three million workers. Bangladesh has a large low-wage workforce and the takeoff in 
the garments sector happened in the 1980s shortly after the statist planning of the 
early 1970s was abandoned. This lends credence to the argument that market forces 
and gradual liberalization led the growth of this sector.  
Liberalization and the abandonment of a perverse type of ‘socialism’ during the 
dominant party political settlement of 1972-75 were indeed necessary for the 
garments sector takeoff but they were by no means sufficient. Even in a low-
technology sector like garments, the workers, supervisors and entrepreneurs of the 
country lacked the know-how and tacit knowledge of production processes to set up 
globally competitive factories. This was despite the fact that investible funds were 
available in the hands of many potential investors after the massive ‘primitive 
accumulation’ of the post-independence years. The technology acquisition necessary 
for the takeoff was enabled by a number of specific institutional arrangements that 
allowed critical market failures constraining learning-by-doing to be overcome in this 
sector. The relatively successful implementation of these institutional solutions in the 
1980s depended on a number of characteristics of the political settlement of that time 
which we have described as clientelistic authoritarianism as the country came out of 
the uncertainty and violence of the immediate post-independence years. The 
                                                 
1 The Political Settlement and its Evolution in Bangladesh, companion paper presented to DIIS, 
December 2011. 
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characteristics of this political settlement allowed the garments sector to exploit to the 
full the temporary advantage that was offered to least developed countries like 
Bangladesh by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which provided Bangladesh with 
effective temporary rents that assisted the start-up investments in the new sector. 
 
The garments industry is extremely important not just because of its current size and 
significance in the Bangladesh economy but also because it demonstrates the types of 
institutional strategies that can overcome critical market failures constraining 
technology acquisition and growth in developing countries. The solution that the 
garments industry enjoyed was not replicated in any other major sector for a number 
of reasons. First, a critical component of the institutional solution involved a 
fortuitous rent created by a global institutional arrangement, the MFA. The terms on 
which this rent was available for investors was, for serendipitous reasons, very 
effective in inducing high levels of effort on the part of firms investing in learning-by-
doing. While the particular details of this arrangement were not designed by anyone, 
the reasons why this particular institutional structure creating incentives and 
opportunities worked so well has enormous significance for designing institutions for 
supporting learning-by-doing in the future. Secondly, clientelistic authoritarianism 
during the early phases of the sector’s takeoff allowed the rapid solution of a number 
of additional institutional constraints facing the sector. Other sectors did not enjoy the 
exogenous rents created by the MFA for the garments sector, and by the mid-1980s, 
clientelistic authoritarianism was in crisis, to be replaced by a vulnerable democracy 
in 1991 that still describes the political settlement in contemporary Bangladesh.  
 
The two other sectors we look at are the power generation sector and electronics, both 
as they operated in the democratic period in the 2000s. The period that we describe as 
vulnerable democracy was characterized by more intense competition between 
political organizations and a failure to evolve institutions that could maintain stability 
in the political domain. The instability and vulnerability that this caused seriously 
constrained the evolution of solutions to market failures in other potentially 
competitive sectors in the economy. The power generation sector has not been 
successful in organizing the long-term investments that are required for supporting the 
rapid expansion that the country needs. Bangladesh has one of the lowest per capita 
electricity generation figures in the world, and apart from the failure to provide power 
to the large rural population, power scarcities have created very serious constraints for 
the expansion of other sectors of the economy. The political settlement is directly 
implicated in the problems facing the sector. Standard explanations for failures in this 
sector have focused on the lack of transparency and good governance, and the 
presence of corruption and insider dealings. All of these are accurate descriptions of 
the sector, but they are characteristic features of all sectors in Bangladesh, and indeed 
of the power sector in neighbouring countries like India which have performed much 
better in power generation. The constraints in Bangladesh are related to specific 
failures in developing appropriate structures of financing and institutions that can 
support the efficiency of this financing within the context of the current political 
settlement. This results in a persistent failure to overcome the critical market failures 
constraining investments in this sector. 
 
The final sector we look at is the emerging electronics sector in Bangladesh which is 
still very young but is a sector that displays strong potential. Unlike the garments 
sector, this sector has not benefited from institutional rents that supported learning, 
3 
 
and it is attempting to establish itself in a context of vulnerable democracy. Growth 
has, not surprisingly, been slow compared to the takeoff in the garments sector in the 
1980s. What is interesting is that market failures constraining learning are being 
overcome in this sector largely as a result of a ‘nationalistic’ entrepreneurial attitude 
on the part of a pioneering company that decided to invest heavily in learning-by-
doing on its own account. The sector, led by this company, has also been able to 
penetrate policy-making to a limited extent to change some policies to support its 
investments. Nevertheless, unlike the garments case, there have been no significant 
external rents supporting the learning process in electronics. This example shows that 
there are many routes to solving problems of technology acquisition even in the 
context of a very fragmented clientelist democracy. But there is a price to pay in terms 
of the pace of progress that is possible, and of course the electronics sector relied on 
dedicated entrepreneurs turning up who are not interested simply in profit 
maximization. The prospect of developing a new sector with all its risks is not the 
easiest and fastest way of making money in a clientelist political settlement.  
 
The next section summarizes a theoretical framework developed in Khan (2009). This 
reviews the important market failures that have been identified in the literature to 
explain constraints on investment and technology acquisition in developing countries 
and argues that the most fundamental constraint is set by the difficulty of acquiring 
the tacit knowledge required for organizing competitive production processes. The 
theoretical framework argues that the achievement of competitiveness requires both 
the provision of opportunities for carrying out learning-by-doing but also institutional 
pressures and compulsions for ensuring that the participants put in high levels of 
effort that raise the probability that the learning will be successful and the support 
provided can be withdrawn to be re-allocated to other sectors. These conditions are 
closely connected to the characteristics of the political settlement because the relative 
power of organizations affected by investments in the sector, and indeed of 
institutions in the political domain can modify the effectiveness of particular 
institutions through which these market failures are being addressed. The political 
settlement in Pakistan was not appropriate for the effectiveness of the core institutions 
through which its industrial policy was being implemented in the 1960s, but in the 
1980s, the institutional structure through which support for the garments industry in 
Bangladesh was organized proved to be very effective in meeting the requirements of 
learning success (Khan 1999). The next three sections apply this framework and the 
insights coming from our parallel analysis of the evolving political settlements in 
Bangladesh to the three sectors, garments, power generation and electronics.  
 
2. Catching up and Learning: An Analytical Model  
This section summarizes a model of learning and catching up developed in Khan 
(2009) which we will use to explain critical aspects of the growth performance in our 
three sectors in Bangladesh. The model helps to explain why industrial policy 
achieved some growth during the authoritarian period in Bangladesh when the 
country was part of Pakistan, but also why Pakistan’s growth success, unlike the 
authoritarian states in East Asia, proved to be unsustainable. We then apply it to 
explain the remarkable success of the garments industry and the very specific 
financing arrangements and institutional incentives that contributed to high levels of 
effort in learning in this sector. The model also identifies the extent of the challenge 
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facing the electronics sector as it moves forward from the domestic start-up phase to 
attempt international competitiveness and export success.  
 
At the heart of the development problem is a contracting problem that institutions or 
interventions have to solve if the adoption of modern technologies is to be 
accelerated. Developing countries find it difficult to catch up despite their 
significantly low wages and large pools of underemployed labour, often with many 
unemployed workers having respectable levels of formal education. This paradox can 
be explained in terms of a simple catching up model. Competitiveness depends not 
just on wages but also on the productivity of labour, and its effectiveness in 
converting expensive (often imported) inputs into outputs. The productivity of the 
labour and input used depends not just on the formal education of workers and 
managers, but more significantly on their tacit knowledge embodied in routines of 
production that can only be learnt through actual practice. Without periods spent in 
learning-by-doing, a developing country typically has productivity levels that are too 
low for it to competitively engage in production. This is true even for relatively low 
quality and basic production processes. As a result, a new firm or an entire country 
can find entry even into low-quality production blocked.  
 
Competitiveness depends on both price and quality. Developing countries are entering 
a global market where products have established price-quality combinations and for 
many products there are minimum product qualities below which it is not possible to 
find a market regardless of price. The simplest way to capture critical features of the 
problem is to define products as combinations of characteristics. Broad clusters of 
characteristics define a particular type of product, but any product also has detailed 
characteristics of reliability, performance, attractiveness, design and a range of other 
functions that can distinguish particular products within the broad group in terms of 
‘quality’ (Lancaster 1966; Sutton 2005, 2007). Products can therefore be indexed by 
quality, with higher quality cars (for instance) being (in general) more difficult and 
more expensive to produce, but also attracting a higher price that is high enough to 
make it worthwhile for producers to always seek to improve product quality.  
 
Developing countries are generally not in the business of producing goods of higher 
quality than are being produced elsewhere. Developing new products is the process of 
product innovation that at best characterizes a small part of the productive sector even 
in middle income developing countries. Rather, their problem is to learn how to 
produce an increasing range chosen from the product qualities that already exist at a 
price that is equal to or lower than the ones already available. If it can produce an 
existing product of a particular quality at a price lower than that currently prevailing it 
has a chance of capturing markets from already established producers. At the very 
least, it has to be able to sell that product at the current global price for that quality. 
Lower quality products are generally easier to produce, but a minimum quality level 
usually exists for any product and if it fails to achieve this minimum quality, it will 
not be able to enter even with very low wages.  
 
Higher quality products have, by definition, a higher selling price, so in general they 
allow either a higher wage or a higher profit mark-up or both. Wage and profit growth 
is therefore likely to require movements up the quality ladder or shifting to other 
products where quality levels are higher. A further reason for aiming at higher quality 
is that lower quality products are or can become inferior goods and as world incomes 
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increase, global consumers are likely to shift away from some goods of lower quality. 
Finally, lower quality products are more likely to be targeted as entry points by other 
poorer countries attempting to break into global production.  
 
The move up the technology ladder is not always a smooth and incremental process. 
Low and high quality products within the same product family are not necessarily 
closely linked technologically. A country that specializes in low quality garments or 
mid-technology motor cars is not necessarily in the same technological trajectory as 
other countries producing designer garments or hybrid ‘green’ cars. Moving up the 
quality ladder can therefore in some cases mean significant and discontinuous shifts in 
the technological trajectory from ‘mature’ to ‘evolving’ technologies that in turn has 
significant implications for future productivity growth and quality improvement 
potential (Perez and Soete 1988). The production of mature products only allows 
wage growth as long as improvements in labour and input productivity are taking the 
developing country towards the frontier established in more advanced countries. But 
sustained productivity growth is only likely in higher product qualities where 
innovations are still taking place in more advanced countries.  
 
It is therefore socially and privately desirable to produce the highest quality products 
that are feasible. Of course, for countries that do not yet have the technological 
capabilities to produce even basic lower quality products the challenge is to increase 
technological capabilities sufficiently to enter production at some acceptable level of 
quality. The catching up problem can therefore be defined as a) achieving the 
minimum quality that allows entry into globally competitive production for a variety 
of products even if the initial entry quality is low, b) spreading these basic 
manufacturing and productive capabilities broadly across the working population and 
c) systematically moving up the quality ladder across product categories. Many 
developing countries find it difficult to produce anything at a quality high enough to 
have a market, others produce a very limited range of items but of low quality and 
find it difficult to move up the product and quality ladder, and the more advanced 
produce a range of products, some of higher quality, but face challenges in sustaining 
quality improvements and even more in entering into new products.  
 
To examine the implications of the quality and productivity problem in the simplest 
way, we use a simple mark-up pricing model that allows us to distinguish between the 
key variables that determine a country’s ability to produce competitive products. The 
current global price of a particular product of quality Q is set by its cost of production 
in the global production leader as shown in eq. [1]:  
 
 
( )Q
i
leader
Qi
Qi
leader
Q
leader
Qglobal
Q m
PW
P +








+
Π
= ∑ 1α  [1] 
 
To simplify the notation we do not denote products and the discussion at this stage 
refers to a particular product with varying quality indexed by Q, so Q+1 represents a 
higher quality of the product compared to Q. globalQP  is the international price of the 
product of quality Q. leaderQW is the wage level in the leading country in the industry 
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producing the product of quality Q. leaderQΠ is the productivity of labour, measured by 
the output per person in this activity. There are also i other inputs used in the 
production of the product, and to simplify, we assume these inputs are globally traded, 
each with a global price of PQi. The efficiency with which inputs are used is measured 
by the productivity of input use (output per unit input). In the leader country, the input 
productivities of each of the i inputs are represented by leaderQiα . The price of the 
product is determined by the direct input costs per unit (of labour and the other i 
inputs) and the mark-up mQ.  
 
In the same way, the cost of production (in a common currency) in the developing 
country is domesticQC for quality Q given by: 
 
( )Q
i
domestic
Qi
Qi
domestic
Q
domestic
Qdomestic
Q m
PW
C +








+
Π
= ∑ 1α  [2] 
  
The developing country can only engage in market production if domesticQC ≤
global
QP . It 
may appear that it should easily be able to do this since its wage level is significantly 
lower: leaderQ
domestic
Q WW < . In fact generally it cannot break in because the developing 
country typically suffers from significant productivity disadvantages that more than 
negate its wage advantage. Output per person is generally lower, leaderQ
domestic
Q Π<Π , 
indeed so low that despite low wages, the developing country cannot enter the 
production of most products, particularly high quality products.  
 
In theory a low enough wage level could compensate for this, though in reality the 
required wage may be lower than is feasible even in the developing country. But 
while a lower output per person could in theory be compensated by lower wages, low 
wages may even in theory be unable to compensate for a lower efficiency of input 
use. This is because inputs have a global price that has to be paid. If leaderQi
domestic
Qi αα < , 
and if we assume that both countries face the same globally traded input prices, PQi, 
differences in input efficiency can only be compensated by further falls in the 
domestic wage rate. In this case, a small efficiency disadvantage across a number of 
inputs could mean that even with zero wages, the cost of production in the developing 
country may be higher simply because of inefficient input use. In fact, the general 
problem of development is that the domestic cost of production of almost everything 
is higher than the globally competitive price so that globalQ
domestic
Q PC >  for most or even 
all products and product qualities.  
 
Why is developing country productivity so low? Output per person, QΠ , depends on 
both economy-wide and firm-level factors. Firm productivity can depend on public 
goods and utilities including the general level of education, infrastructure and the 
reliability of utility supplies. Firm productivity is also determined by firm-level 
variables like the capital equipment used by labour and the skill and experience of the 
workforce and management. In the same way, the efficiency of input use, Qiα  
depends on the same economy-level variables as well as firm-level variables like the 
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type and sophistication of the capital equipment used and the skill and experience of 
the workforce using this equipment. The firm-level determinants of productivity 
describe the technological capability of the firm, its workers and its management. 
Understanding the factors that might determine technological capability is vital for 
understanding the catching-up problem faced by developing countries.  
 
If productivity were simply a function of the type of machinery used, developing 
countries could achieve global competitiveness by investing in the purchase of the 
appropriate machinery. This is why early development theory and practice put much 
emphasis on accumulation and machinery imports. We now know this is not sufficient 
and differences in labour and input productivity can persist even with identical 
machinery (Clark and Wolcott 2002; Sutton 2007). The effects of general 
infrastructural constraints on productivity are also well known. Developing countries 
have inadequate physical infrastructure and investments in education. But this is a 
chicken and egg problem because the resources for significant improvements in 
infrastructure or in utilities that enable reliable and competitively priced utility 
supplies can only come from sustained growth. In the meantime, significant shortfalls 
in infrastructural quality, education and in utility supplies are likely to persist. The 
only viable short term response is to provide temporary assistance to catching up 
sectors in the form of more focused infrastructure provision to industrial clusters 
and/or compensatory fiscal and other arrangements to offset their higher costs.  
 
While infrastructure constraints are widely recognized, the technological capabilities 
of workers and management are probably much more important in explaining why 
some countries take off when they do. The importance of technological capabilities as 
a constraint on technology acquisition is based on three interrelated observations. 
First, there is the observation that tacit knowledge is an important part of the skills and 
organizational capabilities that are necessary for the success of firms (Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Dosi 1988; Pelikan 1988; Perez and Soete 1988). Tacit knowledge is 
knowledge that cannot be codified (Polanyi 1967). All human activity involves the 
use of a mix of formal or codifiable knowledge (knowledge that can be communicated 
in words or symbols) and a variable amount of uncodifiable ‘knowing-how-to’ 
knowledge that is embodied in unconscious and often complex routines. The process 
of learning these routines inevitably involves practice rather than simply someone 
explaining what to do or reading a manual. Buying the machines for a factory together 
with the operation manuals does not give the investor anything like the distribution of 
tacit knowledge across all segments of the firm required to achieve international 
competitiveness. Even relatively low-technology production of relatively low quality 
products like garments requires a huge amount of tacit knowledge embodied in 
hundreds of workers and managers if production is to proceed smoothly and 
effectively to produce internationally competitive products. The tacit knowledge 
involved in producing higher quality products is likely to be exponentially greater. 
 
Secondly and closely tied to the importance of tacit knowledge is the observation that 
learning-by-doing is critically important for acquiring tacit knowledge. This explains 
why developing countries can initially only achieve a level of productivity 
significantly lower than in more advanced countries. They also explain why the 
developing country can get stuck in a trap of low technology. Investments in new 
higher technology facilities would allow opportunities to engage in learning-by-doing 
that could eventually raise productivity enough to allow the competitive production of 
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products adding greater value. But these investments will not be undertaken if 
entrepreneurs believe that at current levels of productivity the investment would not 
be competitive. In turn, the failure to invest prevents the acquisition of experience that 
may have raised productivity over time. This learning trap can only be feasibly 
overcome if production can be initiated through a period of ‘loss financing’. The 
question then becomes: why do private investors fail to treat this temporary loss 
financing as part of the overall investment cost of the project? 
 
This takes us to our third and final observation. Since the private financing of these 
loss-making periods is not sufficiently widespread, there must be significant market 
failures constraining the financing of learning. By market failures we refer to 
contracting failures that result in a failure to capture achievable improvements in net 
social benefits. If the financing of learning-by-doing would allow the firm and the 
country to achieve higher levels of wages and profits, the failure of private contracting 
to achieve this financing is by definition a market failure. The policy response 
depends on the type of contracting problem or market failure that we think is 
constraining investment in loss-financing the learning-by-doing period.  
 
The loss-financing required is described by considering a developing country facing a 
domestic cost of production for quality Q higher than the global price: 
global
Q
domestic
Q PC > . The loss financing that would allow production (and learning-by-
doing) to commence can be measured as a per unit ‘subsidy’, sQ, which brings the 
domestic cost of production domesticQC  into line with the global price 
global
QP . The 
‘subsidy’ is not necessarily a transfer from government and could be private loss 
financing in the form of investors accepting a lower mark-up or putting in additional 
cash to cover a period of loss-making. A public subsidy can also be delivered in a 
variety of ways, some explicit, others more subtle. The possibilities include export 
subsidies, import protection, subsidized interest rates, subsidized inputs or 
infrastructure, or a cash subsidy. Contribution to loss-financing could also take the 
form of prioritized public spending on certain types of education or skills, or they may 
be implicit in the locational and pricing decisions of public infrastructure providers 
that reduce the costs of production of industries involved in learning. Thus a variety 
of loss financing schemes may enable learning-by-doing to commence, and in general 
we can describe these as providing ‘rents for learning’ (Khan 2000a).  
 
The essential features of the problem can be shown by focusing on the situation where 
the domestic firm can produce products of quality Q, but at a higher cost than the 
current global price. The required effective rate of subsidy, sQ, is given by the 
equality: 
 
global
QQ
domestic
Q PsC =− )1(  [3] 
  
Inserting eq. [2] defining domesticQC  into this gives the required sQ: 
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If follows from [4] that: 
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Not surprisingly, the required rate of subsidy declines if the global price rises, or if 
domestic labour productivity or input productivity rise. It follows that the faster 
domestic labour and input productivity grows, the sooner the subsidy can be removed. 
The subsidy per unit required for entering production is also likely to differ depending 
on the quality level the developing country initially aims for. Lower and higher 
quality versions of the same product are indexed by Q and Q+1. Using [3], the per 
unit subsidy required in each case is shown in equations [5] and [6]. 
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Q
global
Q
Q C
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s −=1
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Under plausible assumptions it is likely that sQ+1 > sQ implying that the rate of loss 
financing required for entering higher quality products is in general higher than that 
required for entering the production of lower quality products. The plausible 
assumption is that the productivity gap between the advanced country and the 
developing country is greater in the higher quality product than in the lower quality 
product. Both the gap in labour productivity and gaps in input productivities are likely 
to be greater in higher quality products because the latter typically require greater 
labour skills and more sophisticated management of inputs. A greater labour and input 
productivity gap between the two countries in quality Q+1 compared to quality Q can 
be represented as a set of inequalities: 
 
iallorsomeforand domestic
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Equations [1] and [2] show that costs of production in both countries are inversely 
proportional to productivities of labour and inputs in the respective countries. All i 
inputs may not be used in the production of both qualities of the product, but if some 
or all of the inequalities in [7] hold, it must be the case that  
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Q
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Q
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Q
global
Q
C
P
C
P
<
+
+
1
1  [8] 
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The inequality in [8] says that the cost of production in the developing country is 
greater (relative to the global price) for the higher quality product compared to the 
lower quality product. Using inequality [8] and comparing equations [5] and [6] it 
follows that a greater subsidy per unit will be required to achieve competitiveness in 
the higher quality product compared to the lower quality product. 
 
QQ ss >+1  [9] 
  
These results suggest two propositions. 
 
Proposition 1. The subsidy (loss-financing) required to enter production is in general 
higher the higher the quality of the product.  
 
Proposition 2. By moving down the quality ladder, it may be possible to find a product 
quality for which no subsidy is required, but this is not assured. 
 
A further proposition follows from the observations of technology trajectories in 
developing countries. Economics textbooks often show innovation and technical 
progress as the outward shift of the production function that a country faces. In 
reality, this is very misleading because improvements in technological capabilities are 
likely to be very localized to the learning and innovation that happens around specific 
technologies (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Stiglitz 1987). As a result, the learning-by-
doing that results in productivity growth is likely to benefit technologies that are 
directly involved in the learning-by-doing and very closely associated technologies, 
rather than raising productivity across all technologies in use in the country. Learning-
by-doing in the motor car industry is likely to raise productivity there but is unlikely 
to have any effect on the productivity in the garment industry, let alone in agriculture. 
Thus, rather than the smooth improvement of productivities across the board over 
time that is suggested by an outward shift of a ‘production function’, we are likely to 
see ‘bumpy’ improvements in productivity clustered around technologies that are 
actually being adopted and where learning-by-doing is successfully happening.  
 
Proposition 3. Potential productivity growth is likely to be localized around products 
and technologies involved in learning-by-doing, and productivity growth is likely to 
be higher in higher quality products that are likely to benefit from further innovation. 
 
We draw on these three propositions to construct Figure 1 which summarizes some of 
the fundamental issues facing catching up and technology acquisition in developing 
countries. The issues are presented in the figure in terms of ‘capability curves’ facing 
different developing countries across qualities of a particular product. However, the 
issues are of general applicability for understanding choices between sectors and 
technologies. The x-axis measures the quality of the product, and the y-axis the 
degree of competitiveness in producing that quality. Competitiveness in different 
qualities depends on the technological capabilities of firms in the country, and is 
measured by the ratio: domestic
Q
global
Q
C
P
. The higher this ratio, the more competitive the 
developing country, and when the ratio is equal to 1, it can competitively sell in 
global markets.  
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Figure 1 Loss Financing and Learning-by-doing  
 
When the competitiveness ratio is less than 1, the developing country will either not 
enter production or will require (temporary) loss-financing from some source to allow 
production to commence. The required rate of ‘subsidy’, sQ, equals domestic
Q
global
Q
C
P
−1  in eq. 
[5], and is shown in Figure 1 as the gap between the unit competitiveness line and 
current competitiveness defined by the current technological capability curve.  
 
From proposition 1 we know that competitiveness is likely to be lower for higher 
quality products so the curve of current capabilities is likely to be downward sloping. 
The greater productivity gap in higher qualities will force market-reliant developing 
countries to specialize in low quality products. This may have nothing to do with the 
relative price of labour and capital as in standard neoclassical theory. While we have 
developed this argument for products with the same characteristics but of different 
‘qualities’ the capability curve can also be used to understand a range of related 
problems. For instance, we could see different ‘qualities’ as components of the same 
product in a vertically organized value chain. Low qualities would in this case be low 
value-added parts of the value chain (like packing and assembling), medium qualities 
would be producing the intermediate products going into the assembly and the higher 
qualities would be the design, product development and marketing parts of the value 
chain. In exactly the same way, the global ‘price’ of the low value added activities 
would be lower, and they would very likely be activities which require less tacit and 
formal knowledge and are therefore open to greater competition and lower mark-ups. 
To enter production at any point of the value chain a developing country would have 
to achieve a ‘competitiveness ratio’ of at least 1, so that its cost of production was no 
higher than the globally competitive level set by the global leader. At an even more 
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general level, we could use the capability curve to think about choices across all 
products ranked by technological sophistication or ‘quality’.  
 
Consistent with proposition 2, it is easy to imagine a developing country like B in 
Figure 1 where current capabilities are so low that it cannot even produce the lowest 
quality of this product, and indeed may not find any globally traded products that it 
can competitively produce. Country B needs loss-financing of sBQ1 from the outset to 
even begin production of quality Q1 at point U. Higher capability countries (like A) 
may be able to competitively produce some lower quality products like Q1 at point V, 
without any loss-financing. But movements up the technology and quality ladder may 
again require loss-financing. If country A wants to begin production of quality Q2 at 
X, it will require temporary loss-financing of sAQ2. If the competitiveness measure 
became more than 1, the developing country could either earn a rent (a mark-up 
higher than mQ) by selling at the global price or it could bid down the global price in 
these qualities to below a price acceptable to the leader, thereby displacing the leader 
from these segments of the market and capturing much larger sales volumes. If the 
latter is the more profitable option, the developing country becomes one of the leaders 
for that quality and the global price is eventually defined by the cost of production 
and market power of the new leader.  
 
Finally, proposition 3 tells us that even if a competitive quality level exists, there is a 
further policy issue to be considered. If future technological progress is localized 
around higher qualities and technologies, catching up can require programmes of 
assistance to improve quality to the points where innovation is happening faster in 
more advanced countries. In Figure 1 the potential productivity growth at quality Q1 is 
relatively low because the technology is already mature and no further product and 
process innovations are likely at this quality level. The challenge for country B is to 
go from point U to point V. While country A can produce unaided at V, further 
productivity growth at this quality may be limited. Thus, even for country A, there 
may be a policy justification to assist learning-by-doing around quality Q2 by 
organizing temporary loss-financing of sAQ2. The challenge for A would be to go from 
point X to point Y to achieve competitiveness. This would not only allow the country 
to raise its domestic value-added and therefore living standards using existing 
technologies, it would also ensure faster productivity growth in the future if 
innovation and productivity growth was higher at quality levels like Q2 compared to 
mature and low technology quality levels like Q1.  
 
But if temporary loss-financing can assist a country to raise its productivity through 
learning-by-doing and thereby move up the quality ladder, how high should a country 
aim in terms of its entry quality for a product? Proposition 1 tells us that given 
existing capabilities, the higher the quality level that the country tries to achieve, the 
greater the financing cost measured by sQ. Moreover, the greater the gap with leading 
countries at that quality, the longer is the catching up likely to take to reach break-
even levels of competitiveness. As a result, trying to aim too high may involve 
excessively long periods of subsidy. Moreover, the competitiveness gap is only 
partially due to the absence of tacit knowledge. Some of the gap is also due levels of 
formal education and skills. If the initial gap is too big no amount of firm-level 
experience and learning-by-doing is likely to remove it entirely. As both the social 
time preference and the cost of finance in poor countries are likely to be high, there is 
a limit to how high up the quality ladder it is feasible to go. Moreover, the limited 
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evidence of private investments in learning-by-doing suggests that market failures 
must be significant in preventing these investments.  
 
The private calculation would be of the following type. The private investor compares 
an investment in loss-financing of sQ for the prospect of achieving a competitiveness 
of domestic
Q
global
Q
C
P
 >1 after n years. In principle a competitiveness ratio greater than one can 
be achieved through productivity growth towards the advanced country simply 
because the developing country wage level is significantly lower. As soon as these 
levels of productivity are achieved (by assumption after n years), the developing 
country can achieve a rent in the form of a higher mark-up of mQ' > mQ if it sells at the 
price set by the global leader. The firm also has an expectation that the rent mQ' – mQ 
will last for x years. Then the magnitudes of sQ, n, mQ' – mQ, x, and the discount rate 
or cost of finance of the entrepreneur will determine whether the investment in 
learning-by-doing is privately profitable. Both sQ and n are likely to be lower if the 
product quality aimed for is close to the capabilities that already exist in the firm. 
Given the vast pools of cheap underemployed labour in developing countries, 
including workers with formal education at different levels, and with an array of 
technologies freely available at low to medium quality levels, we would expect a wide 
range of sectors and product qualities where investments in learning-by-doing by 
private entrepreneurs should be profitable. But in fact we see very little private 
investment in learning-by-doing in developing countries.  
 
This suggests that the market failures that prevent private investors from contracting 
to achieve these investments may be important. In many developing countries it may 
appear that finance is not available for financing learning in the way we have 
described, but this may be because entrepreneurs do not believe that they can actually 
achieve the profits that are potentially available. Since the gains from successful 
catching up are potentially great, if these market failures could have been addressed, 
private financing alone may have allowed a significant increase in investments in 
learning. Thus, instead of attempting greater precision in determining the appropriate 
level of investment, it may be more appropriate to focus on the governance 
capabilities that may allow the country to address these market failures. In either case, 
a greater range of learning-by-doing could then be profitably financed.  
 
Market Failures and the Need for Policy  
The temporary loss-financing required to acquire vital skills and capabilities 
necessary for global competitiveness is no different from any other investment 
required to increase future profitability. If these investments are not forthcoming, 
there are likely to be specific contracting problems preventing the investments, which 
we define as ‘market failures’. There are a number of possible market failures 
identified in the literature. These include the institutional difficulty of ensuring high 
levels of effort when learning is being subsidized, several different types of 
appropriability problems limiting the future profits of investors in the presence of 
externalities and the costs of coordinating complementary investments across sectors. 
In principle, several different market failures may be operating simultaneously, 
constraining investment in learning and technology acquisition, but some may be 
more important than others. Moreover, the governance requirements of addressing 
different market failures may be markedly different. If an important market failure 
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cannot be addressed with existing governance capabilities, attempts to address parts of 
the problem are likely to result in unsatisfactory results. One reason why policies 
supporting learning and technology acquisition in the past often yielded poor results is 
that important sources of market failures were not properly understood. As a result, 
governance capabilities that were necessary to address them were not adequately 
developed.  
 
Our use of the term ‘market failure’ simply refers to a variety of reasons why 
voluntary private contracting can fail to exploit opportunities for increasing collective 
welfare. In using this terminology we do not presume that private contracting could 
have captured all these opportunities in a real market. For many market failures there 
is no feasible way in which private contracting could capture these potential gains, so 
some areas of necessary intervention remain even in societies where markets are very 
efficient. Nor do we use the general equilibrium benchmark as indicative of what 
markets could in theory achieve. If market failure is defined as a deviation from a 
welfare-maximizing general equilibrium, the usefulness of the concept can be 
justifiably questioned (Nelson 2008). Thinking of real economies as deviations from a 
general equilibrium can hinder rather than help the identification of policy because 
general equilibrium is not an achievable target and markets are systematically in 
disequilibrium (Scitovsky 1954; Kaldor 1972; Arndt 1988; Stiglitz 1996). Instead our 
definition of market failures simply refers to pragmatically identified potential 
improvements in net social benefits that are not being achieved because of various 
failures of contracting.  
 
If private investors are failing to invest in profitable opportunities, either they do not 
have good information or (more likely) enforcement agencies are weak and investors 
do not believe that their potential future profits will actually be realized. For instance, 
investments in learning require credible performance conditions agreed with the firm 
so that managers and workers put in high levels of effort. If the enforcement of these 
contracts is weak, discipline cannot be imposed on the firm and investors may lose 
their money simply because the firm could not be bothered. The existence of market 
failures can provide a justification for intervention (for instance in the form of public 
financing of learning) but parallel governance capabilities are required to ensure that 
these interventions add net value. Without appropriate governance arrangements the 
intervention could result in an even worse outcome associated with governance 
failure. For instance, public resources could be spent and the technology could fail to 
be adopted. Governance failures are defined as government actions or inactions that 
reduce (or fail to raise) net social benefits (Krueger 1974; Toye 1987; Krueger 1990).  
 
The likely source of the government failure will depend on what was causing the 
market failure in the first place. For instance, if the market failure was primarily 
caused by the difficulty of compelling effort on the part of workers and managers, the 
reduction of government failure would have to ensure that the effort is forthcoming if 
learning is financed by public funding. In contrast, if the market failure was caused by 
a failure of the private sector to coordinate investments across complementary sectors, 
public policy would require governance capabilities for effective coordination of 
investments. Identifying the most important sources of market failures is therefore a 
critical part of developing appropriate growth-enhancing capabilities to ensure that 
public policy is effective and the possibility of government failure is minimized.  
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Figure 2 Market Failures in Learning: Implications for Governance Capabilities  
 
Figure 2 outlines a number of critical market failures affecting learning and 
technology acquisition in developing countries. Most have been discussed extensively 
in the literature but the governance capabilities required to address each of them have 
not received sufficient attention. The market failures and governance requirements are 
discussed in full in Khan (2009). In particular, we argue that an important cause of 
inadequate investment in learning-by-doing comes from institutional failures to 
enforce effort and these can result in the failure of both public and private investments 
in new sectors. Without a strategy for enforcing effort, attempts to address other 
market failures are very likely to fail because missing tacit knowledge is a 
fundamental constraint that affects all modern activities in developing countries. One 
of the weaknesses of learning and technology policies in the past was that the full 
range of problems causing potential market failures were often not identified, so the 
most critical governance capabilities could not be identified.  
 
Institutional Problems of Ensuring Effort in Learning  
Effective learning clearly requires time, but it also requires significant effort if it is to 
be successful. Time and effort are inversely related: the lower the effort, the longer 
the learning takes. Since learning has to be financed, this has obvious implications for 
the investors financing learning, whether public or private. Thus, in Figure 1 firms in 
country B may not be able to begin production at point U without loss-financing, but 
the question from the perspective of the feasibility of the financing is how long the 
firm will take to go from U to V, or even whether V will ever be reached. Loss-
financing of sBQ1 allows country B to begin production at Q1 even while its 
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competitiveness curve is at its initial position. The viability of the loss-financing 
depends on the assumption that learning-by-doing will raise the competitiveness curve 
so that it will eventually pass through or be above V, implying that loss-financing will 
no longer be necessary. Similarly, country A could produce quality Q1 but if it wants 
to move up the value chain to produce a higher value adding quality Q2, it finds that it 
currently lacks the production capabilities to do so. Loss financing of sAQ2 will allow 
it to begin production at quality Q2 but viability now requires that the competitiveness 
curve should rise over time to intersect or pass above the point Y. The elevation of the 
competitiveness curve in turn depends on the degree of effort that is put into the 
learning process once the loss financing allows learning-by-doing to commence. 
 
The policy responses to all the other market failures discussed earlier assume that the 
problem of ensuring high levels of effort in the learning process has been solved. 
Otherwise individual firms will fail to raise their productivity and even if all the other 
market failures are addressed, the overall policy will fail because permanent 
subsidization of production is obviously unviable. Unfortunately, disciplining the loss 
financing process is one of the most difficult problems to solve. Without appropriate 
incentives and compulsions, a production team can keep on repeating procedures 
without any improvement in its productivity. The ‘learning’ process can in effect 
continue indefinitely, as all countries with infant industries that refused to grow up 
have discovered. Indeed, even if the learning process is happening but is happening 
too slowly, the financing project may fail because the opportunity costs are 
unacceptable. If the public or private principals who are thinking of investing suspect 
this in advance, they will not invest in the first place.  
 
The object of learning is to reach the breakeven point of competitiveness where loss-
financing is no longer required. If we define this length of time as the break-even 
time, Bt, we can see that this plausibly depends on a number of obvious variables. 
First, it must depend on the initial gap between the country and the global leader 
which we can measure by the initial competitiveness ratio. The gap between the actual 
competitiveness ratio and the competitiveness that is required to match the leader is 
measured by the loss-financing or subsidy sQ required to enter production at that level 
of quality. The greater the initial gap, the longer it will take to catch up and break 
even. The second variable determining the break-even time is most important for our 
analysis, and that is the level of effort the participants in the production process put in. 
Whatever the initial gap, a higher effort is likely to result in faster convergence 
towards the global standard. Effort can be measured by the intensity of application of 
workers and managers to continually improve productivity. This can be observed as 
the rate at which managers and workers experiment with and adapt production 
processes to achieve improvements in productivity. As experimentation and trials 
impose costs on individuals and can also create differentiation between the more and 
less able, particularly at the level of management and supervision, higher levels of 
effort are more difficult to achieve, everything else being the same.   
 
Finally, the breakeven period can also depend on country and firm specific factors. 
Country specific factors refer to general levels of education, exposure to technology, 
prior history of production, infrastructural quality and so on. If a country is 
significantly behind the technological capability required to produce a product of a 
particular quality, it may fail to approach required levels of competitiveness within 
any feasible time period. Firm level factors refer to idiosyncratic differences in the 
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quality of entrepreneurship, the quality of technicians and managers inherited by a 
firm and so on. These variables are summarized in eq. [10]: 
 
( )FCesfB Qt ,,,=  [10] 
  
The break-even period Bt is likely to be longer the higher the initial gap in 
competitiveness measured by sQ, the lower the level of effort, e, and also on C and F, 
which describe country-specific and firm-specific factors respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3 Effort Levels and the Viability of the Learning Process  
 
Figure 3 focuses on the key role of differences in the level of effort keeping all other 
determinants constant, and focusing on catching up in the production of a specific 
product of quality Q. The figure tracks the achievement of competitiveness over time. 
Compared to Figure 1, the critical question we are now asking is the following: if 
country A began at point X, how long will it take to reach Y, or will it reach Y at all? 
The idea is that with any given level of loss-financing, the pace of achieving 
improvements in labour and input productivity, and therefore in achieving 
international competitiveness, depends on the level of effort put into learning. To 
simplify, we distinguish between two levels of effort, defined as high and low. 
 
At time t=1 country A’s competitiveness is too low for it to enter production at quality 
Q without loss-financing from some source. The initial loss finance is shown as sQ in 
Figure 3, which allows the country to begin production and initiate the learning-by-
doing process. If effort levels are high, the breakeven period Bt = n periods. At that 
point, loss financing can be abandoned and indeed the country may even be in a 
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position to earn rents in subsequent periods. Note that the firm will just have 
substituted market profits earned with effort for a subsidy that came for free. It is this 
incentive incompatibility that requires some form of external enforcement or 
disciplining for financing to work in these contexts. In contrast, if effort levels are 
low, international competitiveness may not be achieved even if there are some initial 
improvements in productivity. In the low effort scenario shown in Figure 3 Bt = ∞, 
which means convergence does not happen. After k periods a steady-state subsidy of 
sQL emerges which is indefinitely required for production to continue. Note that 
productivity growth is also happening in the leader country, so a constant sQL may 
emerge even with some domestic productivity growth. This is equivalent to the case 
of infant industries that failed to grow up. Eventually, loss-financed learning in these 
circumstances is very likely to be abandoned because the social cost grows over time. 
 
Clearly, financiers of learning would like the highest level of effort to be forthcoming 
so that not only is there convergence but also convergence in the shortest possible 
time. In contrast, workers and managers engaged in learning may have mixed 
motives. They may understand that jobs and perhaps income growth may eventually 
depend on productivity growth. But since learning is costly in terms of effort and may 
result in adverse outcomes for individuals who fail, workers and managers have an 
individual interest to free ride on the effort of others, which can lead them to distort 
true information about their own levels of effort. They may often also articulate a 
collective interest to pursue a less traumatic learning path without recognizing its 
long-run non-viability. These individual or collective strategies can extend the period 
of loss-financing much beyond what is acceptable to public or private financiers. In 
extreme cases, such as the low effort trajectory shown in Figure 3, the result may be 
that financiers are stuck in a situation of permanent loss-making and the project has to 
be eventually abandoned with significant losses. Alternatively, financiers may suspect 
that this will be the case and the investment will not be forthcoming in the first place. 
 
Since in the long run it is plausible to argue that high levels of effort would have 
potentially benefited all participants and society, there is a market failure here that can 
be described as a failure of credible ‘contracting’ between investors and the firm 
engaged in learning. The problem is therefore not one of an inadequate rule of law 
and the insufficient enforcement of formal contracts in courts, but broader political 
economy issues of achieving sufficiently high levels of compulsion for different sets 
of agents who are required to put in high levels of effort. The underlying institutional 
failure here is very similar to principal-agent problems that can in general result in 
breakdowns in team effort and in credit markets result in inadequate investment 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
However, the specific problems here refer to a much wider range of issues than the 
asymmetric information literature on monitoring or credit market failures normally 
addresses. In particular, we want to highlight the issues of enforcing discipline on the 
recipients of support in the context of particular political settlements. The broad 
‘variables’ that are likely to affect the level of effort are listed in eq. [11]:  
 
),,,( PSFSGAFIfe =  [11] 
  
Effort e is defined as the intensity with which learning is carried out, measured by the 
pace of experimentation and trials within the production process. The higher the level 
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of effort, the faster the movement up the competitiveness ladder, as Figure 3 shows. 
FI is the specific financing instrument through which the learning is to be financed. 
The financing instrument is a micro-level institution because it defines the rules for a 
particular type of financing. These ‘rules’ define who contributes what, the 
expectations of the different parties, and measures to be taken if expectations are not 
met. Different financing instruments have design features that aim to compel high 
levels of effort while sharing risks and returns in ways that all parties find acceptable. 
The other three variables define the context in which there particular institution is 
located and are components of the macro political settlement.  
 
GA describes the characteristics of the governance agencies charged with monitoring 
and enforcing the contracts underpinning the financing instrument. Governance 
agencies are a subset of the bureaucratic organizations that define the bureaucratic 
subsystem of a political settlement2
 
. The enforcement of the rules implicit in each 
instrument can vary widely depending on the formal and informal enforcement 
capabilities of the agencies responsible for enforcement.  
FS is the firm structure within which learning is being organized, referring to relevant 
characteristics of the firm(s) including size, age and internal organization, and the 
type of market in which it operates. The firms that are involved in the catching up 
process are a subset of the economic organizations that define the economic 
subsystem of a political settlement.  
 
PS describes relevant characteristics of the political structure, in particular the 
distribution of power across political organizations in the political subsystem of the 
political settlement. The function f allows interactions between these variables so that 
the effect of any variable can depend on the ‘value’ of the other variables in a non-
linear way.  
 
The macro political settlement is an operational equilibrium of institutions and 
organizations that describes the effective relative power of different types of 
organizations. The efficacy of a particular financing instrument has to be assessed in 
this specific context. The likely interdependence between the last three variables 
(describing aspects of the macro political settlement) and a particular financing 
instrument is shown in Figure 4. From a policy perspective, it is also important to 
distinguish between variables that are difficult to change and which can therefore only 
be the targets of policy in the long term, and variables that are easier to change. The 
variables that are most difficult to change are best treated as ‘exogenous’ and policy is 
likely to have to accept them as ‘given’ in the medium term. In Figure 4, the political 
structure, PS, appears at the top as it is likely to be the ‘variable’ that is most difficult 
to change. However, even the political structure can of course change as a result of 
‘political’ policy, for instance through the organization of new political coalitions or 
movements. Indeed, if the political structure is very unfavourable for overcoming 
growth constraints, the only meaningful policy may be a process of political 
reorganization. Of course, this is only a task that political organizations with 
legitimate leaderships can hope to achieve.  
 
                                                 
2 See the companion piece entitled The Political Settlement and its Evolution in Bangladesh  
20 
 
 
Figure 4 The Interdependence of Variables Determining Effort 
 
Next in terms of difficulty of changing is the firm structure variable, FS. This can be 
affected by policy (by selecting particular groups of firms or sectors for support) but it 
may be difficult to change this rapidly. Therefore, the variables that are usually the 
most direct targets for policy are the financing instruments, FI, and the associated 
governance agencies, GA. However, both may be difficult to change if the existing 
structure of instruments and governance agencies (bureaucratic organizations) are in 
an operational equilibrium that satisfies powerful economic and political 
organizations. Nevertheless, in most cases, it is likely to be relatively easier to affect 
these variables than the others. However, the most important point from our 
perspective is that the most appropriate financing instruments and associated 
governance agencies cannot be identified without at least identifying the constraints 
set by the other variables even if those variables cannot be easily changed. In some 
cases these other variables may be so unfavourable that any policy for promoting 
growth may have no option but to address either or both of the higher level variables 
as a medium or long-term goal. But in any case, the policy variables are unlikely to be 
‘separable’, meaning that it is unlikely that ‘good financing instruments’ or ‘effective 
governance agencies’ can be identified independently of a macro political settlement 
in which they are to be located. 
 
The most important interdependencies between these variables are shown in Figure 4. 
The political structure describing the configuration of political organizations describes 
the operational equilibrium in the political system. This has important implications for 
the other variables. The cohesiveness or fragmentation of political organizations 
determines the ease with which economic organizations can protect their interests 
even if these damage the collective benefit. The time horizon and enforcement 
capabilities of political organizations are directly relevant because if powerful 
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political organizations feel that the distribution of benefits from particular institutions 
is unacceptable, formal or informal modifications are likely to follow. And finally, the 
competition between political organizations can affect the coordination and 
enforcement capabilities of bureaucratic organizations. The effect of the formal 
financing instrument can therefore depend not only on its formal details but also on 
how its enforcement is modified. Economic organizations that are affected may have 
both the incentive and the holding power to modify the implementation of these 
institutions, indirectly with the assistance of some political organizations. Governance 
agencies may also have a limited ability to enforce important aspects of the 
instrument because of its own weak capabilities, and also because these organizations 
work under and with political organizations that may have other goals.  
 
The problem of sustaining effort is therefore an iterative search across these variables 
to find the combination that is both feasible for a country and likely to achieve 
moderate to high levels of effort, even if in a restricted subset of firms and sectors. 
We will see later that some of these interdependencies can explain why particular 
types of learning processes worked in particular contexts or were less dramatic in 
others.  
 
Financing Instruments 
Learning can be financed through a variety of financing instruments. Financing 
instruments are institutional rules and the question is whether the efficacy of a 
particular financing institution can be assessed independent of the context defined by 
the other variables in eq. [11]. Each instrument implicitly defines rules of contribution 
and reward and therefore the incentives and responsibilities of the different 
participants in the learning process. Effort is likely to be maximized if the individuals 
putting in the effort gain significantly from their effort or suffer potential losses if 
they fail to put in effort. But effort will only be financed if the financiers also get a 
return. In team production where large numbers of people have to cooperate, 
sustaining high levels of effort is a challenge. Supervision and coordination at 
different levels become important because individuals can attempt to conceal their 
true levels of effort. Sustaining effort may now require supervision and incentives for 
those supervising the effort for instance by making them ‘residual claimants’ (Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972). But even this may not be sufficient unless the residual claimants 
also have the effective authority to impose discipline on team members. The residual 
claimant model describes in a partial way the basic ‘capitalist’ firm and its underlying 
property rights. It is partial because it underplays the significance of the political 
power that gives owners the effective authority to carry out disciplining functions.  
 
In early developers, compulsions for high levels of effort and labour discipline were 
based on a configuration of property rights described as ‘capitalist’. Capitalist rights 
define a class of asset owners (residual claimants) and a class of property-less workers 
who are compelled to accept workplace discipline. This configuration of property 
rights was sufficient to ensure productivity growth in early developers who could 
grow through incremental innovations in products and processes. As technology 
leaders, the early capitalist developers had to innovate, but they did not have to 
achieve significant jumps in their productivity through learning to become globally 
competitive. 
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The learning requirements of contemporary (late) development are different. Firms do 
not have to innovate to the same extent, but are faced with a massive gap between 
their initial technological capabilities and the minimum required to produce anything 
in global competition. An important consequence of the catching up problem is that 
‘capitalist’ property rights are no longer sufficient for ensuring effort. Contemporary 
late developers need to organize and finance learning-by-doing to learn to use 
technologies far in advance of their existing capabilities. This now requires loss 
financing for entry into new sectors and technologies, and often requires financing by 
outside investors including the state. More complex financing instruments and 
complementary governance structures need to emerge at a much earlier stage of 
development. It also follows that more complex systems of incentives and 
compulsions to ensure effort are also required at a much earlier stage. 
 
In theory, learning could still be financed by owner-entrepreneurs investing in their 
own firm. For instance, an owner-entrepreneur can accept a longer period of losses to 
set up in a higher quality sector. This is no different from any other investment, where 
the entrepreneur accepts temporarily low profits to achieve higher profits later. The 
only difference is that here the investment is in the acquisition of tacit knowledge. As 
the owner is the residual claimant, there are strong incentives to monitor effort to 
reduce the period of loss-making. This case is closest to the simple capitalist firm with 
its strong incentives and compulsions for sustaining effort. Whether high levels of 
effort can be sustained in this case is likely to depend on exogenous political factors 
that determine the extent to which owners can enforce discipline on their workforce, 
and social and political factors determining collective discipline, cooperation and trust 
(Leibenstein 1982).  
 
But owner-financed learning is likely to be relatively rare given the long periods of 
learning required and the uncertainty of ensuring effort in new products. The typical 
developing country entrepreneur lacks technological capabilities and the learning 
process therefore involves learning-by-doing by the entrepreneur. There is therefore a 
high degree of uncertainty in the success of the enterprise and in most cases the risk-
return profile is too adverse to attract the sole investor. There is also likely to be a 
significant gap between the resource base of the typical entrepreneur in a developing 
country and the investments required to acquire machinery and finance periods of 
loss-making of uncertain length. The risks and the financing may both be beyond the 
capacities of most individuals attempting to become entrepreneurs in a developing 
country. Therefore successful development is likely to be associated with more 
complex ‘financing instruments’ where the entrepreneur does not directly provide the 
entire finance but raises it in different ways.  
 
If the entrepreneur borrows from a bank with debt backed by collateral, the incentives 
could be quite similar to the first case. If the bank has the power to sell collateral in 
case of non-performance, the entrepreneur bears all the risk of learning. For large 
investments or new technologies, where there is a chance of failure despite the best 
effort of the entrepreneur, investment on these terms is unlikely. But banks in many 
developing countries are unlikely to have effective powers to realize collateral and the 
weak compulsions on the entrepreneur can result in low effort and potential losses for 
banks. If banks know this, they in turn may be unlikely to lend for new technologies 
or to new entrepreneurs. If the financing comes from equity investors or other 
investors outside the firm, standard principal-agent problems emerge. Will the 
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manager put in sufficient effort; will workers accept the discipline that managers try 
to impose on them under these circumstances?  
 
More complex issues arise when financing comes from the state. This can take 
various instrumental forms, ranging from tax breaks, low interest credit, subsidized 
inputs, subsidized utilities or infrastructure, export subsidies, or the protection of 
domestic markets. In theory, it should be possible to devise financing instruments that 
allow periods of learning to be financed with strong compulsions for rapid 
productivity growth. For instance, the instrument could be designed to progressively 
increase exposure to competitive international prices by announcing ex ante the rate at 
which the level of export subsidy or the level of protection of domestic markets will 
be reduced.  
 
Governance Agencies 
Financing instruments as institutions can be enforced with different degrees of 
success and may also be informally modified in different ways in the typical 
clientelist political settlement. A financing instrument may appear to make sense seen 
as a formal contract because it may allocate incentives and compulsions, rewards and 
penalties in an appropriate way. But the financing instrument can only be effective if 
there are bureaucratic organizations that can serve as governance agencies in terms of 
enforcing this contract. The capabilities of the bureaucratic organizations and their 
location within a specific political settlement that may constrain or enable the 
enforcement of particular institutions can therefore play an important role in 
explaining the performance of particular institutions3
 
. The bureaucratic organization 
that is relevant depends on the financing instrument. For instance, if the financing for 
learning is provided through export subsidies, the compulsion on effort depends on an 
institutional rule that export subsidies will be reduced over time. This is only likely to 
be credible if the agency responsible for managing subsidies can do so without 
pressure from firms and their allied political organizations who may want to change 
this policy in the future. This could be the finance ministry or the industries ministry. 
If the loss-financing is based on credit from industrial banks, the relevant 
organizations operating as governance agencies are the banks and other agencies like 
courts and arbitration bodies that they rely on for enforcement. Do they collectively 
have the capabilities to monitor loans effectively; do they have the power to withdraw 
loans if firms are failing? If the loss-financing is organized through subsidies, the 
relevant bureaucratic organizations are those responsible for administering the 
subsidies. Do they have capabilities for monitoring performance and withdrawing the 
subsidies if necessary?  
If financing is internal to the firm, the enforcement of productivity growth is a 
struggle largely internal to the firm. Loss-financing could take the form of owners 
accepting a lower mark-up before the project becomes profitable. The enforcement of 
effort in this case is indistinguishable from ‘normal’ conflicts over discipline within a 
capitalist firm. The governance organizations relevant here would be formal and 
informal external bureaucratic organizations regulating and enforcing labour 
contracts, or contracts between owners and firm managers as third party enforcers. In 
the ‘good governance’ literature, contract enforcement and the rule of law are 
considered to be necessary and sufficient capabilities for achieving growth 
                                                 
3 The Political Settlement and its Evolution in Bangladesh (2011) is a companion paper to this one. 
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(Acemoglu, et al. 2004; Khan 2007). The assumption is that with sufficiently robust 
contract enforcement firms looking for financing for their internal learning will be 
able to raise it in the market. In theory this is a plausible claim, in practice there are no 
examples of developing countries that are able to improve generalized contract 
enforcement to the extent that specific solutions for solving market failures in critical 
areas like learning are no longer required. 
 
Firm Structure 
The firm structure describes the distribution of economic organizations in the 
economic subsystem. The degree to which effort can be enforced is likely to depend 
on the internal organization of firms, and on the structure of economic organizations 
in the market. We have already seen that effort is more likely to be forthcoming in 
firms where owners are investors and they control the firm. This case comes closest to 
the classical model of a capitalist firm driving productivity growth. (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Wood 2002). The ideal type of capitalist firm has a number of 
characteristics that ensure that it can mobilize high levels of effort. First, it has strong 
internal hierarchies and a workforce disciplined by a competitive labour market 
(possibly with a reserve army of unemployed labour creating a credible threat of 
replacement in case of low effort). Secondly, the theoretical capitalist firm has 
significant retained profits giving it the financial strength to invest in itself and the 
incentive to protect its own capital. Thirdly, the theoretical capitalist firm already has 
the capability to use its technology and is not facing an indeterminate learning period. 
Finally, the ideal capitalist firm analysed in textbooks is not individually politically 
connected or powerful, though the class of capitalist firms may collectively have 
significant holding power. This means that the ideal-type capitalist firm does not have 
the capacity to override contracts with external investors or the state using political 
connections and power but does have the power to ensure that property rights and the 
rule of law are in general well enforced. The real capitalist firm may significantly 
differ in some or all of these respects, but the differences are particularly important in 
developing countries, with significant implications for the effort expected in a context 
where outside investors invest in learning.  
 
Internal hierarchies are unlikely to be strong in many firms in developing countries. 
Firms with strong internal hierarchies are likely to be older more established firms 
where employees, particularly at managerial levels, have large sunk investments in 
firm-specific career structures. These employees stand to lose their investments and 
their career prospects if the firm collapses, and are likely to put in effort in learning 
and experimenting with new technologies when new investments take place. Newer 
firms that are skill intensive and where the production team has high human capital 
are also likely to be good at organizing high levels of effort, particularly if the team 
leaders also own the firm. Firms engaged in software development in developing 
countries are an example. In contrast, start-up firms using conventional technologies 
in developing countries are likely to face significant problems with their internal 
organization of effort, slowing down their learning process. Secondly, internal finance 
is likely to be significant only in well-established and larger firms. The owners are 
likely to have a greater incentive in ensuring effort if they have committed more of 
their own money in internal financing. On the other hand, most firms in developing 
countries are likely to require significant outside finance, diluting the incentives 
owners have to put in high levels of effort in the absence of effective governance by 
external agencies.  
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Thirdly, by definition, most firms in developing countries do not have high enough 
levels of technological and entrepreneurial capabilities to be competitive in the 
qualities that they want to produce. This is a general problem, not related to the 
problem of firms trying to produce products that are too sophisticated for them. There 
is a gap between existing capabilities of economic organizations and the level 
required to achieve competitiveness for almost all quality levels, though this gap is 
higher for more sophisticated products and qualities. Most start-up firms also have to 
spend a considerable amount of time to learn how to learn before they actually start 
learning (Stiglitz 1987). Finally, real world firms are likely to have strong political 
connections and indeed many firms may be set up by entrepreneurs closely connected 
to politics, particularly in developing countries. Alternatively, entrepreneurs are likely 
to patronize politicians, providing the owners with significant political power to resist 
or influence the enforcement activities of external agencies. Older, larger and well-
established firms are more likely to be well-connected to different political 
organizations and it may be difficult to discipline them in a context where external 
loss-financing is coming from instruments controlled by the state.  
 
These considerations mean that external financiers of learning have to look at a 
complex range of issues in determining which types of firms, products and financing 
instruments are more likely to result in competitiveness through effective learning-by-
doing. Large economic organizations may have greater technological capabilities, 
better internal discipline and are perhaps able to commit more of their own finances. 
But they may also have oligopolistic political power based on close connections with 
particular political organizations that makes it difficult to impose credible threats on 
them to enforce effort. Given the interdependence of political and technological 
factors determining effort and efficiency, it is not surprising that the characteristics of 
the efficient firm varies significantly across countries (Whitley 1992).  
 
For instance, both Pakistan and South Korea in the 1960s assisted large domestic 
conglomerates to acquire and learn new technologies and move into export markets, 
using similar financing instruments like subsidized credits, import protection and 
export subsidies. However, effective compulsions for high levels of effort for firms of 
this type could not be achieved in Pakistan but were achieved in South Korea. To a 
significant extent this was because large conglomerates in Pakistan acquired the 
political capacity to protect their rents from threats of withdrawal in a way that South 
Korean chaebols could not. In Taiwan, a large firm strategy may also have failed 
because such firms would be owned by local Taiwanese entrepreneurs. The immigrant 
political leadership of the KMT in the 1950s and 1960s may not have had the political 
authority to stand up to powerful locally owned conglomerates so early in the 
development process. Fortunately for Taiwan, government strategies of technology 
acquisition initially focused on supporting smaller firms in high technology sectors, 
either by accident or design. As a result, the Taiwanese state’s ability to enforce 
discipline was not politically constrained as it may have otherwise been. The 
interesting counterfactual is whether countries like Pakistan and India may have fared 
better if they had designed support schemes for smaller firms who may have found it 
much more difficult to find allies within political organizations willing to protect them 
for a price in the manner of the ‘twenty-two families’ of Pakistan or the big business 
houses of India (Wade 1988; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Whitley 1992; Khan 1999; 
Khan and Blankenburg 2009).  
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Of course, in many product and quality lines, scale economies may rule out a strategy 
based on promoting a large number of relatively small economic organizations. When 
it is unavoidable for technology acquisition strategies to work with economic 
organizations with market and political power, the learning strategies have to be 
designed appropriately. Bureaucratic organizations entrusted with enforcement have 
to be sufficiently strong in terms of their bureaucratic capabilities and even more so in 
terms of the political support they have for preventing the big players from resisting 
discipline. In some developing countries the answer may be to delegate the 
governance of the financing to independent external agencies like industrial banks. If 
the management of the industrial bank is capable and committed to competitiveness, 
and not accessible to political factions, the credibility of withdrawal may be high 
enough to enable learning to be financed in sectors with scale economies.  
 
The Political Structure  
The political structure describes the operational equilibrium in the political subsystem 
based on the distribution of power between political organizations and the political 
institutions regulating their interaction and competition (Khan 1995, 2010)4
 
. The 
political structure affects all other subsystems but is also the most difficult to change 
in terms of policy interventions. Differences in underlying political structures can 
explain why apparently similar governance agencies, firm structures and financing 
instruments have resulted in very different outcomes across countries. For instance, 
South Korea and Pakistan in the 1960s both used fairly similar strategies of providing 
long-term bank credit to large conglomerates involved in capability development in 
export-oriented sectors. The organization of the bureaucracy regulating these 
interventions was also similar, with coordination and monitoring organized by 
planning agencies operating under the President.  
However, the outcomes were significantly different because the distribution of 
organizational power in their political systems had significant implications for the 
enforcement of the conditions required for generating high levels of effort (Khan 
1999). Since the design of the financing instruments was similar in these two cases, 
the major difference was in their monitoring and enforcement. An attempt to enforce 
these financing instruments in Pakistan to the extent that they could be in South Korea 
threatened to result in a steep decline in stability and in unacceptable political costs 
given the protection provided to economic organizations by organizations within the 
political structure. The operational equilibrium in Pakistan therefore required a 
significant modification in the operation of important financing instruments. The 
result was that the incentives and compulsions to put in high levels of effort were 
seriously attenuated. The effects on effort in turn resulted in a slow growth in 
competitiveness and ultimately the abandonment of the strategy.  
 
Equally, differences in political structures across countries can help to explain why 
effective financing instruments and governance agencies responsible for their 
enforcement have differed significantly across similarly successful catching-up 
countries. South Korea, Taiwan, China and Malaysia demonstrate significant 
differences in their catching up strategies in terms of how they financed learning, the 
                                                 
4 See also the companion piece entitled The Political Settlement and its Evolution in Bangladesh 
(2011). 
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agencies enforcing and managing the financing strategies, and the types of firms and 
sectors supported. Success required that the ensemble of variables determining effort 
in eq. [11] were consistent in terms of the configuration of political power so that the 
mechanisms for imposing compulsions required for high effort were credible and 
enforceable (Khan 2000b, 2008b; Khan and Blankenburg 2009).  
 
Interdependencies Affecting Policies for Learning 
Effective learning strategies require as a precondition an ensemble of conditions to 
ensure high levels of effort. This is not always easy to achieve, and the failure to 
address these problems have been responsible for the abandonment of many learning 
and technology acquisition strategies across developing countries. An important 
reason why effective policies have been difficult to devise is because the variables in 
eq. [11] determining levels of effort are interdependent and so their effects are likely 
to be non-linear. This means that the best instrument for financing, for instance, may 
depend on the type of political settlement that a country has inherited. As a result, 
there is no single set of financing and governance arrangements that characterize all 
successful catching up countries. It also follows that it is not possible to simply 
imitate the policy or governance structures of more successful developers.  
 
Given these interdependence, there are likely to be non-linearities in the relationships 
between these variables and effort. A financing arrangement that would result in an 
acceleration of learning in a particular political settlement and applied to a particular 
structure of firms may have a different effect in another political settlement or applied 
to a different structure of firms. For instance, historical evidence shows that financing 
learning-by-doing through conditional export subsidies to large firms may work very 
well if the political relationship between firms and governments allows subsidy 
withdrawal to be credible. But export subsidies to large firms may be a poor way of 
delivering financing if large firms have powerful political friends who can protect 
them from state attempts at subsidy withdrawal.  
 
This means that the effects of institutions and governance arrangements on the pace of 
learning in particular countries can only be identified by looking at possible 
interactions between (at least) the variables identified in Figure 4. Historical case 
studies support this argument by demonstrating that the efficacy of particular 
instruments and governance arrangements have varied across countries according to 
their underlying political settlements (Khan 1999, 2000b; Khan and Blankenburg 
2009). While almost every developing country attempted some form of state-led 
catching up, their relative success depended very critically on combinations of 
variables that determined the level of effort in the catching-up exercise. 
 
3. The Garments Takeoff  
When Bangladesh became independent in 1971, there was hardly any Bengali owned 
industry, and the little that had developed was destroyed by the sweeping 
nationalizations of the ‘socialist’ regime5
Sobhan and Ahmad 1980: Table 10.1
. By 1974-5, the dominant economic 
organizations were public sector corporations that included almost the entire 
manufacturing and industrial base. Ninety two per cent of industrial assets were 
nationalized by 1975 ( ; Murshid and Sobhan 
                                                 
5 See the discussion of this period in our companion paper on political settlements in Bangladesh. 
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1987: 3-4). The public sector corporations were largely inefficient and served as 
venues for job creation for the clients of the regime and enabled political 
accumulation based on price fixing, the political allocation of contracts and even 
outright theft. Bengali economic organizations in the private sector were for a while 
excluded from large-scale industry, and concentrated on trading and acquiring 
government contracts for infrastructure construction. These activities were lucrative 
because political connections resulted in very attractive terms and the quality of the 
output was not closely monitored. The result was a significant and rapid accumulation 
of money in new hands.  
 
Processes of accumulation based on the direct and indirect exercise of power can be 
described as ‘primitive accumulation’. The independence of Bangladesh created 
opportunities for primitive accumulation on an unprecedented scale. It created a new 
moneyed class that was different from the older but tiny Bengali industrial 
bourgeoisie that had developed during the Pakistan period. The beneficiaries of this 
primitive accumulation were political entrepreneurs closely connected with the public 
sector and the new private sector entrepreneurs based on trade and public contracts 
who had close political links with the dominant party. By the late-1970s Bangladesh 
had hundreds if not thousands of politically-connected entrepreneurs who had 
accumulated relatively significant blocks of capital and who had become as a result 
potential investors who could eventually hope to be small to medium capitalists. 
These individuals began to look around for simple technologies to invest in, if only to 
preserve their capital. It was at this stage that a lucky accident involving 
internationally created rents had a significant impact on Bangladesh’s prospects. 
 
The growth of the ready-made garments industry in Bangladesh has often been 
presented as a vindication of the success of free market policies combined with the 
virtual absence of labour market protections in Bangladesh. The overthrow of the 
Awami League in 1975 allowed a reversal of the policies of socialism. In the years 
that followed, both liberalization and privatization gradually followed.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
But in fact investment even in the simplest of technologies involves significant risks 
for domestic investors when these technologies are new to the economy. The 
machines may be relatively simple and the formal skills of the potential workers may 
appear to be more than appropriate. But setting up a factory that can achieve 
international quality standards, meet orders on time and manage internal timekeeping 
and waste management to achieve global competitiveness is a different order of 
requirements altogether. The time it will take an investor to achieve global 
competitiveness is not known since this depends on the time their production teams 
take to acquire the tacit knowledge required to operate their factories competitively 
within very specialized globalized production networks. Nor is it viable for foreign 
firms to invest and finance learning-by-doing in low-margin, low technology 
substitutes simply on the promise of future profits. The future profits are unlikely to 
be high enough in most cases to compensate for the risks. This is of course why 
global production does not rapidly shift to the poorest countries. But a combination of 
factors made this transfer of technology feasible for Bangladesh in the early 1980s.  
 
The takeoff of the garments industry is important because it demonstrates that 
liberalized product and labour markets are not sufficient for achieving a globally 
competitive industry. The takeoff also required a set of ‘financing instruments’ that 
were governed by different types of agencies, and located in a specific political 
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context, which collectively ensured that the financing both allowed learning-by-doing 
to begin and also ensured that high levels of effort would be put in. Indeed, an 
important financing instrument that enabled this learning-by-doing to happen in 
Bangladesh was based on a violation of free market principles. This component was 
related to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) that the USA negotiated to help its 
own garments and textiles industry in 1973, administered by the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). MFA set bilaterally negotiated quotas on established 
developing countries exporting textiles and clothing to protect the US garment and 
textile industry. As a concession to global opinion, the MFA did not put quotas on a 
number of least developed countries like Bangladesh which did not have any garment 
industry at the time and were therefore no threat to the US (Goto 1989). For 
Bangladesh, it was fortuitous that just at that time a potential investor class was 
emerging. These investors did not have the requisite tacit knowledge to be globally 
competitive in garments production despite the low wages in Bangladesh. The MFA 
created ‘quota rents’ for countries like Bangladesh and thereby helped to finance a 
period of learning-by-doing. Once established garments exporters like South Korea 
hit their quotas, newcomers could sell their products at a slightly higher price, thereby 
enjoying a ‘quota rent’. The quota rent served as a partial financing instrument that 
temporarily reduced the cost of financing learning in the Bangladesh garments 
industry. And finally, the clientelistic authoritarianism characterizing the ruling 
coalition of the time enabled a good enough growth-stability trade-off for the 
introduction of a few critical domestic institutional innovations required for the 
takeoff of the garments industry.  
 
The MFA created a serious problem for established producers of garments in 
countries like South Korea who suddenly found themselves quantity-constrained. 
They had a strong incentive to relocate production to countries that did not have 
quotas so that at least their textile output could be marketed. But developing countries 
that did not already have a textile and clothing sector were relatively poor countries 
that lacked the tacit knowledge to set up competitive production even though their 
wages were much lower. Moreover, they suffered from market failures that affected 
the financing of acquisition and learning. To attract investors from more advanced 
countries who wanted to relocate, developing countries had to offer something more 
than just their quota-free status. After all, many poor countries were quota-free but 
only a handful benefited from MFA. Bangladesh was one of them and its success has 
to be explained in terms of specific mechanisms through which these market failures 
were addressed.  
 
By the late 1970s, primitive accumulation had created numerous potential investors 
for a sector like garments where the minimum efficient scale of investment was at 
most in the hundreds of thousands or low millions of dollars. Technology transfer 
came about in Bangladesh through collaboration between a retired Bangladeshi civil 
servant turned entrepreneur, Nurul Quader Khan, and a South Korean multinational, 
Daewoo. The Bangladeshi entrepreneur set up Desh Garments in 1979, acquiring the 
land and machinery with its own capital and arranging government support for the 
requisite institutional changes required to support a potentially risky investment in a 
new area. The South Korean multinational advanced the cost of training a critical 
number of supervisors and managers, but this advance was effectively a loan that was 
to be repaid in the form of a claim of a percentage share of future exports. Daewoo’s 
up-front investment was to host the visiting Bangladeshis at their plant in Busan and 
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train them in modern garment manufacturing processes. Effectively, what was being 
transferred here was the tacit knowledge of setting up the plant, managing quality 
control, minimizing wastage of raw materials, managing time-keeping and all the 
other aspects of factory production that determine the difference between profit and 
loss in a competitive world where every quality of garments has an international price 
that is predetermined.  
 
The role of the quota rent was to reduce the competitiveness gap that a new entrant 
like Bangladesh would have to immediately overcome. But the quota rent was clearly 
not sufficient for Desh to simply set up its factory and start production. Further 
investments in learning-by-doing were necessary and these were organized by the 
private contract between Desh and Daewoo. However, the quota rent reduced the 
mountain that Desh had to climb and made it more credible that the Bangladeshi 
company would be able to learn enough to be able to begin paying back Daewoo’s 
up-front investment relatively rapidly. Moreover, the fact that a retired civil servant 
from Bangladesh could sit across the table from a global multinational and offer 
credible equity to set up a collaborative venture can only be understood if we 
remember the primitive accumulation that the country had just gone through. 
Daewoo’s calculations were straightforward. Bangladesh’s access to the US market 
through MFA was an attractive business proposition which would enable them to 
market their textile output. But they would probably not have been willing to take the 
risk of participating in a Bangladeshi collaboration without a number of factors that 
reduced the risk of failure.  
 
The equity invested by the Bangladeshi firm came from internal financing by the 
investor and provided commitment that the top management at least would put in high 
levels of effort in raising competitiveness rapidly. This reduced the institutional 
requirement of enforcing contracts between outside investors and stakeholders within 
the firm who would be expected to put in high levels of effort in learning. No less 
important was the explicit support provided by President Ziaur Rahman to the project. 
President Zia’s support had credibility because it was his initiative to link up Nurul 
Quader with Kim Woo-Choong, the chairman of Daewoo. His support assured the 
South Koreans that unexpected institutional problems would be dealt with or at least 
addressed. This political support ensured that relatively small but critical institutional 
innovations like the back-to-back LC (which allowed Bangladeshi producers to 
borrow from local banks to finance their imports of raw materials using their export 
orders as collateral) and the bonded warehouse (which allowed complex customs 
duties on imported inputs to be avoided) were quickly introduced. The president had 
sufficient control over the (clientelistic authoritarian) ruling coalition to implement 
discrete institutional changes like these without significant modification or cost in 
terms of political stability. Interestingly, the owner of Desh Garments, Nurul Qader 
Khan was a civil servant who had made his money in the previous Awami League 
regime. Zia’s objective in supporting him was clearly to develop the economy, not 
because he was a political client of his own party. 
 
Desh was remarkably successful. Between 1981 and 1987 its export value grew at an 
annual average of 90% (Rahman 2004). The learning and transfer of technology that 
was unleashed by this single project was remarkable. By the end of the 1980s, of the 
130 people who were first trained by Desh in Daewoo’s factories in South Korea, 115 
became entrepreneurs and set up their own garment firms (Rhee 1990: 341). This 
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apparently did not do much damage to Desh, whose output continued to grow at close 
to one hundred per cent per annum during this period. The loss the company suffered 
when it lost a manager was made up many times over by the high levels of effort that 
these individuals invested in the first place as a result of this implicit incentive. From 
virtually a zero base in 1980, by 2005 there were around 3500 active firms in the 
garments sector employing upwards of 2 million people (World Bank 2005). 
Primitive accumulation continued to be an important source of entrepreneurial supply. 
In a survey carried out in 1993, 23% of garment factory owners responded that they 
had originally been civil servants or in the army (Quddus and Rashid 2000). We can 
assume that many others had close contacts with politics and had made their initial 
capital through political processes.  
 
The rapid emergence of Bangladesh as a garment exporting country is shown in Table 
1. Exports grew at double digit rates for more than two decades. By the early 2000s, 
the sector accounted for around 70% of Bangladeshi exports. By 1985, such was the 
success of the Bangladesh garment industry that Ronald Reagan negotiated quotas for 
Bangladesh under the MFA (Rashid 2006). Bangladesh has continued to benefit from 
preferential treatment, particularly in European Union markets, but effectively, the 
first five years of quota protection were enough to trigger a major shift in the 
country’s technological capabilities. By the 2000s the garments and textile sector in 
Bangladesh was globally competitive without the need for additional protections. 
Clearly, this was a case where an initial competitiveness gap was met by protection 
and financing of learning in a way that achieved eventual success and a globally 
competitive industry. The industry continued to grow through the global recession of 
2008 as the lower end of the garments and textile industries gradually began to 
relocate to Bangladesh from China as its wage costs and exchange rate appreciated in 
the late 2000s.  
 
Table 1 Bangladesh Garments: Growth Rates of Dollar Exports 1985-2006 
Year Woven Knitwear Total Garments Dollar Export Growth Rates 
1985-1990   45.9 
1990-1995   24.1 
1995-2000   14.3 
2000-01   11.7 
2001-02 –7.1 –2.5 –5.7 
2002-03 4.3 13.3 7.2 
2003-04 8.6 29.9 15.8 
2004-05 1.7 31.3 12.9 
2005-06 13.5 35.4 23.1 
Sources: (based on  Mlachila and Yang 2004: Table 1; World Bank 2005: Table 1). 
 
The rapid growth of the garments industry has meant that the share of manufacturing 
in GDP in Bangladesh had become comparable to that in India by the turn of the 
century. Indeed, the share of manufacturing in Bangladesh is higher than is expected 
given Bangladesh’s overall economic characteristics (ADB 2007: 294). But the bulk 
of Bangladesh’s manufacturing is labour intensive and low technology. Moreover, 
globally competitive production is almost entirely specialized in garments even three 
decades after the country’s breakthrough in this sector. This is indicated by the fact 
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that around 70 per cent of the country’s total export earnings still comes from the 
garments sector in the 2010s. Moreover, the challenge for the Bangladeshi garment 
industry is to move up the value chain as it continues to be dominated by the lower 
value-added segments that depend on low wages to be globally competitive. 
 
The history of the first phase of the garments industry has important implications for 
Bangladesh as it attempts to move higher up the value chain. Much of its growth so 
far has been at the lower ends, even though there is evidence of growing backward 
linkages and diversification. By 2005, roughly 45% of export value was value added 
in the domestic economy due to growing backward linkages in spinning, weaving, 
dyeing and accessories (Bhattacharya, et al. 2002; World Bank 2005; Ahmed and 
Hossain 2006). The story of the first phase of the garment industry’s success tells us 
that market failures constraining learning were overcome through very specific policy 
and governance arrangements. The blocks of capital required for the next stage of 
upgrading are much larger and primitive accumulation cannot be relied upon to 
provide these investments. A survey of the garment sector in 2007 revealed that the 
available terms of financing were an important constraint to technology upgrading in 
the sector (Khan 2008a). Banks were willing to lend but the fixed return and collateral 
requirements meant that investors were only willing to borrow to invest in segments 
of garments they were already competitive in. They were deterred from investing in 
new sectors where they were not sure about the length of time learning would take. 
The sharing of risks and returns across a number of investors could in theory address 
this problem, but in the absence of an overall rule-following contracting structure, 
economic organizations could not credibly commit to reveal profits or pay dividends 
in the future, making these market solutions fail.  
 
Our interpretation of the causes behind the rapid growth of the garment industry in 
Bangladesh casts doubts on the argument that Bangladesh’s success was based on 
open markets, cheap labour and labour market flexibility. It is true that Bangladesh 
scores higher than India on labour market flexibility (it is easier to fire workers 
compared to India) and indeed both Pakistan and Bangladesh often score higher than 
India on the overall ranking of ‘Doing Business Conditions’ of the World Bank. But 
the specific mechanisms through which the garment industry developed suggests that 
cheap and flexible labour by itself did not help Bangladesh much before the market 
failures constraining investment in the sector were overcome. Moreover, the 
persistence of cheap and flexible labour has not helped investment in the next stages 
of the value chain even though wages have remained low. The implication is that 
further movements up the value chain will depend on solving specific market failures. 
The break that was provided by the MFA cannot be relied on for other sectors or for 
moving up the value-chain in garments and textiles. The Indian experience in 
automobiles and pharmaceuticals also suggests that if market failures impeding 
capability development and technology acquisition can be addressed, low wages and 
excessive labour market flexibility are not even necessary conditions for 
manufacturing success.  
 
Market Failures and Institutional Solutions in the Garments Industry  
The standard economic explanation for the breakthrough in garments is that this 
growth was based on comparative advantage and flexible labour markets in 
Bangladesh. But this is not entirely convincing. Why did Bangladesh’s comparative 
advantage in labour intensive industries not emerge before 1980? There do not appear 
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to have been any significant labour market or other reforms exactly around that 
period. Nor did any other labour intensive industries take off in quite the same way. 
Clearly, there were market failures that had prevented the acquisition of technological 
capabilities even in the least technically sophisticated types of manufacturing like 
garments. It is widely recognized at least by economic historians that the MFA may 
have contributed in some way to relaxing some of these market failures, thereby 
allowing Bangladesh to enter this market. But what type of market failure did the 
MFA address? The answer to this question has significant policy implications for 
countries like Bangladesh if they want to devise policies to move into other sectors of 
manufacturing, labour intensive or otherwise. In particular, can the experience of the 
Bangladesh garment industry under the MFA be fitted into the metaphor of 
‘discovery’ suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003)? Perhaps entrepreneurs had 
not invested in trials in new sectors fearing that their discovery rents would be lost if 
new entrants rushed in. In that case the role of the MFA may have been to reduce the 
cost of trials, resulting in discovery. The type of market failure that was solved is 
critical both for a proper analysis of what happened in this sector, but even more for 
designing institutional solutions that can help with the emergence of new sectors. 
 
The discovery analysis of Hausmann and Rodrik suggests that investments in new 
sectors in developing countries are blocked because investors have to first invest to 
‘discover’ the sectors in which the country has comparative advantage. However, they 
may not want to do this because any rents they may earn by discovering profitable 
sectors will be rapidly eaten away by imitators rushing in and pushing up wages. If 
this is the market failure constraining investments, it can be solved by governments 
subsidizing trials, so that the first investors do not face high risks which need to be 
compensated by the promise of future rents. The problem with this apparently 
plausible explanation is that deeper reflection suggests that it is very unlikely that 
countries simply have a comparative advantage in some low technology sectors and 
not others. Why should countries have such intrinsic capabilities of being more 
efficient in producing hats relative to bed-sheets? Indeed, the MFA was not a fund 
that allowed many ‘trials’ to be organized through which Bangladeshi entrepreneurs 
discovered what the country was good at doing. The MFA created rents in just one 
sector, garments. It brought in just one South Korean company, Daewoo, in 
collaboration with one Bangladeshi entrepreneur who set up just one factory called 
Desh Garments in 1979. Everything followed from that. If this was really a case of a 
singular trial that discovered a huge latent capability in Bangladesh, it would truly be 
a case of incredibly good luck. The coincidence would be even more remarkable 
because somewhat earlier in its history other ‘trials’ were conducted in Bangladesh, 
often assisted by public policies of protection and subsidy. These ranged from 
protection and subsidies for production in moderate technology sectors like textiles 
and chemicals to low-technology sectors like leather products and agro-industries but 
no other sector like garments had emerged. Something rather special was going on in 
the singular trial organized by the Desh-Daewoo investment.  
 
A more plausible explanation and analysis is possible using our learning approach. 
The learning approach suggests that low-wage countries like Bangladesh could 
potentially engage in many different types of labour-intensive or low technology 
activities and achieve global competitiveness. What constrains them is the absence of 
the appropriate tacit knowledge. The absorption of tacit knowledge requires 
investments in learning-by-doing and while the learning is being absorbed, investors 
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will not be making profits. The fundamental problem is that if sufficient effort is not 
put into the learning exercise, the investments in learning are wasted. The reason why 
other trials failed is because inadequate effort was put in. It is not plausible that 
Bangladeshis had no innate capabilities to produce any of those other labour-intensive 
products. It is more plausible that other sectors did not develop because appropriate 
financing arrangements for learning-by-doing were not set up in those sectors that 
also created strong incentives and compulsions for high levels of effort. So the really 
interesting question is: what was the structure of incentives and compulsions that 
ensured high levels of effort in this particular project?  
 
The role of a partial public financing or risk sharing in the learning exercise is that 
without this, the risk facing private investors in sectors requiring learning may be too 
great. Nevertheless, as we have seen, if initial capabilities are high enough and effort 
can be assured, private financing of learning can well drive capability development. 
On the other hand, public financing of learning may fail and has often failed in the 
past, if effort is not forthcoming. The key determinant of success in the learning 
explanation is effort, not the source of the financing. Effort depends on the 
governance agencies and the broader conditions determining the enforcement of the 
different types of contractual arrangements through which the financing for learning 
is provided. This is very different from the discovery analysis, where public financing 
of discovery is important because the market failure stems from a positive externality 
that results in a loss of rents for the successful entrepreneur after a successful sector or 
capability has been discovered.  
 
This does not mean there are no positive externalities in new start-ups, but in many 
technologies, these positive externalities are minor and need not, on their own, 
prevent investments. Compare the risks for the investor coming from the difficulty of 
ensuring high levels of effort with the potential losses that could follow as a result of 
positive externalities. The risk that follows from the difficulty of ensuring effort is 
that private financiers cannot predict ex ante how long it will take to achieve 
profitability. This is not because innate capabilities are not known, but rather because 
success in enforcing effort is difficult in most developing countries where typically 
investors cannot fully rely on either formal contracting or informal enforcement 
mechanisms. The more confidence investors have in their own abilities and in the 
relevant governance agencies that can enforce contracts, the less important the cost-
sharing with government becomes. We see strong evidence in support of this 
argument in the garment sector in Bangladesh.  
 
The risk involved in learning is highest for the first investors because tacit knowledge 
is most difficult to adopt and adapt when it is not known locally. But once the tacit 
knowledge has been transferred to a locality, it becomes relatively easy for other 
producers and investors to understand the routines. Once the knowledge becomes 
‘local’ subsequent investors take a lesser risk. The routines are now locally known 
and can be observed in operation, benchmarks of effort exist and one or two key 
personnel can even be poached from successful enterprises The required learning 
becomes less and less risky and uncertainty about learning times reduces dramatically. 
One indication of the dramatic reduction of risk when tacit knowledge becomes 
‘local’ is that local commercial banks suddenly become willing to lend because the 
required ‘investment in learning’ can now be more readily quantified. Yet the same 
banks may be very unwilling to play a ‘developmental’ role by coming forward to 
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finance learning in sectors where the tacit knowledge does not exist locally. This is 
exactly what we observe with banking practices in the Bangladesh garments industry. 
These are positive externalities of the first successful learning exercise in the sector, 
but this knowledge is almost a public good because the loss to the first investor can be 
rather small, and too small to explain why investments do not happen in the first 
place. Again, there is strong evidence of this in the Bangladesh garments industry.  
 
The real constraint on the first investors is that they take a big and unquantifiable risk 
because the transfer of the first tranche of tacit knowledge is most exposed to the 
uncertainty that existing institutional and contractual arrangements may fail to enforce 
adequate effort. The entry or otherwise of subsequent imitators has no plausible 
bearing on this calculation even if minor positive externalities exist. Their appearance 
is not likely to have any significant effect on profits in labour surplus economies. The 
Desh-Daewoo investment performed a vital function for Bangladesh precisely 
because it successfully organized the critical initial transfer of tacit knowledge. The 
MFA helped critically in two ways, but the MFA alone cannot explain the success of 
the technology transfer process in terms of effort. First, the MFA reduced the requisite 
private loss-financing by creating quota rents for Bangladesh. By imposing quotas on 
exports from more competitive countries, MFA allowed follower countries to sell at 
higher prices once more competitive countries hit their quotas. This implicitly 
improved the competitiveness of follower countries like Bangladesh for as long as the 
quotas were in place. Secondly, the MFA created compulsions for the South Koreans 
to actively seek to transfer some sites of production to countries like Bangladesh. 
Quotas on South Korean garments exports not only affected their garment industry 
but also their sales of fabrics and accessories that were indirectly exported through 
garments. If they could find alternative sites like Bangladesh, they would be able to 
keep more of their textile industries going. This was the context in which Daewoo 
was looking for partners in least developed countries to develop a garments industry.  
 
The MFA therefore created a ‘public’ subsidy for countries like Bangladesh, and 
incentives for some private foreign investment in learning as well. But all of this 
would have gone to waste if the firm that was set up failed to put in high levels of 
effort in learning. Without that, the subsidies for setting up garment firms would be no 
different from countless other subsidies that have been available for trials in other 
sectors. We would then have ‘discovered’ that Bangladesh cannot make garments 
either. From the perspective of a learning-based explanation of the success of the 
garment industry, the most critical issue therefore is to understand how high levels of 
effort were sustained to make this particular exercise a success. We will argue that 
this can be explained in terms of the features of the interactive variables identified as 
determinants of effort in Figure 4 and eq. [11].  
 
The important features of the MFA experience in Bangladesh are summarized in 
Figure 6. The initial capabilities in the garments and textile sector were low in terms 
of what were required to achieve international competitiveness. There were of course 
some small-scale operations consistent with a low technology garment industry going 
back many decades in Bangladesh, but there was nothing on a global scale. The MFA 
provided an implicit financing instrument for learning by raising global prices of 
qualities subject to quota. This temporarily raised the competitiveness of quota-free 
countries like Bangladesh, shown by the higher dotted competitiveness curve that 
Bangladesh enjoyed with its quota-free access to US markets. To simplify, we assume 
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that quotas on more competitive garment producers were imposed for all qualities, 
and that prices for all qualities increased by the same factor. This is obviously not 
how MFA operated, but the simplified diagram captures key aspects of the story. The 
implication is that MFA provided a quota rent of sMFA that could serve as temporary 
loss-financing for firms engaged in learning how to produce quality Q2 in Bangladesh. 
 
 
Figure 5 High-Effort Learning under the MFA in Bangladesh 
 
The problem was that even with this improvement in competitiveness, garments 
operations did not immediately become viable. Tacit knowledge was still too low to 
enable production of quality Q2. We know this was the case because significant 
additional investments in learning had to be financed by the Desh-Daewoo 
partnership. This is shown in Figure 6 by an initial capabilities curve that is so low 
that the improvement in competitiveness would have allowed an improvement in 
qualities from V to a marginally better position at W, but not to Q2 which we assume 
is the quality level required for mass export markets. For a significant improvement in 
prospects, private investment was required to raise capabilities to a globally 
competitive level at this level of quality. Indeed, while a large number of least 
developed countries enjoyed quota free access to US markets under MFA but most 
did not experience export growth. Nevertheless, MFA clearly helped Bangladesh by 
effectively reducing the competitiveness gap that needed to be bridged by learning 
financed by private investments.  
 
The Desh-Daewoo partnership began production of quality Q2 in Figure 6, which 
represents the quality that could sell in mid-level retail outlets in the US and other 
global markets. This required a period of partial private loss-financing (shown as sP in 
the figure) in addition to the ‘public’ financing (of sMFA) provided by the quota rent 
that was temporarily made available by the MFA. This private investment was 
organized by the extraordinary partnership between Desh and Daewoo described 
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earlier. The characteristics of this contract and its enforcement are interesting because 
the result was a remarkably successful phase of learning that was in fact concluded 
faster than the partnership had initially estimated. The overall capabilities in the sector 
rapidly moved up, allowing not just competitive production of the qualities initially 
introduced by Desh, but the improvement of capabilities in this region very soon 
allowed the production to move to somewhat higher qualities like Q3 as well. Why 
was this investment so successful in achieving rapid learning?  
 
Effort, Learning and the Success of Desh Garments  
The Desh-Daewoo collaboration began in 1979. Desh effectively purchased learning 
from Daewoo, sending its future managers, supervisors, and some production line 
workers to Daewoo’s Busan plant in South Korea to do the learning-by-doing on site 
in a working and competitive garments factory. Daewoo was also to assist in 
identifying the modern machinery that Desh would purchase, provide access to inputs 
like fabrics at world market prices and provide assistance with marketing the 
garments using its established marketing network. Daewoo would be making some 
up-front investments, including hosting and training the Bangladeshi visitors at 
Busan, but this would be repaid in the form of a royalty of three per cent of sales for 
the technical training and another five per cent of sales for marketing (Rhee 1990). 
All investments in machinery, salaries and the project costs in Bangladesh were 
covered by Desh. Clearly, both sides were taking some risk for an appropriate share of 
the return. Fortunately, the incentives and compulsions implicit in these contractual 
arrangements and the degree to which they were enforceable ensured very high levels 
of effort being put in by both sides.  
 
The collaboration was initially expected to last for five years, but so successful was 
the learning and technology transfer that Desh was able to cancel the collaborative 
agreement in 1981, after just one and a half years. Within a year the collaboration 
succeeded in transferring a large part of the requisite tacit knowledge required to 
actually produce garments using modern production techniques. The Bangladesh 
garments industry would not have succeeded if it had simply produced garments using 
existing capabilities under the protective barrier created by the MFA. The latter may 
have allowed Bangladesh to produce at the point W in Figure 6, but the removal of 
MFA would have resulted in the collapse of the industry. The fact that tacit 
knowledge was actually acquired and brought to the local economy is proved by the 
fact that once the new production routines had been established and understood, 
many new garments factories opened up in Bangladesh within two or three years and 
they gradually improved their product qualities beyond the initial levels. Indeed, so 
dramatic was the growth of the garments industry that the USA imposed quotas on 
Bangladesh in 1985 just a few years after Desh Garments actually began exporting. 
But very high growth rates continued beyond the new quota entitlements proving that 
new competitive capabilities had been established.  
 
The quotas imposed in 1985 on Bangladesh defined the quantities of different 
categories of garments that could be exported to the US without paying tariffs. These 
quotas were generous, but for a variety of reasons, many exporters were soon 
exporting outside the quota, and therefore without benefiting from the quota rent. This 
was sometimes because some producers were not part of the ‘in-group’ of the 
BGMEA, the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association that 
was responsible for distributing the quota between different garments producers. In 
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addition, quotas for popular lines were soon fully allocated so new producers could 
not have got an allocation anyway. Thus, within two or three years of the garment 
industry coming on stream, probably as little as one third of all producers were ‘quota 
protected’. But growth continued rapidly. By the time the MFA was effectively 
removed in 2007 Bangladesh had a diversified garments industry that was engaged in 
some amount of backward and forward linkages as well. This evidence suggests that 
MFA was possibly only important for the first few major investments in the garments 
industry but these investments were vital in achieving a significant transfer of know-
how through learning-by-doing.  
 
In terms of eq. [11] and the relationships between the variables suggested in Figure 4 
we can identify a number of fortunate conditions that can help to explain the 
successful acquisition of technological capabilities by Desh and its transfer to the 
emerging Bangladesh garments sector. First, the ‘financing instrument’ involved in 
financing the learning-by-doing was a combination of a public ‘quota rent’ subsidy 
and private investment in learning, primarily on-site in Busan and subsequently on-
site in Bangladesh. This co-financing of learning characterized not just the Desh 
investment, but also the investments that were made by new entrant companies 
benefiting from MFA in other product lines in the months and years after Desh started 
production in Bangladesh. All of these companies were beneficiaries of quota rents 
and yet had to make relatively uncertain investments in learning to produce different 
types of garments to global standards. Co-financing in this form meant that the 
Bangladeshi investor had very strong incentives to put in high levels of effort because 
the quota rent was not sufficient to achieve global competitiveness with existing 
levels of capabilities. If the quota rent had been sufficient for Bangladeshi firms to be 
immediately profitable without exerting any effort in learning, the takeoff would have 
been immediate without the need for the Busan collaboration. But equally, most of 
these enterprises may later have collapsed when the quota rents disappeared with the 
gradual withdrawal of MFA. The partial boost provided by the quota rent proved to be 
sufficient to induce private investment but also ensured that private investors would 
only be successful if genuine capability development happened at the outset. This was 
a very fortunate aspect of the levels of protection provided by the MFA. 
 
Second, the governance agencies responsible for allocating the MFA rent were 
initially entirely exogenous to the internal political structures of rent-management in 
Bangladesh. Initially, the quota rents were available to every producer exporting 
garments of the requisite quality. A permanent export subsidy of this type may not 
have had the desired effect, but everyone knew that there was no reason to expect the 
MFA to be a permanent feature of the global economy. Indeed, within a few years, 
Bangladesh had its own quotas and the allocation of these quotas by the BGMEA 
became important. If quota rents had still been important for learning at that stage, the 
management and allocation of the quota rents by the BGMEA would have been an 
important determinant of subsequent learning success. Aspects of the political 
settlement (in particular the distribution of power between economic organizations 
within BGMEA and their relationships with political organizations) would have been 
critical. As it turned out, by the time quota rents began to be allocated by the 
BGMEA, the core capabilities required for achieving global competitiveness had 
already been absorbed by the first firms and second and third tier entrants had already 
started imitating them. New entrants already knew how to become globally 
competitive on the basis of their private investments in learning, even if they no 
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longer benefited from quota rents. This is proved by the fact that many new entrants 
after 1985 did not receive any quotas. 
 
In other words, the transition from competitiveness levels of X that had initially 
characterized the sector to competitiveness levels like A where a firm could be 
globally competitive without any quota rent happened rather rapidly. This transition 
was based on an upward shift of the capabilities curve from its pre-MFA to a post-
MFA position. Once firms learnt how to achieve competitiveness (and they continued 
to enjoy a significant wage advantage compared to most competitors), they were not 
afraid to set up production without a quota. It took them slightly longer to turn a 
profit, but they knew they could do it because the type and extent of effort was known 
by then. The fortunate aspect of the technologies that were protected by the MFA was 
therefore that protection was only required to induce learning in the very first firms 
where the learning was most risky and uncertain. In later cases, the MFA rents were 
not essential, and therefore the governance structures allocating the MFA rents were 
not decisive. The core routines had already been transferred to the local economy. 
This lucky characteristic was related to the simplicity of the technologies involved in 
the garments industry. For more sophisticated technologies, the ‘public’ component of 
the financing for learning may have had to last for longer and the agencies monitoring 
and governing these investments would be of much greater significance for 
determining the incentives and compulsions they created for high effort in learning.  
 
The firm structures of the early firms involved in the learning were very important for 
effective learning and high levels of effort. The collaboration between Desh and 
Daewoo involved significant investments from both sides, but particularly significant 
from the Bangladeshi side which had to put in most of the capital and effort. The 
founder of Desh, Nurul Quader Khan provided the bulk of the capital required for 
investment in plant and machinery for the venture. Daewoo’s investment was to invite 
a large team of Bangladeshis to visit and study its operations in South Korea and 
understand on-site how production was actually organized. The characteristics of this 
firm-to-firm relationship and the internal incentives and compulsions within Desh are 
perhaps the most critical characteristics explaining the success of the technology 
transfer. On one side was a relatively small Bangladeshi firm led by a motivated 
investor who clearly had the capability to motivate his team of enthusiastic middle 
managers. On the other side was a disciplined South Korean conglomerate that had no 
interest in retaining commercial secrets in a very mature sector, and every interest in 
rapidly transferring this technology to its new partners. Moreover, the speed with 
which it would get a return on its investments in training would depend on the rate at 
which it could transfer tacit knowledge to the visiting Bangladeshis and assist them in 
transferring this to their production site in Bangladesh. Much of the tacit knowledge 
was communicated in South Korea in the form of hands-on experience on the South 
Korean factory floor and the strong incentives on both sides ensured that this was a 
rapid and rigorous process. It is clear from the subsequent experience of Desh that this 
hands-on learning experience was decisive for achieving success. Between 1981 and 
1987, Desh Garments grew its exports at a staggering average rate of 90 per cent 
every year (Rahman 2004).  
 
An important factor that also helps to explain the high levels of effort of the early 
Desh managers is that they believed that one day they could become garments 
entrepreneurs on their own. The relatively insignificant scale economies in the sector 
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made this a credible hope. Motivated managers and even supervisors could expect 
that if their learning was successful, they could one day become an owner themselves. 
Desh, the pioneering company of garments production in Bangladesh, did nothing to 
deny this possibility. To its credit, it realized that the motivation of its staff was more 
important than trying to internalize all the positive externalities of its investment in 
learning. Perhaps, it also recognized that the clustering effect of many garments 
factories would be an advantage for itself. Even today, high levels of effort in the best 
garments factories in Bangladesh are sustained by entrepreneurial motivations of 
middle managers who work hard to continuously upgrade processes within the firm 
with an implicit incentive that this know-how could eventually be advantageous for 
them. Of course, the nature of the technology was important for sustaining these 
incentives. The relatively easy transferability of the routines required to maintain 
competitiveness meant that Desh could sustain its breakneck growth despite the 
turnover of managers. As long as some continuity could be maintained between 
generations of managers, Desh and later other garments factories could continue their 
growth despite losing some managers. Moreover, many routines became embodied in 
the workforce where turnover was much slower in percentage terms. These 
characteristics of the technology and therefore of the firm structures they supported 
are important for understanding the incentives for high levels of effort  
 
The technology of the garments industry was therefore fortunate in several respects. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that the tacit knowledge involved in this 
industry was very simple to absorb. Before Desh there was no medium-to-large scale 
modern garment industry in Bangladesh. Even after the routines became local 
knowledge and were widely imitated, the failure rate in the industry was extremely 
high. Published figures for failures are not available but industry insiders suggest that 
between thirty to forty per cent of early start-up firms failed to survive. The 
knowledge required for success is not just about how to set up the factory floor, but 
also how to manage a complex service relationship with demanding buyers and 
difficult supply chains in a changing environment. The critical point is not that tacit 
knowledge was not important here, but rather that features of the technology and firm 
structure provided very strong internal incentives for effort. In sectors with significant 
scale economies where managers could not expect to set up their own firms in a few 
years, internal firm incentive structures motivating middle management would be 
extremely important.  
 
The success in sustaining effort in the early stages of learning was also assisted by 
features of the political structure that characterized Bangladesh at that time. The late 
1970s were a period characterized as clientelistic authoritarianism. The new 
government wanted to undo the economic damage done by the ‘socialist’ experiment 
under the previous dominant party period. The abandonment of the attempt to create a 
one-party state had important implications for strategies of pushing through pro-
business institutional reforms on a piecemeal basis. A one-party state or even a 
dominant party in a competitive political system has to try and accommodate every 
political organization that has significant power. The downside of this is that there are 
contrary interests within the dominant party and decisions that hurt any powerful 
internal organization or faction are likely to be successfully blocked. The clientelist 
authoritarian strategy of political management was different. Powerful organizations 
were encouraged to compete outside the ruling coalition and only a subset of these 
organizations was selectively accommodated within the ruling party. This meant that 
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there were fewer centres of opposition to policies within the ruling party and in 
particular, weaker organizations that were not necessary to the ruling coalition could 
be excluded and ignored. A range of organizations who may otherwise have objected 
to the pro-business strategies of the new regime, and who may have demanded high 
payoffs to enable the implementation of these institutions and policies, could now be 
overruled or ignored without significant political cost.  
 
The new political structure played an important role in allowing the leadership to 
focus of a small number of targeted reforms that did not significantly affect 
established interests, but which could not be blocked by powerful political 
organizations looking for a share or the rents. President Ziaur Rahman backed the 
Desh project at the highest level and was instrumental in introducing Desh to the 
South Koreans. He also backed the introduction of vital institutional innovations like 
back-to-back letters of credit which allowed firms to import raw materials on the basis 
of their export orders and of bonded warehouses that allowed duty-free imports of 
inputs designated for re-export after processing; thereby freeing garments 
manufactures from complex customs payments and reclaims. The perception that 
these institutional changes would not be held back by internal political obstruction 
was important for encouraging both the Bangladeshi and South Korean investors to 
begin investing even before the institutional problems had been fully resolved. On a 
broader front, the changes in the political settlement meant that political organizations 
that may have sought to block these changes in the name of ‘socialism’ or as a 
bargaining tool to extract concessions were now excluded from the ruling coalition 
and were unable to do so. Thus, the new political structure was important for enabling 
investments and institutional changes that made the new sector potentially viable if 
learning could be organized. The changed political settlement therefore significantly 
increased the likelihood that stakeholders would invest significant effort in learning 
rather than simply using investment in the sector as a strategy of short-term rent 
capture in the presence of quota rents.  
 
The clientelistic authoritarian political settlement allowed the introduction of required 
institutional innovations like back-to-back letters of credit and customs rules that 
allowed bonded warehouses. The new income flows (rents) that could be potentially 
captured as a result of these institutional changes were not essential for the ruling 
coalition for two sets of reasons. First, the amounts involved were initially small and 
secondly, the new ruling coalition did not attempt to include all political organizations 
and therefore it had relatively more limited internal rent requirements compared to the 
previous one-party state. As a result, the new institutions were not significantly 
modified due to significant rent-diversion by powerful organizations nor did their 
enforcement face strong resistance from political organizations that were deprived of 
a share of these rents. Moreover, the quota rents created by the MFA were obviously 
not domestically created and the global institutional arrangements on which they were 
based could not be significantly modified by domestic political organizations. The 
quota rents could only be captured by garments exporters in certain categories and 
Bangladeshi political organizations could not determine the allocation of these rents 
through domestic institutional modifications. Once quotas were introduced for 
Bangladesh in 1985, BGMEA became responsible for allocating quotas across its 
members. However, the BGMEA was relatively successful in allocating quotas 
according to historical export performance so that politicization did not become 
excessive. These favourable background conditions, partly based on the international 
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institutional origin of some of the rents and the political settlement that ensured that 
complementary institutional changes were not significantly modified combined to 
ensure that the rents available to the garment sector in its early days created the right 
incentives for effort in learning.  
 
Thus there were good reasons at the micro and macro level why the configuration of 
incentives provided by the MFA quota rents, private financing, the nature of the 
technology and the associated firm structure and finally political conditions interacted 
to sustain high levels of effort in the learning process. The outcome was by no means 
accidental even though all these variables were not designed by policy to be 
compatible and achieve a high-effort learning result. In sectors where the technology 
is different, where accidental trade-related rents do not exist to the appropriate extent, 
or where political conditions prevent critical incremental institutional changes that 
support investment in a sector, it may be much more difficult to create new financing 
instruments and governance structures that ensure high levels of effort in learning. 
This explains why devising effective instruments for financing development has 
proved to be so challenging in developing countries and why financing instruments 
for new sectors have frequently achieved poor results.  
 
From a policy perspective, it does matter whether the success of the garment industry 
was based on ‘discovery’ or ‘learning’. If the absence of effort in learning explains 
the failure of previous trials, then carrying out a number of further trials using public 
funds is unlikely on its own to ‘discover’ further sectors like the garments industry. 
What is needed is policy that can invest in the transfer of tacit knowledge in other 
sectors and ensure effective learning through high levels of effort. Subsidies without 
mechanisms of enforcing high levels of effort in the experimentation and adaptation 
that constitutes learning have failed in the past and are likely to do so again. The 
Desh-Daewoo experiment succeeded because it achieved high levels of effort, and the 
policy lesson is to try and design further rounds of learning with appropriate financing 
instruments and associated conditions that ensure similarly high levels of effort.  
 
The metaphor of discovery may allow us to be too sanguine and argue that failure 
simply shows that innate capabilities were missing for producing a particular product 
in a particular country. The policy implication that follows from the discovery 
metaphor is that we only need the credible capacity to terminate subsidies for 
discovery in time and try again in another sector. The learning model says that we 
need to probe more deeply into success stories and design new policies with greater 
attention to the interplay of factors that determine the level of effort put into the 
learning. The challenge for policy in Bangladesh, even within the garments and textile 
sector, is to follow up on the implications of the importance of learning and to 
consciously design policies to accelerate further moves up the technology ladder.  
 
Technology Upgrading in the Garments Sector 
More than thirty years after the garment sector’s growth began the sector is still 
rapidly growing. However, technical progress up the value chain and into new 
technologies has been slow, while lateral expansion multiplying existing types of 
plants has been very rapid. A number of characteristics can help to explain these 
features. The MFA gradually declined in significance and no new arrangement of this 
type emerged for new or more technologically sophisticated garments and textile 
sectors. In the latter, there was therefore no part-public financing of the learning 
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process. Secondly, the political settlement changed after 1990 with the replacement of 
clientelistic authoritarianism with a vulnerable democracy based on competitive 
clientelism. These changes meant that the private financing need was higher and even 
more so because the technologies were now more sophisticated and the learning gap 
was larger. And the political context of competitive clientelism meant that the 
capacity of the ruling coalition to make targeted and specific institutional changes to 
support particular technological requirements of catching-up sectors was reduced.  
 
This does not mean that a broadening of the technical base did not happen. There was 
significant growth in backward and forward linkages. By 2005, roughly 45% of 
export value was added in the domestic economy demonstrating the growing 
backward linkages in spinning, weaving, dyeing and accessories (Bhattacharya, et al. 
2002; World Bank 2005; Ahmed and Hossain 2006). Discussions with entrepreneurs 
in the sector reveal a number of systematic problems that are closely related to our 
analysis of learning. Moreover, with the garment industry accounting for roughly 70 
per cent of exports, there is a strong case for greater diversification. This requires 
transferring lessons from the successful experience of learning in this sector to devise 
policies for other sectors. 
 
A widespread observation in the industry is that once the learning requirements for a 
particular technology become known, banks are willing to lend freely (though the real 
interest rate for investors has been high in Bangladesh). The difficulty is that for new 
technologies and sectors, banks understandably have no metric for estimating their 
exposure to risk. In fact the entrepreneurs themselves do not know how successful the 
learning exercise will be. The fixed interest and collateral requirements of bank loans 
do deter investors who are not sure how long their learning will take. Nor can the 
absorption of new technologies be easily financed by profit sharing agreements with 
outside investors because the latter are deterred by poor guarantees of disclosure, 
weak contract enforcement and weak mechanisms for compelling effort on firm level 
managers. Thus, there were significant market failures constraining investments in 
learning, which in turn constrain the rapid acquisition of new technological 
capabilities. While supporters of market-enhancing ‘good governance’ argue that this 
is one reason to improve contract enforcement, the realistic possibility of making a 
significant impact on contract enforcement in the medium term in clientelist political 
settlements is very limited. Other governance approaches therefore have to be devised 
to address critical market failures. 
 
New technologies continued to come in but only when supported by very specific 
financing mechanisms. One variant driving technical progress in the industry is of 
enterprising entrepreneurs who are willing to accept high risks and negative returns 
for an indefinite period. These investors are investing in learning by reinvesting 
profits from their existing businesses in new higher risk technologies. A second 
variant that can drive learning in new sectors is when foreign partnerships help to 
finance investment and learning. As foreign partners cannot rely on very credible 
contract enforcement, these relationships typically work in developing countries when 
they are based on established relationships of trust between the domestic and foreign 
partner. But there is widespread recognition within the industry that if appropriate 
instruments of financing for new technologies could be developed while ensuring 
incentives for high levels of effort, the adoption of new technologies and investment 
in the acquisition of tacit knowledge would be much accelerated. 
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The companies who were able to absorb the risks of financing investments in 
technology upgrading using their own retained profits were typically bigger 
companies with strong modern managements. They had already established positions 
in other segments of the market that could generate the profit stream for financing 
learning and technology absorption in new segments of the market. We surveyed 
technically dynamic firms in the garments sector in 2007 and again in 2011 and found 
that a gradual technical upgradation was taking place based on the reinvested profits 
of successful firms and the ability of established entrepreneurs in these firms to 
absorb the risk of learning in incremental new sectors based on the profit stream 
coming into their established businesses. An example in 2007 was the Bengal Jeans 
and Bengal Denims group that was moving up into denim manufacture. This was 
entirely based on reinvested profits, which ensured strong incentives for effort within 
the firm. The firm achieved 80 per cent of the rated productivity of its new denim 
weaving machines within a year. But integration across all inputs and differences in 
costs of inputs meant that Chinese imports of denim with all the transport costs were 
US$1.50 per yard compared to their internal cost of production of US$1.70. Thus, an 
implicit internal loss-financing of learning was continuing after a couple of years.  
 
Still the use of the Bangladeshi fabric was viable because the group had its own jeans 
stitching business and in-house production allowed better quality control and quicker 
response times for their jeans manufacturing. Moreover, Bangladeshi inputs enjoyed 
GSP advantages at that time as Bangladesh was an LDC (least developed country) 
and this gave users of local fabrics a cost advantage of up to 12.5 per cent in some 
markets. They were taking a bet that achieving scale economies in their domestic 
production and rising costs in China would eventually make the denim production 
globally competitive. Clearly, without their integration into jeans production (and 
GSP privileges) the backward linkage would have been unviable given the time it was 
taking to compete with the Chinese.  
 
Another example of a modern factory that had become sizable through incremental 
internally financed investments was Far East Knitting and Dyeing Industries. This had 
around 1300 workers in low value-added garments making, but the stream of income 
from that was financing sustained moves into higher value-adding knitting and 
dyeing. Around 800 workers were employed in these more technically advanced areas 
in the late 2000s, and these numbers were growing. The company’s strategy was to 
retain 5 per cent of its gross export earnings for reinvestment in technology 
upgrading. The owners and managers were individuals with a long exposure to 
western markets, had good relations with buyers and understood how to create 
incentives for high levels of effort by their workers. The firm had devised internal 
incentive schemes like a rolling fund where the firm paid in around 300,000 taka 
every month (around US$5000) which accumulated into a sizable fund over the years. 
Employees who stayed with the firm more than five years were entitled to a per capita 
share of the fund when they left, creating incentives for staying on. This was to reduce 
the perennial problem of leakage of trained workers.  
 
Firms in Bangladesh are obviously aware of the ‘positive externality’ problem, which 
means that new entrants or other existing firms have an incentive to poach on the 
training efforts of firms that engage in skilling up new workers or workers in 
particular segments of quality. But it appears that firms have adjusted to these positive 
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externalities and are not excessively constrained by it. A mechanism that is widely 
used is to force workers to share some of the initial training costs by hiring them as 
‘helpers’ in the first place. They often have rates of pay that are below the market 
wage because the assumption on both sides is that the training has a value which can 
be lost to the firm if the worker leaves. The bargaining power of firms in a labour 
surplus economy has meant that this arrangement has been widely adopted, though 
the pressure to implement minimum wage laws for helpers became unavoidable by 
2010. Clearly, firms can and have misused these arrangements, but it is one 
mechanism through which the external benefits of training were internalized by the 
firm in the form of initially lower employment costs. 
 
The other model sustaining investments in new technologies has been partnerships 
with foreign partners. This requires strong relationships because foreign partners 
providing some of the capital or technology for upgrading have to be assured that the 
Bangladeshi firm will put in high levels of effort. Contracts protecting the investments 
of foreign partners are recognized as being of limited value in the general context of 
weak enforcement. In the small-scale garments sector where corporate reputation still 
has limited value, personal relationships and industry knowledge have been very 
important. An example is K.S. Embroidery where personal relationships between 
Chinese investors and a Bangladeshi entrepreneur allowed a small investment and 
some technology transfers in new segments of the industry such as mechanized 
embroidery.  
 
A potentially very interesting model of foreign partnerships driving technology 
acquisition is the Danish Business-to-Business (B2B) programme run by the Danish 
development agency DANIDA in the mid-2000s in Bangladesh (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Denmark 2006). This programme identified viable and reputable Danish 
companies and introduced them to developing countries and potential local partners 
with whom joint ventures or partnerships could potentially be set up. The Danish 
programme vetted high quality Danish technology providers, financed their visit to 
the developing country and set up meetings with domestic entrepreneurs. Its main 
purpose was to cover the costs of potential Danish companies to come to a developing 
country that they do not know and where they might otherwise not have come. In 
other words, the programme covered the coordination costs but not the direct 
investment and learning costs faced by the joint venture.  
 
But consistent with our argument of risk, this limited support resulted in new 
investments in relatively sophisticated technologies. As an example, the International 
Trade Connection, a Bangladeshi business group implemented a project setting up a 
composite textile knitting factory at Bhaluka with German and Danish technicians 
providing assistance in 2007. As a result of the linkages established by the 
programme, there was also a private Danish investment with a 33 per cent stake in the 
project. The Danish programme is obviously restricted to Danish companies, and this 
significantly limits the range of technologies and sources of financing Bangladeshi 
firms can access. Nevertheless, it is a good example of how relatively small 
investments in coordination and information provision can help bring about 
investment in new technologies in developing countries. It is a model that other 
development partners could consider, and indeed the Bangladeshi government could 
use some of its own resources to reduce the coordination costs of foreign investors in 
new technologies. 
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The characteristics of the Danish B2B programme mean that care would need to be 
exercised to scale it up. The financing instrument here is a like a public subsidy that 
reduces the overall costs of investing in new technologies by reducing some of the 
information and coordination costs. The partial contribution to investment means that 
private financing of learning is still required to achieve competitiveness. Here the 
small scale of the programme and the intensive knowledge that the Danish 
programme coordinators have both of the Danish business they invite and the 
Bangladeshi businesses they introduce them to means that the business partners start 
off with some degree of confidence towards each other. The rest is then based on 
intensive inaction to establish trust and confidence in the mutual business models. As 
the Bangladeshi side cannot become competitive without an investment in effort, and 
as the foreign investor in technology knows what is involved in the technology and 
can help the local company set up the operation, there is once again a mutual 
incentive in putting in high effort in learning. The political context by this time was 
less favourable for incremental institutional changes supporting particular 
investments, but given the very small scale and specificity of these investments this 
failing did not matter excessively.  
 
By 2011 the garments sector in Bangladesh had become fairly differentiated with 
some technically sophisticated firms at the top and some very basic technology ones 
at the bottom and a range of variation between. Some of the more sophisticated firms 
at the top had gradually progressed to very sophisticated technologies and production 
techniques. An investigation of a few of the sophisticated firms at the top reveals that 
some of these firms have achieved a self-sustaining dynamic of technical progress 
based on the investment of their internal profits for gradual movements up the 
technology ladder. We look at two examples. Viyellatex Group is a dynamic firm 
based in Khortoil in Gazipura Tongi near Dhaka. Its history goes back to 1996 when it 
was set up with 450 workers and six production lines and today employs 14,000 
people, with backward linkages into spinning, knitting, dyeing, customized 
packaging, and accessories including buttons, hangers.  
 
Its chief executive, David Hasanat, does not recall getting any external assistance in 
building up the company, which has grown based on its reinvested profits. The 
original capital was entirely a bank loan backed by the collateral of the partners. 
Clearly, the risk of succeeding in learning was entirely borne by the partners based on 
their observation of the technical capabilities that other Bangladeshi firms had 
achieved at that time. In the basic lines on which they initially focused, it was possible 
to estimate the learning-by-doing that was required. Subsequently, in moving up the 
value chain and into new lines, their secret was aggressive reinvestment of profits 
based on a long-term commitment by the owners to build a technically sophisticated 
company. In 2011 the firm was investing in green technologies to become a carbon-
neutral company. The design features were commissioned from the Bangladesh 
University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), with the design financed by 
German aid as part of a GTZ project. This company was therefore capable of 
gradually moving up the quality ladder based largely on reinvested profits and the 
learning capabilities that the top management had acquired over time.  
 
Far East Knitting and Dyeing Industries had moved on further in 2011. Asif Moyeen 
its chief executive explained that the company always solved its problems by itself. 
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The company was making a significant investment in a high technology spinning 
plant and weaving plant. There had been no government help but neither had there 
been government expropriation or obstacles set up to enable rent collection. The 
primary problem for the company in moving up the value chain was power supply and 
this too had to be solved in-house as in all major garments factories with the 
development of captive power plants. The company had a gas-based generator but 
with the shortages of gas it was now building diesel and furnace oil generators. The 
prioritization of gas supplies to some firms did require government assistance and 
therefore kickbacks and bribes and for this reason the company preferred to diversify 
its power sources even at a relatively high cost. The main constraint to the expansion 
of the company was the dire situation in national power generation and infrastructure.  
 
The growth of the garments industry has obviously resulted in an increased political 
influence of its two associations, the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (BGMEA) and the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (BKMEA). However, the two associations wield less power 
and influence in national policy-making decisions than the economic dominance of 
the garments sector in exports and manufacturing may suggest. Shafiul Islam 
Mohiuddin, second vice-president of BGMEA, describes a relationship with 
government that suggests a limited engagement between the two sides, either positive 
or negative. The low rents (profits higher than competitive market levels) that the 
sector generates possibly makes it less interesting for political organizations, either as 
a target for predatory activities or as a sector to assist in exchange for a share of its 
profits. This  
 
The BGMEA was involved in a fifteen-year long negotiation with successive 
governments to set up a ‘garments village’. The aim was to bring a large number of 
garments factories together in a cluster, solving the problem of land acquisition and 
infrastructure facing start-up companies in the sector. The land would be bought by 
firms locating within the village, but government support was required to acquire the 
land in the first place. After nineteen meetings with Saifur Rahman, the last finance 
minister, the government promised a 300 acre park in Kachpur. But at the last minute, 
the decision was changed to offer the garments industry plots in the huge Adamjee 
Jute Mills site, which was now empty after the public sector jute mill had been closed 
down. The problem for the garments industry was that the proposed price of land at 
Adamjee was too high to be viable. Saifur Rahman offered land at Adamjee at 9.5 
million takas per bigha (one-third of an acre in Bangladesh) when land was available 
at industrial sites like Savar and other areas at around 2 million takas per bigha around 
2002-3 (when the exchange rate with one US dollar was approximately 55 takas). Not 
surprisingly, this long negotiation to solve the locational problems of the industry 
ended in failure. 
 
At an institutional level BGMEA has some successes to its credit. These include its 
successful taking over of the functions of allocating Utilization Declaration (UD) and 
Utilization Permission (UP) certificates, which determine how much cloth per dozen 
shirts a garment factory is allowed to import duty free. This assessment is technically 
the function of the Customs department. By acquiring the right to assess and allocate 
these certificates within the industry, BGMEA reduced the ability of Customs to 
harass manufacturers but Customs can still occasionally take bribes for conducting the 
annual audit comparing the aggregate imports and exports of raw materials. The 
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allocation of these certificates also gives the BGMEA a certain leverage over its 
member firms that it has used to advantage in its additional role in facilitating 
arbitration between firms, buyers, workers and buying houses. Arbitration is 
important in a context where the formal court and legal system is notoriously slow 
and open to influencing activities. The BGMEA has its own arbitration process and 
structure, which includes retired high court judges and with its own case law. As the 
arbitration is done by insiders who know how the industry works as well as its 
undeclared practices like informal cost and profit-sharing agreements, the arbitration 
works relatively well. Intransigence on the part of firms who may otherwise have 
ignored judgements that went against them is mitigated because firms do not want to 
antagonize the BGMEA as it has real powers in allocating UD and UP certificates. 
 
The BGMEA can also help its members with problems like late payment of utility 
bills by some factories because of delayed payment receipts from abroad. Without its 
intermediation and its confirmation that some delays are legitimate, power may have 
been cut off to some firms. BGMEA guarantees to the power company thus helps to 
keep some firms in business. The BGMEA has also begun to play a more important 
role in negotiating government support for the sector during a crisis. For instance, 
after the 2008 recession, BGMEA lobbying led to government promises of support. 
For new markets (that is markets outside the USA, Canada and the EU) such as 
Australia and Turkey, the government offered an export cash support of 5% for 2010, 
gradually reducing to 0% after 5 years. In addition, small producers whose sales were 
less than $3.5m, the government offered a two per cent cash incentive for up to 25% 
of the firm’s FOB value of exports or its value-added beginning in 2010. The 
association also negotiated an exit policy for bankrupt firms in 2010. The policy 
provided bankrupt firms around seven years to pay off bank loans with government 
giving implicit interest rate support. The strategy allowed owners of bankrupt firms to 
avoid bankruptcy certificates that would have prevented them from doing other 
businesses.  
 
4. The Emergence of the Electronics Sector 
Electronics is one of the promising new sectors in Bangladeshi manufacturing with 
some capacity already developed at the beginning of the 2010s. Its promise lies in the 
fact that many basic electronic items like fridges, televisions, air-conditioners, CD-
players or DVD-players have a relatively significant assembly component that a 
labour-surplus economy can easily adopt. Moreover, many of the lower-technology 
parts can also be locally produced. As Chinese wages and exchange rates rise, many 
of these assembly and basic manufacturing activities will inevitably shift to lower 
wage countries. Some of the critical components like chips will undoubtedly have to 
be imported till a much higher level of overall industrialization has been achieved, but 
there are significant manufacturing and assembly operations that could be done at the 
level of manufacturing capabilities that exist in Bangladesh. However, this takeoff has 
to happen in a context where the political settlement already has characteristics of 
competitive clientelism with weak democratic institutions. Bureaucratic organizations 
have also become relatively fragmented and uncoordinated and are unlikely to play a 
coordinated role in organizing support for learning in these new industries. The only 
counterweight to these negative developments is that some economic organizations 
have developed sufficiently to be able to finance a gradual process of learning-by-
doing by themselves. As a result, we see the same gradual technology adoption 
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strategies in electronics that we see in the more mature garments firms, with personal 
assets and profits being used to gradually finance relatively risky learning. The 
significant difference with the garments industry is that while the latter had a lucky 
break at its earlier stages due to a more favourable political settlement and fortuitous 
public financing in the form of the MFA, the electronics industry did not, and 
therefore has had to accept a slower process of learning and capability development, 
and therefore slower growth from the outset.   
 
The pioneering company that has led the learning processes involved in introducing 
electronics manufacturing in Bangladesh (as opposed to small-scale assembly 
operations that had existed for some time) is Walton Hi-Tech Industries. Despite its 
name this is a Bangladeshi company that took the unusual step of advertising and 
marketing its products as ‘Made in Bangladesh’. Its marketing strategy reflects the 
economic nationalism of the five brothers who are its owners. As one of the brothers, 
Shamsul Alam explained, their mission is not just to make money but also to 
introduce new manufacturing capabilities into Bangladesh. Indeed, without such a 
commitment it would be difficult to explain how a company could enter a sector that 
was entirely new for Bangladesh and take the private risk of financing a relatively 
long period of learning-by-doing.  
 
The brothers entered business by setting up a trading company in the early 1980s, 
trading corrugated iron, imported zinc ingots and engaging contract manufacturers to 
produce the products which they marketed. Their trading company subsequently 
became involved in importing nineteen electronic items. It was at that time that they 
began to visit China to see why they could not manufacture some of these items in 
Bangladesh. Initially the project was totally self-financed, drawing on profits from 
trading. The construction of the first electronics factory began in 2004 with trial 
production from 2006. The range of products that are already part-manufactured in its 
new plant in Gazipur near Dhaka includes fridges, motorcycles, and televisions, with 
different levels of domestic content. The production of assembled air conditioners is 
targeted from late 2011 with mobile phones next in the pipeline. The big ambition of 
the brothers is to produce the first Bangladeshi motor car. Clearly, the range of 
products that the firm is experimenting with suggests that its desire at this stage is 
primarily to absorb these technologies and show they can be produced in Bangladesh 
and this outweighs purely commercial interests in achieving scale economies and high 
levels of profitability. The company’s lasting contribution may therefore be to 
introduce new technologies to Bangladesh even though it is unlikely to achieve 
competitiveness across all these different lines. 
 
In 2011 the company employed between 5500 and 6000 workers. Its production was 
still small, at around 25,000 fridges and around 4,500 motor cycles per month. Its 
motor cycles were around 20,000 takas ($300) cheaper than similar quality imported 
ones. Its refrigerators were also somewhat cheaper than imported fridges but in 
addition its extensive network of retail and service outlets throughout the country 
ensured that it could provide better after-sales service than its competition in the more 
basic segments of the market. The motor cycles already had 60 per cent domestic 
content and the plan was to begin producing engines very soon based on Chinese 
models. The fridges were entirely manufactured in Bangladesh except for the 
compressor. According to Walton engineers the compressor was also easy to make in 
Bangladesh but for the capital investment to be viable a larger scale of production was 
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required. Export markets were being explored with small trial exports to Qatar, Oman, 
Myanmar and Nepal. Total exports in 2011 were only around 1500 units but if these 
markets could be opened up there were good prospects for expansion that could 
justify the investment in making compressors. The company also assembles cathode 
ray televisions, with the tubes imported from Malaysia and LCD assembly was due to 
begin soon using South Korean panels. Clearly, panel making capabilities were far 
away in the future and there were no plans to attempt this soon. Apart from this, the 
company was selling Chinese produced mobile phones and DVD players under its 
own brand name to build name recognition in preparation for the gradual assembly 
and part manufacture of these items in Bangladesh. 
 
There was some government support in the form of customs duties and taxes that 
supported domestic production and assembly of electronic items. But this tariff 
structure had existed for some time without triggering any significant assembly or 
manufacturing of electronic products. Table 2 shows the duty and tax structure for 
refrigerators and air conditioners in 2010. The tariff protection together with lower 
duties and taxes on imported parts provided an advantage to domestic manufacturing 
and assembly. The duty and tax structure had remained unchanged since before 
Walton began its operations and the only incremental support that was associated with 
the emergence of Walton’s operations was that in 2009 the supplementary duty (SD) 
on imported refrigerators went up from 20 to 30 per cent. Shamsul Alam, one of the 
brothers who owned Walton, plausibly argued that as this policy support had come 
after Walton had set up all its plant, its production decision had not been contingent 
on this additional duty support. The additional support probably emerged because the 
new government discovered that Walton was emerging as a significant manufacturer 
and supporting it would make economic and political sense. Exports do not get any 
subsidies but there are duty drawbacks on imported materials that are re-exported.  
 
Table 2 Duties and Taxes on Selected Electronics Imports June 2010 
 Refrigerator Refrigerator 
Parts 
Air 
Conditioner 
AC Parts 
Customs Duty CD 25 25 25 25 
Regulatory Duty RD 5 5 5 5 
Supplementary Duty SD 30 0 60 20 
VAT  15 15 15 15 
Advance Income Tax 3 3 3 3 
Advance VAT  2.25 0 2.25 0 
Total  80.25 48 110.25 68 
Source: National Board of Revenue, Bangladesh. 
 
The tariff structure had clearly not been sufficient for triggering domestic learning, 
and this is itself a good indication of the initial competitiveness gap. Further evidence 
that the private initiative to absorb the costs and risks of learning played a critical role 
in refrigerators comes from the case of air conditioners. Air conditioners received at 
least as much duty and tax support but were not yet being produced in 2010. Indeed, 
according to Walton, government policies made air conditioner production more 
difficult as we discuss later. However, with the loss-financed learning carried out by 
Walton and perhaps helped by the incremental increase in supplementary duties in 
2009, fridge production achieved competitiveness with imported alternatives by 2010. 
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Walton’s ‘Made in Bangladesh’ fridges rapidly achieved price and quality 
competitiveness compared to imports. Production is also potentially price competitive 
in regional export markets though brand recognition is still low and volumes need to 
increase.  
 
The real protection provided to domestic manufacturing by duties and taxes is in 
addition significantly less than the nominal rates in Table 2 suggest because customs 
duties are routinely evaded by under-stating the value of imports or evading duties 
altogether. After repeated complaints from Walton and latterly other refrigerator 
manufacturers, individually and through the Bangladesh Refrigerator Manufacturers 
Association, the National Board of Revenue launched an investigation into 
undervaluation and dumping. Till 2010, Bangladesh used pre-shipment inspection 
companies to verify import values at the port of export and granting pre-shipment 
inspection (PSI) certification. But according to domestic producers, importers were 
able to by-pass these valuations too. After 2010 the PSI system was abandoned but 
the problem of undervaluation of imports became even worse with local customs 
valuation. An investigation by the Bangladesh Tariff Commission (BTC) in 
September 2010 found that 99% of imported fridges were undervalued (Financial 
Express Nov 2010, Volume 18 no. 12). Repeated pressure from the growing number 
of domestic refrigerator manufacturers and the reports of fraud resulting from their 
private investigations is likely to have some effect on the overall incidence of duty 
evasion by importers. 
 
The sequence through which competitiveness was achieved by Walton in its 
refrigerator manufacturing suggests that the initial level of duties and taxes was not 
sufficient for domestic production to be competitive. The gap in tacit knowledge in 
production and the implicit loss-financing that would be required was substantially 
greater. Walton’s contribution was to see the learning exercise as a challenge, 
implicitly financing the learning out of its own retained profits from its earlier trading 
businesses. This is summarized in Figure 6 which shows that private loss-financing 
was the critical driver in this sector, with government assistance playing a follower 
role in supporting the initiative. The initial level of competitiveness shown on the 
lowest competitiveness curve describes the non-viability of manufacturing of products 
of quality Q2 even with significant duties and taxes on imported refrigerators. The 
learning-by-doing in refrigerators was initially financed by Walton taking on its 
domestic capability development mission. The private loss-financing led to a higher 
level of competitiveness shown by the second curve in Figure 6. This was initially 
based on loss-financing but the strong incentives for learning based on in-house 
financing meant that the competitiveness curve actually rose rapidly towards its 
intermediate position and loss-financing did not have to continue for long. 
Competitiveness was further augmented by the additional increases in supplementary 
duties in 2009. By all accounts, the latter was not decisive in explaining the takeoff, 
and may have had a relatively small effect because of weak governance capabilities 
that resulted in the avoidance of duties by many importers of refrigerators.  
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Figure 6 The Financing of Learning in the Electronics Industry 
  
Apart from the direct support provided by government through duties and taxes on 
particular electronic products, indirect assistance was also provided by a lower 
income tax on incomes generated by the production of certain products. The 
Emergency interim government that governed during 2007 and 2008 had 
recommended that the income tax holidays allowed for sectors like garments should 
be extended to electronics but left it for the next government to implement. The 
subsequent Awami League government reduced the income tax imposed on 
electronics manufacturers from 37.5% to 5% in line with the practice in the garments 
sector. This could be described as a further instrument for sharing the loss-financing 
costs of organizing learning in a new sector. In 2009 VAT was also waived on the 
domestic value added by motorcycle and fridge manufacturers but not air 
conditioning manufacturers. Value added tax at 15 per cent was still payable on the 
imported material part of the finished product. This was temporary help to these 
sectors according to the government. Walton played a part in lobbying for these 
changes and provided the detailed information about imported parts to the National 
Board of Revenue (NBR) that would need to be provided to calculate the domestic 
value-added.  
 
These processes show that the government was fairly receptive as a follower and did 
carry out policy changes. However, lobbying was not always successful. Walton 
failed to extend the VAT reduction for domestic value-added to air conditioners. 
Interestingly, this disadvantaged Walton not because the VAT remission on domestic 
value-added was critical for making domestic production of air conditioners viable. 
Rather, Walton officers argued that this anomaly meant it could not start producing air 
conditioners in a unified plant with refrigerators because book keeping of similar parts 
going into the different products would be difficult. It would be possible for ‘enemies’ 
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to claim that Walton was shifting value-added from air conditioners to refrigerators to 
reduce its VAT liability. This would create opportunities for the tax bureaucracy to 
create problems for the company and this was sufficiently unattractive for Walton at 
that time to slow down its investments in air conditioners.  
 
The role of government was therefore to follow Walton’s initial investments in land, 
plant and machinery with some additional tax and duty assistance, but some of this 
assistance was not actually delivered because of weak enforcement of customs duties. 
The overall effect was therefore likely to have been relatively small and is shown in 
Figure 6 as a smaller but additional upward movement of the competitiveness curve. 
This additional protection may have allowed Walton to immediately produce higher 
qualities, like Y in Figure 6 as opposed to qualities like B. The government support 
for the sector had a number of interesting features. Walton did not achieve favourable 
policy changes to support its investments before it set up its production facilities. The 
family-owned business claims not to have had close political connections with any 
political party although it is possible they did have private contacts and access. The 
absence of close links was possibly fortuitous in the context of competitive 
clientelism and weak enforcement capabilities of bureaucratic organizations. While 
Walton’s owners were clearly motivated to develop new manufacturing capabilities in 
the country, opportunities for making easy profits through political connections at the 
start-up phase of their projects may have created adverse incentives. If anything, 
bureaucratic enforcement capabilities tended to become weaker during the ‘vulnerable 
democracy’ phase of Bangladesh’s political settlement after 1990 as a result of a 
creeping politicization of the bureaucracy6
 
. With such weak enforcement capabilities, 
a government strategy of assisting learning based on committing implicit subsidies in 
advance of investment decisions may have created adverse incentives. Investors may 
have justifiably believed that official conditions for receiving and using subsidies for 
learning could be easily circumvented. If so, less serious investors may have entered 
the field with the objective of capturing subsidies, and they would inevitably put in 
low if any effort in raising productivity rapidly. The subsidies may then have financed 
a lasting competitive weakness in the sector.  
The sequencing of government support to assist an already established firm that was 
likely to have become competitive with its own investments was therefore fortuitous. 
It sustained the incentive structure supporting high levels of effort. In addition, it had 
a positive effect in inducing additional companies to follow Walton, as we see below. 
However, the weakness of governance capabilities meant that the assistance was less 
effective in inducing high levels of effort in learning than it may have been. For 
instance, the government did not announce a time period for the support or the rate at 
which support would decline over time. As a result, firms may have been led to 
believe that the support was indefinite. If they did, they would not put in high levels 
of effort in learning and the underlying competitiveness curve would then not rise or 
not rise rapidly enough.  In Figure 6 this is shown as a strong learning effect from the 
internal financing of losses but a weak learning effect associated with the 
supplementary assistance provided by government. This is because the firms involved 
in internal loss financing of learning would have strong incentives to put in high 
levels of effort to raise their underlying productivity to reduce their loss financing. 
The higher productivity would allow loss financing to be reduced without the 
                                                 
6 See the companion paper to this piece, The Political Settlement and its Evolution in Bangladesh  
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competitiveness curve declining. However, the learning effect from the 
supplementary policy support may be relatively weaker as some firms may see this 
support as indefinite. Their effort to move the actual competitiveness curve higher 
would then be adversely affected. In that case the higher position of the 
competitiveness curve would only remain as long as the implicit subsidies were there, 
with a decline in competitiveness with the removal of support.  
 
The weak design of additional government support can be attributed to weak 
governance capabilities in these areas. A time bound or declining set of 
supplementary duties (which may also have been initially set at a much higher level) 
would have required stronger governance capabilities to track and implement. They 
would also have required a credible distance from political interference in the future 
to ensure that effort was expended by firms in raising productivity and not in 
persuading government to change the terms of the support. With stronger bureaucratic 
enforcement capabilities, government could also have provided more direct support 
with loss financing in learning sectors. For instance, Walton’s finance director 
identified the cost of financing as a critical constraint for their learning efforts. If 
government could devise targeted financial instruments that provided low cost loans 
for financing operational costs during the learning phase, this would be a critical 
policy instrument that could assist firms to move rapidly up the value chain. But such 
financing instruments would require specific governance capabilities on the part of 
the state to ensure that the financing came with credible conditions and was monitored 
and regulated effectively.  
 
Following Walton a number of other firms involved with the import of refrigerators 
found that their traditional business was at risk with the rapid success of Walton’s 
product. These firms then moved rapidly into domestic manufacturing to preserve 
their cost competitiveness with Walton, particularly after the changes in duties and 
taxes that followed Walton’s emergence on the scene. The companies affected were 
the more significant players in trading who would be much less inclined to engage in 
significant and sustained duty avoidance activities, and who already had some 
capabilities in assembly and manufacturing. The dominant second-tier followers in 
manufacturing were Butterfly, MyOne and Transcom.  
 
Butterfly Marketing Ltd, as its name suggests, was primarily a seller of electronics 
products, and one of the largest electronics distributors in Bangladesh. It took its 
name from the Butterfly brand sewing machines from China that it used to distribute 
in the late 1980s. It kept its name even after it moved into other products, with a focus 
on electronic items. From 1995 its business began to be dominated by its partnership 
with the South Korean chaebol LG when it became its distributor, managing the 
process of local pricing, marketing and after sales service for LG products in 
Bangladesh. The entry of Walton into local refrigerator manufacturing reduced the 
prospects for imported brands and induced Butterfly to look into domestic production. 
In 2010 it was engaged in a partnership with Hisense Group of China in a joint 
venture to produce refrigerators in Bangladesh. Hisense would have a thirty per cent 
stake and provide the compressors. The rest of the refrigerator would be domestically 
manufactured, as in Walton. Production was projected to begin by end 2011 and the 
company believed that exports to Myanmar, Laos and maybe even to China were 
possible and necessary to make the enterprise profitable. The investment in this 
project including the cost of land was around twenty million US dollars and the 
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projected output was around 200,000 units per annum. Raising the financing was not 
a problem with banks because of the brand name of Butterfly. As in the case of 
garments, once the first significant firm had established itself and shown that the 
learning problem could be overcome and a competitive product could be produced 
within an acceptable timeframe, the risk for external financiers fell dramatically and 
follower firms did not have the same problems in raising finance.  
 
Butterfly was also moving into the assembly of colour televisions and air conditioners 
with LG. The full local production of colour televisions was not yet possible because 
this required a broad range of local component suppliers and these industries had not 
yet developed. The move into television assembly was also prompted by changes in 
the domestic market of a different kind. Higher quality imported televisions were 
being competed out of the market by low quality assemblers who imported colour and 
black and white tubes from China, Malaysia and India and then assembled them in 
boxes with ancillary electronics. An imported fourteen inch LG colour television cost 
9000 takas in 2011 (around 130 dollars) with all taxes. In contrast, assemblers could 
often evade the (lower) import duties on components and sell a similar sized 
television for less than half this price at around 4000 takas. Interestingly, here the 
lower duties on components and the weak governance capabilities of enforcing even 
these lower duties on smaller companies importing tubes and components created 
pressure on a large formal-sector distributor like Butterfly to move into its own 
assembly operations with LG. It could not hope to achieve the prices that the 
unbranded assemblers could offer but by reducing the price gap on a branded 
television, it hoped to increase its market share. However, as Butterfly’s management 
pointed out, they were limited to assembly operations as far as televisions were 
concerned because of the limited development of the domestic component industries.  
 
MyOne Electronics Industry Ltd. also started life as a trading company in 2001 and 
gradually moved into assembly operations. This was primarily due to a duty and tax 
structure that encouraged assembly. As early as 2002 the company was assembling 
black and white televisions. The import of a finished TV faced overall duties and 
taxes of 78 per cent, but the picture tube on its own faced 32 per cent, the cabinet 52 
per cent, and the printed circuit board (PCB) 78 per cent. If the PCB came unfinished 
the taxes were further reduced to 32 per cent. The average duties and taxes on imports 
of components were therefore around 40 per cent and the difference with a total of 78 
per cent on fully assembled imports provided the margin that allowed domestic 
assembly operations to begin. Domestic value added was around 25 per cent. After 
two years the PCB was also brought in unfinished further improving margins. 
Production was initially around 100-120 pieces per day growing to around 200 to 220. 
But the assembly of black and white televisions has now stopped as a result of 
changing consumer demand. The assembly of colour televisions began in 2005, with 
current production around 400 sets a day. The company also assembled DVD players 
and voltage stabilizers using imported Chinese components. MyOne was the market 
leader for television sales in Bangladesh in 2011 with 33 of its own showrooms, a 
further 150 exclusive franchise showrooms and another 200 or so dealers who stock 
their products along with other brands. It was finishing the construction of a new 
factory in Gazipur that would begin production in 2011 assembling colour televisions 
and LCDs. The domestic manufacturing part was limited to cabinets with all 
electronics components being imported. The investment in the new factory amounted 
to almost 3 million dollars, excluding the cost of the land. MyOne also planned to 
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assemble air conditioners in the future given the duty and tax differential on imports 
of components compared to finished products. 
 
The experience of MyOne and Butterfly in assembly operations suggests that the 
learning required to achieve competitiveness in assembly was very limited given the 
duty and tax structure. However, assembly operations for televisions and air 
conditioners were very different from the manufacture of refrigerators because the 
domestic value added in actual manufacturing processes was much lower in the 
former. The risk involved in learning and the investment by the firm in learning-by-
doing were correspondingly lower. The competitiveness gap with imported products 
could be fully met by the tax and duty differentials on imported components and 
imported finished products. The importance of the duty and tax differentials for 
assemblers meant that they had a strong incentive to monitor tax avoidance and report 
avoidance to the authorities. According to the Managing Director of MyOne, Razzak 
Khan, the Bangladesh Electronics Merchandisers Association and Bangladesh 
Television Manufacturers Association and others monitor the market and report 
suspiciously cheap imports to intelligence and other agencies. Government finds it 
difficult to keep ignoring persistent reports about specific illegal importers and they 
are eventually forced to stop. This was a more favourable assessment of current 
enforcement capabilities compared to that of Walton and Butterfly.  
 
It was certainly the case that the implicit subsidy to assemblers based on differential 
duties and taxes on parts compared to the finished product were sufficient, even 
allowing for partial enforcement, to allow domestic assembly to achieve 
competitiveness. Undoubtedly some learning-by-doing followed in the large assembly 
factories that were being set up by Butterfly, MyOne and other assemblers. We would 
also expect this learning-by-doing to have some long-run impact. But it has to be seen 
if the companies involved in assembly see the duty and tax protection as temporary 
and put in enough effort in the learning process to ensure that eventually assembly 
operations can be competitive even in the absence of duty and tax differentials on 
components. This may not be possible at all if components prices in international 
markets available to small scale assemblers in Bangladesh precluded the assembly of 
competitive finished products. This would be the case for instance if producers of 
finished products in more advanced countries produced many of their own 
components at a lower internal cost of production than the international price or could 
buy components at a significantly lower price from components suppliers because 
they could buy on a greater scale or were in long-term relationships with them.  
 
The Managing Director, Razzak Khan, was very aware of the limitations of assembly 
operations as a strategy of moving up the value chain in electronics. Indeed, he argued 
that a substantial change in the orientation of the Bangladeshi electronics industry was 
required if it were to achieve sustainable competitiveness in some sectors. The 
domestic market for electronics in Bangladesh would remain relatively small in the 
near future (despite its very large population) and therefore manufacturers could not 
hope to achieve significant economies of scale by focusing on protected domestic 
markets. At the same time it was difficult for Bangladesh to compete in international 
markets with countries like China which had an integrated components industry. It 
would be difficult to enter large-scale production of say televisions without a 
diversified domestic components industry, which in turn could not develop without a 
diversified range of final electronics products being produced. It was therefore not a 
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viable strategy for Bangladesh to try and move towards the full production of finished 
products like televisions. Rather it should focus on a few more basic components that 
go into a number of electronic products. If Bangladesh could achieve scale economies 
in these selected components it could become a competitive supplier to countries like 
China. This would require genuine learning-by-doing but Bangladesh would have a 
real chance of achieving competitiveness in a few sectors based on its much lower 
wages. This was a very plausible argument but its realization would require very 
different policies. It would require the achievement of global competitiveness in 
manufacturing a range of basic electronics components as opposed to the assembly of 
finished products like televisions. This would require the setting up of production 
lines with more significant scale economies and would also involve financing 
significant periods of loss-making to enable the learning-by-doing that would create 
genuinely competitive productive sectors. This would clearly be a different strategy 
than assembly behind tariff barriers. Moreover, while the growth of assembly 
operations could be helping to develop basic knowledge and capacities in the 
electronics sector, this would not necessarily help Bangladesh in moving into globally 
competitive component manufacturing. The production facilities and tacit knowledge 
required for competitive production in the latter are likely to be quite different. 
 
A similar focus on local assembly of televisions and a pressure to move into the 
manufacturing of refrigerators was also reported by a third electronics trading 
company, Transcom Electronics. The company has a long history but its electronics 
business emerged in the late eighties when it took over the electronics business of 
Phillips who left Bangladesh in 1989. At that time Phillips used to make light bulbs 
(using imported glass bulb shells) and assembled its own brand of television using 
imported knock down kits. Transcom continued to assemble televisions under its own 
Transtec brand name, but these were knock down kits with no domestic manufactured 
content. It also imported finished televisions from Samsung. There was a rapid growth 
in the production of assembled own-brand televisions, from 6000 sets in 2007 to 
27,000 planned for 2011. The company also progressed over this period from the 
assembly of CRT televisions to LCD televisions, using South Korean screens and 
Chinese motherboards. However, this type of assembly operation was simply based 
on duty and tax differentials on imported parts as opposed to imported finished goods, 
with limited domestic value added and learning-by-doing. The effect of these 
assembly activities on raising know-how and achieving competitiveness was likely to 
be limited. However, like Butterfly, Transcom also found that the emergence of the 
local Walton brand of refrigerators negatively impacted its business of importing 
refrigerators. Transcom too was forced to adopt a strategy to manufacture 
refrigerators as imported ones were no longer competitive against Walton. 
Refrigerator manufacturing is clearly different from the assembly of televisions 
because the refrigerator is almost entirely manufactured rather than being assembled 
from imported components. In early 2011 Transcom was some way behind Butterfly 
in terms of setting up plant for producing refrigerators but it was clear to its 
management that without domestic production it would lose significant market share.  
 
The electronics sector in Bangladesh in 2011 was therefore at a very early stage of 
development. The only significant breakthrough in manufacturing was in refrigerators 
where there was substantial domestic value-added. Here, the pioneering role of 
Walton as a loss-financing investor committed to capability development was critical. 
Walton’s growing market share based on its investment in domestic production 
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demonstrates its success in developing significant productive capabilities through 
learning-by-doing. The subsequent additional assistance that government provided 
helped Walton to some extent, but the most important effect was to make the 
imported refrigerator business even less viable for the big trading companies. The 
major importers were unable to significantly evade the border taxes on finished 
refrigerators because they were big companies that could not operate entirely outside 
the formal rules. This resulted in a number of initiatives on the part of these 
companies to begin their own domestic refrigerator manufacturing and this is likely to 
create pressures for further quality and price improvements and a search for export 
markets. All of this is likely to assist the development of this segment of the 
electronics market.  
 
In contrast, the move into television assembly appears to face more significant 
challenges. It has been almost entirely an assembly operation based on the incentives 
for assembly created by differential duties and taxes on the imports of parts compared 
to the finished products. However, here the gap in the capabilities required for any 
significant domestic manufacturing of the finished product is so great that there has 
been no substantial attempt to produce any components domestically. This would 
require setting up significant production processes and finance the learning-by-doing. 
The level of protection offered by the border taxes is clearly sufficient for inducing 
assembly but not for financing the learning-by-doing that would be required for 
producing any of the components that go into producing a television. Indeed, there are 
good reasons to believe that the domestic production of all or even most of the 
components that go into a sophisticated product like a television cannot be a viable 
strategy for Bangladesh. The most viable pathway into electronics is likely to involve 
the development of a few specialized components industries that can operate at a 
sufficiently high scale of production to achieve international competitiveness in those 
areas. These components could also service a domestic assembly industry for 
televisions or other goods, but the relatively small domestic market would not make a 
globally competitive components industry viable.  
 
The development of such a components industry will require dedicated policy support 
and mechanisms of financing the required learning-by-doing. Given the short time 
horizons and weak enforcement capabilities of a competitive clientelist polity and 
weak bureaucratic organizations, this is not likely to be forthcoming without 
significant pressure from the sector and the development of financing instruments and 
policy mechanisms whose enforcement requirements can be plausibly met given the 
political settlement. The experience of industry-led changes in policy suggests that if 
a case can be built by the electronics industry for a narrowly defined and targeted set 
of policies to support such an initiative, progress may be made, particularly if 
investments are led by pioneering companies like Walton. The experience of the 
electronics industry is positive in the sense that it demonstrates that concerted voice 
from industry associations can result in some improvements in enforcement, for 
instance against duty evasion. A similarly coordinated pressure from industry to 
support a small number of targeted interventions to assist the establishment of a 
components industry may not be too unrealistic.  
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5. The Crisis in Power Generation  
The power sector crisis reveals a different set of problems associated with features of 
the political settlement in Bangladesh. Power shortages are a major constraint on 
economic development, particularly for the growing manufacturing sector. Power 
shortages are identified by close to 80 per cent of firms as a major constraint on the 
expansion of their business in different surveys (Asian Tiger Capital Partners 2010). 
Yet successive governments have failed to make a significant breakthrough in power 
generation. In 2009, Bangladesh had around 4,162 MW (megawatts) of available 
generating capacity, compared to around 15,000 MW in Pakistan with a similar 
population. As Pakistan suffers from serious power shortages of its own, this gives an 
idea of the severity of the crisis in Bangladesh (World Bank 2010). The industrial 
sector cannot rely on the power supplied through the national grid and almost every 
manufacturing unit therefore has to rely on its own captive power generation. 
Government policy has also been to encourage this by supplying cheap gas to 
industry, and estimates of captive power generation are close to another 2.500 MW in 
2009. But shortages of gas have affected captive power generation too, making the 
power crisis very serious indeed for industry. Many producers have been forced to 
back up their gas-based captive power generation with oil and diesel generators, 
significantly increasing their production costs.  
 
The constraint facing power generation is also a financing problem but one which is 
somewhat different from the financing of learning-by-doing and the acquisition of 
tacit knowledge. Power sector investments in fuel extraction (gas or coal in the case 
of Bangladesh) and in the subsequent electricity generation are long-term investments 
where costs and returns have to be managed over long periods to be feasible. The 
problem is that long-term contracts and calculations are difficult when the political 
settlement has features of competitive clientelism with short time horizons of the 
ruling coalition and with low and declining governance capabilities of the 
bureaucratic organizations regulating investment in these sectors. The institutional 
structure regulating investments in this sector has therefore proved inadequate. A 
description of the nature of the financing problem suggests that marginal 
improvements in existing institutions are unlikely to be effective and entirely new 
ways of financing long-term investments are required, with governance consistent 
with the features of the political settlement. The investment problems in the extraction 
of fossil fuels are related to the problems in power generation but our focus is on the 
latter as the generation problem has to be solved even if Bangladesh has no 
indigenous fossil fuels and has to rely on imports.  
 
Around 83 per cent of Bangladesh’s electricity was generated using domestic natural 
gas in 2009. Proven reserves of natural gas in Bangladesh are around 13 trillion cubic 
feet in 2010, which are estimated to cover consumption growing at 6 per cent a year 
for only about thirteen years. But it is also estimated (with a 90 per cent probability) 
that undiscovered reserves may increase the total to more than 30 trillion cubic feet 
(Asian Development Bank 2010: 23-24). For a variety of reasons, gas exploration was 
slow in the 2000s, partly because of a High Court injunction to stop new production 
contracts with foreign companies after an explosion in a gas field in 1997. Bangladesh 
has also been reluctant to allow gas companies to sell gas abroad as there is a public 
perception that the country needs to keep its limited gas for its own development. This 
has discouraged foreign investment in gas exploration as multinationals believe that 
cost recovery will be much faster if they are able to sell the gas rapidly at international 
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prices. The injunction was lifted in 2006 for exploration in offshore blocks. In 2011 
the government signed an agreement with ConocoPhillips of the US to explore gas in 
the Bay of Bengal with the right to export gas. Perhaps because of the long hiatus in 
exploration the deal was arguably too advantageous to the multinational. Apparently 
Bangladesh will have to build pipelines to transport its share of the gas from 150 
miles offshore at its own cost, and if it is unable to do so, the multinational can export 
Bangladesh’s gas share too. Not surprisingly, the deal was strongly criticized by the 
National Committee for the Protection of Oil, Gas and Mineral Resources, Power and 
Ports, a citizen’s group that includes influential academics and professionals.  
 
Imported oil was the second most important fuel for electricity generation, accounting 
for 8 per cent of generation in 2009. Since 2010, the government has attempted to 
bypass difficult investments in cost-effective large-scale power plants by 
commissioning expensive short term ‘rental’ power projects. The rental plants use 
imported fuel oil and were awarded contracts of from three to five years duration and 
for this period at least, the share of oil-generated power would be significantly higher. 
The contracts were granted soon after the new Awami League government came to 
power in 2009 without proper tendering ostensibly to speedily address the power 
shortages facing the country. Short-term rentals are a costly way of generating 
electricity, with the cost of generation per kWh (kilowatt hour) at least four times 
higher compared to larger scale generation facilities. In addition, perhaps because of 
the lack of transparency and competition in the award of the contracts, the prices 
offered to generators by the purchaser, the Power Development Board (PDB) were 
particularly unattractive for the taxpayer. The taxpayer was affected because PDB 
purchases power from generators at a price that is typically a little higher than the 
price at which it sells to final consumers. As a result, when the PDB purchases 
electricity at a very high price, its losses go up exponentially and these have to be 
financed by transfers from the budget. In 2011, the effect of the rental contracts was 
to increase already significant PDB losses to around one billion dollars per annum, 
clearly an unsustainable situation (The Daily Star December 25 2011).  
 
Coal ranks third, accounting for 5 per cent of electricity generation in 2009. 
Bangladesh is estimated to have around 2.5 billion tons of coal in five coal fields in 
Dinajpur and Rangpur that could provide enough fuel for several decades of 
electricity generation at current levels. However, coal mining has also been held up by 
debates about the environmental impact of open pit mining which has strong local 
opposition but is possibly the most effective method of extracting most of the coal. 
There is also strong domestic opposition to foreign involvement in coal mining. The 
Awami League government that came to power in 2009 approved a number of coal-
fired power plants based on imported coal. The last 4 per cent of electricity generation 
in 2009 came from renewable sources such as the Karnaphuli dam and some limited 
biogas and solar generation. These could grow somewhat in the future, but 
hydroelectric potential is limited within Bangladesh because of the nature of the 
terrain. At the moment there is no nuclear generation but the Awami League 
government also signed a framework agreement with the Russian Federation to 
construct a nuclear power plant at Ruppur. The suggested date for completion is 2017 
but this is not likely to be realized given technical challenges and the environmental 
and other opposition to such a plant.  
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While problems facing the exploration and extraction of fossil fuels need to be solved, 
the immediate question is why the generation of power could not be increased with 
imported fuels. After all, the experience of short-term rentals during 2010-11 shows 
that the government was willing to subsidize the generation of power, indeed to an 
unrealistic extent. Yet it failed to deploy subsidies to facilitate the installation of cost-
effective and sustainable power plants. The institutional failures here are related to the 
ways in which the political settlement  (Khan 2010, 2011) affects the operation of 
institutions relevant for enabling investments in the power generation sector. An 
examination of these determinants suggests that the constraining factors are unlikely 
to be significantly affected in the short to medium term using traditional policy tools 
of improving ‘good governance’. This includes, as we shall see, attempts to improve 
procedures so that the awarding of contracts is made more transparent. However, an 
examination of the political economy creating constraints in this sector suggests that a 
way to break the cycle of constraints would be for government and development 
partners to create a substantial long-term investment fund that can lower the cost of 
long-term finance for the power sector. For this to be effective, there would also have 
to be effective governance reforms to create capacity in the bureaucratic agencies 
charged with managing the conditions for accessing these funds. Bureaucratic 
capacity building is not easy in a competitive clientelist polity, but if the goals of 
capacity building are restricted to one or two critical agencies there is a better chance 
of success. Few sectors can be more critical than power and the focus of capacity 
building on these agencies can be justified as vital for sustaining development.  
 
Significant Characteristics of the Power Generation Sector  
The power generation sector in Bangladesh in the late 2000s and early 2010s 
appeared to be trapped in a vicious cycle. The interlinked characteristics of the 
problem can only be understood if we simultaneously look at features of the political 
settlement and features of specific economic policies that affected the evolution of the 
power sector for some years. The political settlement had evolved into a competitive 
clientelist one, with a gradually increasing fragmentation of the political organizations 
out of which the ruling coalition was constructed through political competition. The 
relevant economic history of the power sector refers to the factors that resulted in a 
relatively low share of the public sector in power generation in Bangladesh. 
Government policies for some time had been aimed at increasing private sector 
participation in generation. However, private sector investors in power generation 
faced growing risks which could not be adequately addressed. The main risk was the 
credibility of the long-term contracts made by the sole purchaser of electricity, the 
Power Development Board or PDB. The latter contracted to buy electricity at prices 
fixed by the contract that was granted to producers through a process of competitive 
bidding. But the prices at which the PDB could sell electricity on to final consumers 
were constrained partly by the political imperative of keeping power prices low. In 
addition, if the supply of power had positive externalities by accelerating the growth 
of employment in the productive sector, small subsidies to power could be justified in 
terms of a standard economic logic.  
 
The problem was that the growing deficit of the PDB created a very specific ‘risk 
premium’ for new investors in terms of the credibility of the long-term contracts they 
were signing. In this context, the political settlement with its implications for the 
enforceability of formal contracts ensured that the only likely investors in long-term 
projects would be firms that had close political connections with political 
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organizations. Political connections could help to ensure either that contract 
enforcement would continue for long enough for the investment to become viable or 
in a more adverse scenario it would allow enough up-front profits to be made so that 
the financial viability of the investment would not depend on the enforcement of 
contracts in the distant future. However, these types of calculations result in a further 
worsening of the risk premium for subsequent investors, because the adverse selection 
of politically connected organizations has consequences for the pricing that PDB 
contracts and therefore the future viability of subsequent contracts. This logic can set 
off a vicious cycle of escalating risk perceptions and costs of financing investments in 
long-term projects. We begin by looking at some of the evidence, then present an 
analytical argument that links these characteristics in a causal framework that is 
located within a specific political settlement, and finally discuss the institutional 
escape routes given the likely persistence of the political settlement.  
 
i) The share of the private sector in electricity generation is already high and set to 
significantly increase. In Bangladesh the private sector generated 38 per cent of 
electricity in 2010 compared to less than 15 per cent in India. Moreover, the strategy 
of recent governments has been to base expansion almost entirely on the private 
sector. The Awami League government of 2009 in its ‘New Initiative’ planned to 
attract an additional US$ 9 billion of investment in power generation by 2015, of 
which US$ 8 billion was expected from the private sector. If this had been achieved, 
then ignoring other private sector projects such as rental projects, the proposed 
additional capacity would raise the share of the private sector to around 65% of 
generation capacity (based on figures in Government of Bangladesh 2010). The 
reasons for the focus on the private sector can be traced back to weak bureaucratic 
capabilities in Bangladesh, and the significant weakening of these capabilities as a 
result of the disruptions and politicization of the bureaucracy that happened in the 
years after 1971. The attempt to nationalize almost everything between 1972 and 
1975 had the perverse effect of weakening the civil service by involving it in politics 
and primitive accumulation. The post-1975 political settlement moved towards a 
much greater reliance on the private sector and capabilities in the public sector were 
further neglected. However, in a poor country with weak contract enforcement, the 
expectation that the private sector will invest in long-term projects where revenue is 
derived from government contracts to buy electricity over a period of many years or 
decades faces serious enforcement and incentive problems.  
 
The political economy of investments in power generation in Bangladesh can be 
compared to that in the Indian power generation sector. India has achieved 
significantly greater power generation relative to Bangladesh, even though Indian 
power generation also faces significant challenges ahead. In 2007 India’s per capita 
consumption of electricity was 714 KWh compared to 155 KWh in Bangladesh 
(World Development Indicators 2010). In contrast to Bangladesh, the public sector 
has played a much more significant role in India’s power generation. Till 1990, 
electricity generation was almost entirely reserved for the public sector. Even after 
liberalization and the recognition of private sector participation in the Electricity Act 
2003, the private sector generated less than 15 per cent of Indian electricity in 2010. 
In addition, the expansion plans of Indian policy-makers realistically foresee a 
relatively limited role for the private sector. For instance, the 11th Plan (2007-2011) 
envisaged a total additional investment of US$ 87.5 billion in power generation of 
which only US$ 18 billion or around 20 per cent was expected from the private sector  
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(Altaf 2009: Table 2.1). These figures do not necessarily reflect a bias against the 
private sector because the Indian government has been trying hard since 2003 to 
attract private participation in infrastructure. Rather, they reflect the difficulty of 
attracting private investment in generation even in India. Of the several hundred 
MOUs that were signed for IPPs since 2003, only about twenty actually came on 
stream by 2010. An important reason for most withdrawals was the lack of 
sufficiently credible payment guarantees. 
 
ii) The risk premium for private sector financing for power generation is high and 
growing and affects the long-term feasibility of private investment. Private investors 
in power generation and ultimately their financiers have to absorb the risks that affect 
long term investment in a poor country. These include political risk that future 
governments will not honour contracts made by previous governments who may also 
be their mortal enemies in a competitive clientelist context. The difficulty of 
contracting against all future contingencies and the risk that even contracted 
contingencies may be difficult to enforce combine to raise the risk premium, and this 
is reflected in the cost of financing large long-term infrastructure projects using 
market financing. In addition, there is the specific problem of the viability of the PDB 
as the purchaser of power when it is well known that the subsidies that the PDB 
requires must grow in line with the growth of the power sector and with any increase 
in the purchase price of power that is greater than the selling price. The typical PDB 
contract to purchase power is based on current fuel costs, and the price has a ‘pass 
through’ clause that adjusts the purchase price if the fuel price increases. This protects 
the particular generator but by making PDB more vulnerable, increases the risk for the 
power sector collectively unless the PDB can be expected to pass on all fuel cost 
increases to consumers. This is unlikely in a poor country. For instance, in 2010 the 
World Bank estimated that the projected transfers to PDB were likely to grow from 
around 8 billion taka in 2008-09 (around US$ 115 million) to around 29 billion taka 
in 2011-12 (around US$ 415 million) as a result of the rental power project contracts 
coming on stream (World Bank 2010: 21). In fact as referred to earlier the actual 
annual subsidy was reported to have grown to around US$ 1 billion by 2012. This was 
a result of an escalation in fuel costs faster than retail tariffs and perhaps also because 
some of these rental contracts were even less favourable than the World Bank had 
initially estimated. Clearly, subsequent private sector investors contracting with the 
PDB would take its worsening financial viability into account when signing long-term 
contracts. More than that, banks and financial institutions providing loans to these 
investors would add a risk premium to the price of their lending that would depend on 
their own perception of the future viability of the PDB and its finances. 
 
The post-2008 financial crisis in the West has further raised the risk aversion of 
international banks and therefore the cost of finance for developing countries like 
Bangladesh. The relatively limited financing available from local banks, the higher 
costs of organizing international financing packages and the relatively limited cover 
currently available from international financial institutions like the World Bank makes 
it implausible that the ambitious expansion of private sector led investments in the 
power sector envisaged by the Bangladesh government can materialize. In particular, 
the cost of financing power sector investments will increase, partly as a result of 
worsening international financial conditions but primarily because of the higher risk 
premiums that financiers will add to successive power projects where the buyer is the 
PDB. The cost of financing is a significant determinant of the cost of generation. For 
64 
 
instance, for a relatively small 400 MW plant requiring an investment of US$ 340 
million, AT Capital calculate the impact on the cost of generation of a small change in 
the cost of financing. In their example, the investor covers 30 per cent of the financing 
cost with equity and 70 per cent from loans. In one scenario, the investor has to raise 
this in the higher cost domestic market, and in the other they can borrow in 
international markets at a lower interest cost. Power sector investors in Bangladesh do 
have access to low interest loans from a domestic financial institution financing long-
term projects, the Investment Promotion and Financing Facility (IPFF). This can lend 
at around 6 per cent but their lending is restricted to 8 per cent of the total project 
cost. The other 62 per cent in this example therefore has to come from domestic banks 
which would charge at least 12.5 per cent in 2010. In contrast, foreign financing of the 
entire 70 per cent may have been available at around 7 per cent. The interest rates in 
their example are not necessarily realistic because they ignore risk premiums. What is 
significant is that an extra 5.5 per cent interest charge on just 62 per cent of capital 
results in an additional 16.4 per cent in the cost of generating a kilowatt-hour of 
electricity (Asian Tiger Capital Partners 2010: 24-5). These figures illustrate that a 
relatively modest increase in interest costs can have a relatively big impact on the 
percentage increase in the cost of power. This in turn stretches PDB finances and can 
raise the risk premium and therefore cost of financing for the next power project. 
 
In contrast, India’s greater success in generating electricity is closely associated with 
the availability of relatively low cost public financing, initially for public sector 
generators but increasingly also for the growing number of private sector generators. 
This financing has come from fiscal resources going directly to finance investments 
by public sector power generators and also through a number of financial institutions, 
in particular the Power Finance Corporation (PFC), set up in 1986. The PFC is 
particularly interesting as it was set up as a special purpose development bank for 
power utilities given the perceived chronic underfunding in the Indian power sector. 
The Indian government initially capitalized it with equity and tax free bonds. The 
timing of its creation was serendipitous. Within a few years the Indian capital markets 
had matured enough to develop an appetite for infrastructure bonds. In 1997 the PFC 
underwent securitization and emerged with its balance sheet healthier. In 2007 the 
government of India divested close to ten per cent of its holdings in the company in 
one of the most successful initial public offerings by a public sector enterprise. 
  
Even though the corporation now provides funds to both public and private sector 
companies its disbursals remain skewed towards the public sector given the 
dominance of the public sector in Indian power generation. The PFC is the main 
provider of funds for investments in generation and does this through term and bridge 
loans, supplier’s credit, debt refinancing and lease financing among other methods. It 
provides the public sector with up to 80 per cent loan coverage for generation projects 
and up to 50 per cent for private sector projects. The corporation itself raises money 
through bonds which enjoy the highest credit ratings in India and according to 
Moody’s its international rating was identical to India’s sovereign rating. The ability 
of the PFC to access public finances and borrow at credit ratings available for Indian 
sovereign debt significantly reduces the cost of capital in the Indian power generation 
sector. For instance, in 2010 India’s prime lending rate was 12.25% and most PFC 
loans were actually cheaper: between 10.75% for highly rated states and AAA rated 
companies to 12.25% for some non-rated private sector borrowers.  
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iii) A very small number of players with close relationships with government remain 
at the final stages of bidding for significant power generation projects. A recent 
example is the bidding for major new projects under the Awami League government 
that took power in 2009. The three major projects were the Bibiyana 1 and Bibiyana 2 
plants and the Meghnaghat 2 plant. Each of these plants had a capacity of between 
300 and 450 MW, primarily using gas, and located near known gas fields. 
Meghnaghat 2 was to have the capability of using fuel oil as well. All three contracts 
were granted to Summit Group, a power sector company whose CEO was the brother 
of the Commerce Minister of the day. Summit was also one of the companies that 
benefited from favourable rental power project contracts. The prices bid by Summit 
for power generation in the three major contracts were not high so there were obvious 
questions about how realistic its bid was and how it intended to finance its investment 
in these projects. Interviews with Summit financial officers revealed that it did have a 
financial plan but it was based on achieving indirect access to favourable public 
financing. The company had till February 2012 to finalize its financial package but by 
end 2011 this had still not been completed. At best one or two of the three projects 
may eventually be financed, but even that might be an optimistic assessment.  
 
iv) There appears to be significant leakage at the procurement stage in power sector 
projects. This is in contrast to countries like India where significant leakages are more 
likely to happen at the distribution stage. Procurement problems have resulted in 
persistent problems with the World Bank and other international financial institutions 
about procedures and transparency. To enable rent capture at the procurement stage, 
technical specifications are often tailored to ensure that bidders preferred by particular 
insiders are favoured (by tailoring the specifications to the machines supplied by that 
bidder), or specifications are deliberately set to be very demanding to ensure that 
outsider bidders (who have to comply fully with specifications) can only bid relatively 
high prices for their electricity while insiders can bid lower generation prices because 
they can expect lax monitoring of the specifications when it comes to implementation 
(World Bank 2010: 17-19, 22-30).  
 
All clientelist political settlements can be expected to be associated with weaknesses 
in the enforcement of rules and therefore with some leakage of public resources. But 
the mechanisms through which leakages happen are important and can be different 
across countries and political settlements. For instance, unlike Bangladesh, power 
generation projects in India do not appear to result in serious losses at the 
procurement stage. The major leakage of rents in the Indian power sector takes place 
at the transmission and distribution (T&D) stage through the State Electricity Boards 
(SEBs) in each state. Unaccounted-for electricity (mainly due to theft or non-
payment, but also some technical losses) amounts to an astounding 30 per cent, 
equivalent to almost US$ 9.6 billion in 2010 according to the Government of India’s 
own figures. These losses are projected to grow further to almost US$ 14.5 billion by 
2011. The likelihood of a possible future default in payments to power generators is 
therefore similar to Bangladesh and may have resulted in a similar vicious cycle of 
high risk premiums, high generation costs and shrinking time horizons for rent 
seekers if growth in generation capacity had been driven largely by the private sector 
raising capital in private financial markets.  
 
v) The award of contracts in power generation projects is subject to prolonged 
decision-making delays and is often blocked at the final stages. The absence of 
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significant private sector investments since 2002 is remarkable and distinguishes 
Bangladesh from most other developing countries. This is despite several attempts at 
repeating the experience of the two early (and very successful) independent power 
producer projects (IPPs). In subsequent cases, insiders were divided about the award 
of the contract in question, which was typically blocked at a late stage. Examples 
include the decision not to award the Sirajganj 450MW IPP in 2004. This was 
ostensibly on the grounds that the sponsor (Summit) did not have adequate experience 
even though the World Bank made the case that the tariff offered by the sponsor was 
competitive and the procurement procedures were tolerable. The first round of 
Bibiyana I also ended in a stalemate because of unrealistic bidding and construction 
timetables that deterred outside bidders, while the local bidder (again Summit) was 
disqualified this time for not meeting the net worth qualification requirement. The 
sole remaining bidder was Malaysian Powertek, but their bid price was rejected by the 
emergency caretaker government that took power in 2007. Multiple decision-making 
points, weak technical assessment capacities within government, the existence of 
different factions within government supporting different sponsors, and risk aversion 
on the part of some bureaucrats fearing future charges of corruption are amongst the 
reasons cited. The Awami League government that took power in 2009 did award a 
number of contracts but the most important ones were to Summit, a company very 
close to the government.  
 
vi) There have been remarkably few major successes in the completion of independent 
power producer projects so far. In fact, there have been no significant successful 
private investments in generation since the Haripur and Meghnaghat 1 investments 
that became operational in 2001 and 2002 respectively. In both these cases, the cost of 
capital was reduced as a result of World Bank involvement, directly in the case of 
Meghnaghat 1 through the financing provided by the Infrastructure Development 
Company Ltd. (IDCOL) which in turn received World Bank financing. In the case of 
Haripur the World Bank contributed to reducing the cost of capital indirectly by 
providing a Partial Risk Guarantee. Procurement processes were also effective in both 
cases and achieved two of the lowest costs per KWh in the IPP sector and even 
relative to average public sector generation costs (World Bank 2010: 16). 
 
It is very significant that favourable institutional finance played a critical role in 
successful private sector power generation projects in the past. IDCOL’s US$ 80 
million dollar contribution to Meghnaghat 1 was the largest loan ever made by a 
Bangladeshi financial institution and it made a significant contribution to the cost of 
capital in that project. The government has contributed US$ 350 million in local 
currency to IDCOL in 2009-10 and the ADB committed another US$ 165 million 
(Asian Tiger Capital Partners 2010: 12). However, IDCOL does not currently focus 
on power generation and its priorities have shifted elsewhere. The biggest potential 
financing source for power sector investments in the early 2010s was the Investment 
Promotion and Financing Facility (IPFF), a World Bank supported fund that has 
disbursed US$ 47.5m in low interest loans since 2006. A number of small power 
plants have benefited from this financing facility (Asian Tiger Capital Partners 2010: 
12). The importance of low cost institutional financing for infrastructure projects is 
well understood but compared to the billions of dollars required to make a significant 
impact on the scale of power required in Bangladesh, the dominant public sector 
financial institutions like the IPFF have at most a capital base in the low hundreds of 
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millions of dollars, and only a small part of that is potentially available for power 
sector investments.  
 
Analytical Framework  
The six characteristics of Bangladesh’s power generation sector described above are 
closely connected in terms of mutual causation. The most important directions of 
causality, drawing on our understanding of the contemporary political settlement in 
Bangladesh, are summarized in Figure 7. The multiple lines of causality show that 
many critical features are both cause and effect in an interdependent causal 
framework. Understanding the lines of causation is important for designing effective 
responses to the constraints that collectively both cause and describe the challenges 
facing the electricity generation sector.  
 
 
Figure 7 Causal links between critical characteristics in power generation 
 
Our starting point is characteristic (i) in Figure 7 that describes the dominance of the 
private sector in electricity generation in Bangladesh and the strategy of increasing 
power generation by relying almost entirely on the private sector. This in turn reflects 
the fact that the public sector and public funds are no longer perceived to be sufficient 
for financing the expansion of power generation in Bangladesh. The share of IPPs in 
power generation is therefore projected to grow rapidly in Bangladesh, if the plans of 
governments can actually be implemented. Nevertheless, a comparison with India 
suggests that policy-makers may be expecting the mix between public and private to 
shift too rapidly in the direction of the private sector in Bangladesh given the 
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unwillingness of private sector investors to invest in a sector with high risk 
characteristics. Indeed a rapid initial growth of private investment may have severe 
implications for the risk premium facing new investors in power sector projects.  
 
Arrow 1 describes the general problem with IPP investment in developing countries. 
Private sector investments in power are not in general constrained by classic ‘public 
good’ problems of non-excludability and non-rivalry as power is not a pure public 
good. Nevertheless, market failures are significant because of potential problems with 
contract enforcement due to political risks and unforeseen future contingencies. These 
are important in a sector with significant structural risks due to inevitable 
uncertainties surrounding future fossil fuel supply and fuel pricing over long periods. 
To reduce the risks facing private sector investors, PPP contracts specify a number of 
contingencies that are covered by the government. In particular, they typically 
guarantee payments for a minimum quantity that will always be purchased and at a 
‘pass-through price’ (which means the government absorbs all risks of fossil fuel 
price inflation), often with Partial Risk Guarantees from the World Bank. However, 
even contingencies that are covered by contract may be difficult to enforce in the 
distant future if the financial condition of the government becomes significantly 
adverse. Moreover, given the weakness of contract enforcement by courts, the risk 
faced by different investors may not be the same in a potential crisis. Entrepreneurs 
with better political connections can expect to be ‘last out’ in a potential crisis.  
 
Power plants may have a life in excess of twenty years and many years of operation 
may be required to recover significant capital costs. Investors therefore need to be 
satisfied about revenue income over many years in the future before they can feel 
confident about taking these risks. This risk can grow rapidly if a significant 
expansion of IPPs is being contemplated and sales of power to final consumers are 
significantly subsidized. Both happened to be the case in Bangladesh in the early 
2010s. The solvency of future governments may therefore become significantly worse 
directly in proportion to its success in implementing IPP projects! (This is described 
later in Arrow 9). Given that the financial conditions of governments and economies 
many years in the future are difficult to predict, power sector contracts are 
fundamentally incomplete. The risk is not necessarily one of expropriation but of 
potentially disruptive future transaction costs in renegotiating contracts in different 
local and global circumstances. These features of the sector mean that the 
construction of power plants faces uncertainties that cannot be easily addressed 
through full contracting and this in turn has two important effects. 
 
Arrow 2 shows the most obvious implication of these non-contracted risks: the risk 
premium results in higher private sector financing costs for power sector projects. 
This explains our observation of characteristic (ii) in Figure 7 that private sector 
financing for power projects is expensive and likely to have an impact on the final 
price of power. The cost of finance is therefore both a dependent variable and a 
variable whose magnitude determines other characteristics of the market that in turn 
affect the risk premium. This circularity opens up the risk premium to the possibility 
of vicious or virtuous cycles of causality that we will discuss later. Regardless of what 
a PPP contract guarantees, the market is likely to factor in a growing risk premium if 
the systemic capability of the government to deliver on contractual commitments to 
the sector is perceived to have deteriorated. For instance, the unsolicited and very 
high cost rental contracts that the government entered into in 2010 are very likely to 
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have already had this effect on market sentiment regarding the government’s 
commitment to protect the future solvency of the PDB. As a result, we should expect 
the risk premium built into the average cost of commercial financing for the next IPP 
to have already become a little higher than in the past.  
 
High financing costs in turn have a number of important effects for investments in this 
sector. Indeed, the self-fulfilling characteristic of high risk premiums that follow from 
our causal analysis partly explain why the public sector or at least public financing 
and/or financing by international financing institutions (IFIs) have historically played 
an important role in the power sector in developing countries. Both the public sector 
and state-assisted financing for the private sector continue to play this role in India 
despite the significant opening up that has happened in that country. The market 
failures that prevent full contracting mean that a significant role for public financing 
of power sector projects may be more efficient even though power is not a pure public 
good. In particular, in very poor countries, private risk perceptions may suggest a 
price for power generation that may be beyond the purchasing capacity of emerging 
industry and retail customers, requiring unsustainable levels of government subsidy if 
the cost of capital cannot be reduced ex ante.  
 
Arrow 3 shows the other important and simultaneous effect of the high risks 
associated with IPP investments. The private investor knows that whatever the 
contract says, in potentially adverse future conditions the contract may be difficult to 
enforce and there are many unknown and therefore non-contracted risks that can also 
affect the overall viability of the investment. As a result, it is rational for firms to 
invest in ‘relationships’ with government and with political organizations more 
generally, to mitigate these risks by keeping open preferential and personalized 
channels of negotiation that allow ongoing informal contracting and enforcement. In 
case of future difficulties with payments or access to fuel, investors know that 
contacts and informal bargaining are more likely to be important than contracts and 
formal processes of redress. Given the high cost or even implausibility of enforcement 
through the formal legal system, firms are more likely to be able to negotiate required 
changes on an ongoing basis, or to ensure that they will be higher up the chain of 
claims in case of financial difficulties if they can call on long-term relationships with 
politicians and bureaucrats in critical positions. This is not a sufficient guarantee 
because politicians and bureaucrats will certainly not remain in place for the lifetime 
of a power project, but it is unlikely that firms will even begin to engage in this sector 
in the absence of these relationships.  
 
This explains characteristic (iii) in Figure 7 that only a small number of bidders 
remain at advanced stages of bidding in this sector. As complex negotiations cannot 
rely entirely on legal procedures given the weak legal framework in developing 
countries, only firms that have strong relationships with insiders are likely to sustain 
progress in these negotiations. As these privileged relationships are based on 
historical accidents and relationships already developed through existing businesses, it 
is likely that only a relatively small number of firms have the requisite investments in 
informal networks to enter these negotiations. This also explains why firms as diverse 
as furniture and cement manufacturers in Bangladesh have demonstrated a 
comparative advantage in entering the bidding process for investments in the power 
sector. Their comparative advantage is not based on their technical expertise in the 
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power sector, but rather their extensive informal contacts with government and the 
bureaucracy.  
 
Arrow 4 shows that the close links between political and economic organizations also 
enable collusion and corruption that further increases the risk for investors because 
contracts are likely to be re-examined by subsequent governments if new relationships 
are not rapidly established. Thus, while there are structural reasons privileging firms 
and individuals with established relationships with government and bureaucracy, 
these conditions also enable collusion between insiders. For instance, as discussed 
earlier, technical specifications can be set to privilege suppliers associated with 
particular local sponsors. The interesting observation is that even if firms and 
governments did not initially want to engage in corruption or collusion, the high level 
of contingent risks that cannot be contracted for can create strong pressures for long-
term personalized relationships between business and government. These 
relationships provide some confidence to investors that contingencies will be 
reasonably addressed if and when they arise. But once these relationships exist, it is 
very difficult to prevent a slide into additional privilege-seeking collusion.  
 
Ironically, even if a firm resists capturing additional advantage using its relationships, 
it is very difficult to signal this to the general public or to subsequent governments 
given the structural factors that ensure the uncompetitive nature of the market and the 
clear presence of strong personalized relationships. The presumption will be that 
insiders have benefited and new governments are likely to demand payoffs to 
establish new relationships that will need to be developed to sustain the projects. 
Firms therefore have every incentive to keep some rents on reserve to meet these 
requirements. This argument is not intended to excuse the ongoing corruption and 
collusion of participants, but to demonstrate that this type of corruption is unlikely to 
be addressed using standard anti-corruption tools such as greater transparency in the 
award of contracts. Personalized relationships here are not the result of limited 
transparency. Rather limited transparency is a result of relationships that are required 
to sustain investments in a context where risks cannot be contractually mitigated. 
 
Firms know that the relationship between government and opposition is likely to be 
acrimonious in the context of a ‘competitive clientelist’ political settlement (Khan 
2010). In this context, the ruling coalition is severely constrained in its ability to offer 
credible formal assurances to potential investors that they will not be expropriated by 
future governments. If the relationships between the ruling party and investors are 
perceived to have resulted in ‘rent sharing’ with the ruling party, the process through 
which the contracts were offered may be questioned by an incoming party after an 
electoral victory as a way of punishing particular investors who were close to the 
outgoing party. In Bangladesh there is a history of companies winning major 
government contracts being targeted on technical legal grounds by a new ruling 
coalition if they are perceived to have had significant economic relationships with the 
previous regime. These attacks are in most cases of temporary significance because 
there are political processes through which such companies and individuals can 
eventually protect themselves. For instance, it is common for companies to establish 
relationships with the new ruling party. Arrow 4 simply shows that this requires 
resources and involves additional uncertainty.  
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Returning to the high financing costs, characteristic (ii), this has a number of 
additional and very important effects that are relevant for understanding challenges in 
the power sector. Arrow 5 shows that high financing costs can in turn contribute to a 
preference for procurement rents as opposed to rents in production or distribution. 
The distinction refers to whether significant rents are captured by business and 
government at the procurement stage by colluding in the price and quality of the 
capital equipment that is delivered or in the production and distribution of electricity 
by colluding in the pricing of power and fuel or indeed the calculation and collection 
of bills. The former creates significant upfront rents at the very inception of the 
project, while the latter can create a stream of somewhat more modest rents through 
the lifetime of the project. The latter may add up to be significantly higher in 
aggregate, but if parties are unsure about the economic viability of the project over 
time, or have very short time horizons, they may prefer procurement rents over 
production and distribution rents. Thus, high financing costs that raise the cost of 
power generation and create doubts about the long run viability of the underlying 
contracts can increase a preference for procurement rents. This is because the higher 
the cost of generation, the greater the subsidy required to PDB to sell on this power 
and therefore the greater the doubts about future viability and future streams of rents. 
A preference for one or other type of rent is not neutral in terms of the likely effects 
on power generation. An interest in procurement rents may result in very inferior 
investments that further increase the actual cost of production and put pressure on the 
future viability of the contract. An interest in production and distribution rents may 
have a high social cost later but may be consistent with immediate strategies to 
increase the generation of power. 
 
Arrow 5 suggests a plausible but adverse rational response of private investors in this 
context of uncertainty about the future solvency of PDB and ultimately of the 
government of Bangladesh. Regardless of payment guarantees in PPP contracts, it is 
implausible that the government will continue to pay if it is financially unable to do 
so. The greater the number of IPPs that already exist ahead of a particular investor, 
the less confident that investor is likely to be about the remedies available in case of a 
systemic insolvency of PDB at a future date. The rational investor, particularly the 
local sponsor who may be more aware of local political economy, is therefore likely 
to want to make as much of their return as possible upfront and rely less on the stream 
of future incomes for guaranteeing an overall return on investment. This could explain 
characteristic (iv) in Figure 7, the strong preference for maximizing ‘procurement 
rents’ as opposed to collecting rents on production and distribution.  
 
It is not rational for government and investors to focus on capturing production rents 
by colluding to set the price of generated power except perhaps in the case of very 
short term projects like rental projects. For longer term projects, where more 
significant capital costs have to be incurred, collusion in setting a somewhat higher 
price for power purchases is less attractive because sustaining these future payments 
may not be credible. It is more rational to collude in overpricing procurements of 
capital equipment. In extreme cases, the lack of confidence in the future can be so 
severe that future projects and the future of the current project lose any attractiveness 
for public officials and investors and both become mainly interested in procurement 
profits in the immediate project under consideration. In this extreme case the project 
under consideration resembles a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma where neither 
government nor investors have any incentive to rein in their immediate incentives to 
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capture rents through procurements. Once again, our aim is not to say that 
conventional explanations of procurement irregularities focusing on greed and the 
absence of transparency are wrong. However, there are overlapping structural factors 
that create strong preferences for this form of rent capture as opposed to others, and 
this has further implications for the viability of investments in power generation. 
 
The preference for procurement rents in turn has two other effects. Arrow 6 suggests 
that in this context there is likely to be an adverse selection of bidders. Those who are 
unwilling to play by these rules will be weeded out because the structure of incentives 
will not attract them nor are they likely to find champions amongst government 
insiders. This in turn reinforces the observation of a small number of serious players 
in the bidding game, characteristic (iii). In addition, the tendency of these bidders to 
prefer procurement rents means that some or all of their projects are likely to suffer 
from high cost and low efficiency. This in turn implies higher risks for all investors in 
the future (Arrow 4) and eventually (through Arrow 2) to even higher risk premiums 
for the sector. This is one example of the cumulative causation that can lead high risk 
premiums to be self-fulfilling in the sense that the effect of a high risk premium is to 
drive risk premiums even higher next time. 
 
Arrow 7 suggests another equally serious consequence of high financing costs and the 
preference for procurement rents. Procurement rents can offer significant upfront 
prizes for the individuals and factions in government and the bureaucracy who are 
championing particular sponsors. While greed and limited accountability does drive 
some corruption in developing countries, we know that political leaders also have a 
structural requirement for rents to sustain the political system (Khan 2006; North, et 
al. 2009; Khan 2010). However, the types of rents that are available do matter in 
determining the strategies of different actors and the economic outcomes of their rent 
capture strategies. A focus on procurement rents has particularly adverse implications 
not only for the quality of projects, but also for the intensity of conflicts within the 
ruling party and the bureaucracy. Different factions within government typically 
champion rival bids and have strong relationships with competing suppliers. If the 
primary source of rents comes at the procurement stage, the likely result is that there 
will be more intense conflicts between factions and groups within the ruling party and 
the bureaucracy than if the rents came from production and distribution over longer 
periods of time. Large sums that can be made over short periods of time greatly 
increase the stakes in intra-party and intra-bureaucracy factional conflicts, particularly 
if the overall financial vulnerability of the power sector makes it unlikely that there 
will be a significant stream of projects over time. The one-shot nature of the rent 
capture game can result not only in prisoner’s dilemma incentives for investors and 
government, but also in intense conflicts within government because the likely 
winners from the current procurements round may well be the last ones for a while. 
This can help to explain a critical characteristic of the Bangladeshi power sector: 
protracted decision-making procedures and high chances that projects will be blocked 
by disaffected factions at the last moment, characteristic (v) in Figure 7.  
 
Protracted decision-making and delays in the power sector are typically explained by 
the lack of technical capabilities within the power bureaucracy in Bangladesh and by 
multiple decision-making points within the government. But it is possible to interpret 
these structures in another way. If significant up-front rents are available through 
power sector investments, these rents acquire a great deal of importance within the 
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ruling coalition. The importance of power sector rents and the strategic importance of 
the sector are underlined by the fact that the power portfolio comes directly under the 
Prime Minister in the 2009 Awami League government and major investments have 
required prime ministerial clearance in all governments. Yet multiple points of 
decision-making are also retained. For instance, the post-2009 Prime Minister works 
not only with a state minister but also with a power advisor. We know informally that 
there are other powerful individuals both in the party and the bureaucracy who have 
an input into the decision-making process under the umpiring role played by the 
Prime Minister. This structure is perhaps not accidental and suggests the sensitivity of 
managing factional conflicts over significant rents within the ruling party. The aim 
appears to be to enable factions to compete for these rents because attempting to 
override powerful factions entirely may be very costly for the ruling party. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the rents available makes this competition dysfunctional 
(low quality investments are the likely outcome) as well as intense.   
 
The intensity of these intra-party conflicts can be better understood by remembering 
that in a ‘competitive clientelist polity’, the ruling parties are themselves coalitions of 
factions. Individual investors have relationships with particular politicians and 
factions within the ruling party. If the incentive structure is such that bidders are 
likely to make significant ‘procurement rents’ at the early stages of the project, there 
is likely to be a scramble between factions within the ruling party to be associated 
with lucrative investments from which the faction can benefit. This increases the 
stakes and therefore the intensity of the conflict over the award of particular projects. 
If the rents had accrued over time, the immediate stakes would have been lower and 
the benefits would have accrued to a more diffuse group within political organizations 
over time. There would be no incentive to destroy rent streams created by the 
previous ruling coalition and strong incentives to add to that rent stream by approving 
new projects. Indeed the type of rents available could create incentives for ‘live and 
let live’ compromises emerging between rival clientelist coalitions to enable them to 
share some rents whose flows continue over time. Something like this is seen in India 
in power sector projects where competing clientelist parties implicitly cooperate in 
capturing rents in sequence without blocking or destroying the work of others. In 
contrast, if the power sector rents come in the form of a small number of lucrative 
projects that are not likely to be repeated very often, it becomes rational to contest 
intensely. Intra-party competition can appear to take the form of government 
indecision about projects and procrastination in the granting of contracts. In extreme 
cases no decisions are made.   
 
Arrow 8 shows that occasionally IPP projects can go through but the success rate is 
relatively small, characteristic (vi) in Figure 7. Finally, Arrow 9 describes the paradox 
that after a few successes, subsequent projects may become less viable if the gap 
between the buying and selling prices in the projects already signed imply a 
significant growth in transfers to PDB from the budget. The more financially strained 
the PDB and the Government of Bangladesh become, the higher the risk premium in 
Arrow 2, and the more binding the succeeding constraints become. This insight allows 
us to explain why the early IPPs at Haripur and Meghnaghat 1, went through so much 
more easily compared to subsequent attempts at closing deals. It is possible that 
Bibiyana 1 and perhaps one or two more projects currently under discussion may 
eventually go through. Bibiyana 1 in particular has relatively low risks as a project 
given that supplies of gas are technically assured. But without a strategy for cracking 
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the interdependent links identified in Figure 7, it is unlikely that Bangladesh will 
achieve the scale of power sector investments that the country requires. 
 
In the context of this analysis it is worth asking how the major Bangladeshi player in 
the power sector, Summit Power Ltd., managed to bid relatively low prices for the 
three major projected plants, Bibiyana 1, Bibiyana 2 and Meghnaghat 2. The answer 
is that Summit had not finalized its financing arrangements when it made its bid, and 
its pricing was based on fairly optimistic projections of the financing costs. A few 
months before its deadline of February 2012 when it was supposed to make its 
financing arrangements known to the government, the company had still not 
announced that the financing issue had been resolved. Interviews with a Summit 
director and a technical advisor in 2011 suggested that Summit took an optimistic 
gamble in expecting to raise finance in a number of innovative ways. 
 
The total investment for the three projects was estimated to be around US$ 850 
million. Its main machinery supplier, General Electric of the USA would give it 
suppliers’ credit for two years. GE would also have a small equity stake in the 
company of around 6 per cent of its capital. The rest of the equity stake including the 
holding of Summit would provide a total of 30 per cent of the capital. A further 20 per 
cent was projected to come from international financial institutions like the IFC, the 
ADB, the Islamic Development Bank, and bilateral development agencies interested 
in acquiring an equity stake. But a full 50 per cent of the investment was to be 
financed by floating convertible bonds in the local market. The bonds would have an 
initial coupon return of 5 per cent, significantly reducing the financing cost for 
Summit. The attractiveness of these bonds for buyers would come from the fact that 
after the fourth year, they could be converted into stocks. With optimistic projections 
of the stock price, this would give the convertible bond holders an expected return of 
around 17.5 per cent per annum over eleven years. Part of the bonds was also to be 
repaid after 8 years. The complex formula was a win-win offer but the details hung on 
the expectation that the local Bangladeshi capital market was ready for such a 
significant transaction. Part of the reason behind Summit’s confidence was that its 
privileged position had allowed it to get a commitment from public sector banks to 
take up almost a quarter of the bonds, and BIFF was also expected to buy around 10 
per cent of the bonds. Of course, till it happens, commitments from public sector 
banks are simply expressions of interest in a company known to be close to the 
government.  
 
Effectively, the initial Summit financing plan was to achieve a significant level of 
indirect public financing, without going through the route of an explicit public 
financing instrument and a governance agency that will monitor the use of these 
public funds in any explicit way, or that can ensure that the projected return is 
delivered. Indeed, because of this the financing proposal may be blocked at any stage 
by factions within the ruling coalition or bureaucratic organizations who do not want 
to be associated with such an arrangement or who would oppose it because they felt 
they had been left out of a fair share of the benefits. The plan is also very likely to be 
affected by valuations of future stock in an environment where the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange was rocked by insider trading and dramatic price falls in late 2010 and all 
through 2011. Summit is widely rumoured to have been one of the players in the stock 
market benefiting from poor regulation. It is unlikely in this context that a very 
significant bond issue will be successful without significant uptake by public sector 
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banks at the very outset, and that too may attract strong opposition from many 
quarters. Thus, while the Summit financing plan is audacious and well thought 
through, and would indeed have lowered its financing costs if it could have been 
implemented, it is unlikely that the company will be able to raise the full US$ 850 
million through this route. It is very likely that Summit will have to find alternative 
sources of financing at a higher financing cost and this may affect the quality of the 
investments it may wish to make in the ways discussed above.  
 
Evaluation of Policy Responses  
The most common policy responses to the constraints facing the power sector have 
usually attempted to directly address characteristics (iii) and (iv), namely the small 
number of bidders based on personalized relationships with political insiders and the 
apparent leakage of procurement rents. Development agencies and partners including 
the World Bank have insisted on transparent procurement guidelines and bidding 
procedures. Moreover, political reform and in particular reforms supporting greater 
political accountability have sought to address characteristic (v), the protracted 
decision-making that seems to block investments in the sector. The conventional 
strategy here is to try and make political parties more accountable to the voting public 
and less responsive to internal factional conflicts. If some of these strategies had been 
successful, one or more of Arrows 4, 6, 7 or 8 may have been knocked out or 
significantly weakened with the possibility of setting up positive or virtuous cycles 
instead of the vicious cycles that otherwise characterize the links between these 
factors. In addition, general good governance and rule of law reforms have attempted 
to improve contract enforcement in courts and thereby reduce risk premiums (Arrow 
2) and the need for personalized relationships to support informal contracting 
arrangements (Arrow 3).  
 
However, these reform efforts have not yielded significant results and some of the 
interdependencies in Figure 7 suggest why this may be the case. Many of the 
characteristics that have been targeted are dependent rather than independent 
variables. For instance, the characteristics (iii) and (iv) may appear to be the causes of 
poor procurement and bidding processes when they are actually the outcomes of 
deeper problems associated with high risk premiums and contracting costs in contexts 
of political uncertainty. Not surprisingly, good governance reforms in poor countries 
that have tried to directly tackle these characteristics have generally failed to reduce 
risk premiums and personalized relationships. Our analysis of why a Weberian rule of 
law cannot be enforced in the political settlements of developing countries helps to 
explain why the weak enforcement of particular institutions has to be traced to the 
way in which institutions are modified because of the rent requirements of powerful 
organizations7
Figure 7
 A policy intervention is only likely to be effective if it is plausible that 
its implementation is consistent with the rent-sharing conflicts that will be unleashed 
within that political settlement. A focus on transparency and procedural reforms can 
make some difference but it is unlikely to make a difference that is significant enough 
to alter the interdependent causal links shown in . Moreover, the politics of 
developing countries require the allocation of rents to powerful factions as part of the 
political process of maintaining political stability and this too militates against the 
achievement of impersonal rule-based allocative systems (North, et al. 2007; Khan 
2010, 2011). It is not surprising therefore that good governance reforms attempted 
                                                 
7 See the companion paper on The Political Settlement and its Evolution in Bangladesh  
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during the Emergency Caretaker Government of 2007-09 that hoped to achieve 
greater political accountability within Bangladeshi political parties achieved very 
disappointing results. Given the features of the macro-political settlement it is not 
surprising that rule-following procurement and bidding processes have not emerged 
nor have political parties become more accountable to the extent that they are able to 
make faster decisions in the public interest.  
 
The implication of these observations is that a focus on directly attacking these 
characteristics of the problem is unlikely to make a significant difference to observed 
outcomes even though it may be desirable that pressure for reforms in these areas 
should continue. The two other points of entry in Figure 7 are more promising but one 
is more feasible as a point of entry than the other. An excessively ambitious set of 
expectations for private sector investment in the power sector, characteristic (i) may 
paradoxically be part of the problem. It sends negative signals to financial analysts 
looking at the viability of investments over time and the capability of PDB to service 
its obligations if more than one or two of these investments came to fruition. The 
outcome is a steep rate of increase in risk premiums with self-fulfilling effects as 
discussed earlier. But long before this happens, progress on power sector projects 
slows down and project development is converted into heavily contested games where 
attention shifts to rent capture at the procurement stage. However, the capacity that 
would be required within the state to take on a significant share of the expansion of 
generation capacity within the public sector is not likely to be immediately credible. 
 
This leads to the second point of entry which is by exclusion the most promising route 
for policy-makers and the political leadership. This is the high financing cost and risk 
premiums for power sector investments, characteristic (ii). While other political 
economy factors are difficult to change directly, a significant shift in the cost of 
financing can alter or weaken some of the interdependencies shown in Figure 7, 
sufficient for progress to become achievable. One possibility that could be considered 
is a carefully designed financing facility with a sufficient flow of funds in the pipeline 
that could significantly lower the cost of financing proposed power generation 
projects, together with a dedicated governance arrangement for its proper utilization. 
Clearly, the flow of funds required to make a difference to the cost of finance would 
have to be orders of magnitude greater than was available in IDCOL or IPFF in the 
early 2010s. But as a least developed country, Bangladesh could make a bid for such a 
funding stream through the World Bank, the ADB and other international financial 
institutions. Such a facility could be structured and administered in a number of 
different ways but these alternatives are not the subject of our discussion. We will 
only identify some of the characteristics that such a facility should have in order to 
achieve an impact in the specific political economy of Bangladesh.  
 
By signalling the availability of a credible flow of funds at an interest rate that can 
sustain the generation of power at a price that is within the bounds of PDB purchasing 
capabilities, a number of effects are likely to be set in motion that can be exploited 
with carefully designed institutional strategies. Clearly, the availability of such a 
facility would have to be combined with dedicated governance arrangements to 
ensure that the financing available on beneficial terms was only available for projects 
that satisfied technical and other governance criteria. The IDCOL experience suggests 
that this may be achievable and the causal map in our Figure 7 suggests why it may 
be. By directly intervening to change this characteristic and reducing the financing 
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costs for important power generation projects under consideration, the intervention 
can break or weaken the critical arrows 5, 6 and 7 that lead to the emergence of 
unviable projects or of sustained blocking. First, the lower cost of financing can 
enable the power project to offer to sell power at a price closer to the final selling 
price, thereby making the viability of long-term purchase agreements more credible. 
This can sufficiently reduce the incentive of insiders to focus primarily on the upfront 
procurement rents and thereby enable dedicated procurement conditions to be 
enforced to an acceptable degree. This may appear to be an optimistic expectation, but 
in fact procurement procedures were much better for Meghnaghat 1 when credible 
financing was available compared to some later cases. This is not surprising because 
by offering a credible project, financial institutions also have credible leverage for 
insisting on better procurement conditions.  
 
Secondly, with better procurement conditions and weaker incentives for fixing 
technical specifications, the adverse selection that results in serious bidders dropping 
out is less likely to happen. Thirdly, if upfront rents are less in evidence, the intensity 
of inner-party and bureaucratic lobbying can be expected to decrease, with the focus 
of interested parties shifting to a greater extent to the long-term rents from the 
production and distribution of power. Moreover, if the long-term low cost financing 
makes the project under consideration viable, it is more likely that other projects will 
follow without PDB becoming insolvent. The prospect of successive projects is likely 
to reduce the intensity of zero-sum conflicts and with a sufficiently large pipeline of 
credible projects this could prevent the blocking of projects by disappointed factions. 
None of these potentially beneficial results are likely to automatically follow without 
considerable attention being given to the governance design of any facility of this type 
in the future. But our analysis suggests that without a substantial facility which can 
promise to reduce the cost of financing and contribute to improving the viability of 
investments in the power generation sector, direct interventions targeting adverse 
characteristics of this sector are likely to fail. 
 
The governance structure of the Indian Power Finance Corporation (PFC) is not likely 
to be replicable in Bangladesh because the PFC benefits from the checks and balances 
provided by India’s federal structure. As a central government financial organization, 
the PFC is answerable to the central government, while most power generation 
projects that it finances come under state governments. This, together with strong 
professional bureaucratic leadership has ensured that PFC financing does not get 
excessively captured by inefficient projects, such as ones where the prime interest is 
in procurement rents. In the context of a smaller country like Bangladesh, more 
attention would have to be given to the governance of a similar financial organization 
to ensure that credit allocation was not going to be captured by clients of the ruling 
party even if they are unable to deliver efficient projects. On the other hand, 
Bangladesh has the advantage that the private sector is already a significant player in 
power generation. Potential financing for power generation at preferential interest 
rates would not be targeted towards the public sector alone, but would be open for the 
private sector to bid. It is possible to imagine how a governance structure could be 
constructed which combined access to funds at preferential rates with strong 
requirements for competitive bidding.  
 
Since the underlying finances for the financing instrument would almost certainly 
come from international financial institutions like the World Bank or the ADB, these 
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organizations could insist on strict governance of procurement and other conditions 
for these loans. It is likely that combination of a reduction of incentives for 
procurement rents, the plausible provision of profitable investment opportunities to 
investors and pressure from the business community and international agencies on the 
ruling coalition could allow the creation of a limited bureaucratic governance agency 
with external assistance that could ensure an acceptable use of this funding. In 
particular, the availability of capital at reasonable prices would also attract serious 
bidders both domestic and foreign, who would find the overall contractual context 
more credible in the presence of these facilities. Despite its differences, the Indian 
experience does show that by combining viable financing with appropriate 
institutions, power sector investments are possible even in competitive clientelist 
settings. A focus on developing the governance structures for financing power 
generation at preferential rates in Bangladesh is therefore likely to be a fruitful point 
of entry for cracking some of the political economy constraints facing investments in 
this vital sector.  
 
We surmise that some of these conditions were in place when the first two successful 
IPPs went through. A combination of conditions created virtuous feedbacks in the 
links identified in Figure 7 for both the Meghnaghat 1 and Haripur projects. The scale 
of the projected role of IPPs was initially relatively small, gas supplies were 
promising and the cost of financing was kept low as a result of the role of the IFIs as 
discussed earlier. This combination of conditions lowered the risk perception of 
private financiers and further contributed to the low selling price offered by the IPP 
operators in these projects. The viability of the projects ensured that adverse selection 
or the focus on procurement rents did not happen to the extent that blighted 
subsequent projects. One implication of our political economy analysis is that if the 
cost of capital has to be kept low and if this requires negotiating a financial facility at 
concessionary rates and appropriate governance conditions, there is likely to be a 
ceiling on the pace of expansion set by the magnitude of the facility available. We 
would argue that if the achievement of a lower cost of capital requires greater 
modesty in the rate at which the supply of power is projected to increase in 
Bangladesh it may be a price well worth paying. Paradoxically, the actual rate of 
increase in the power supply may be higher if the private financing that is called upon 
and the rate of subsidy that is implied for PDB is reduced to a far more realistic level.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper applies the framework of political settlements to look at the growth and 
performance of three different sectors in contemporary Bangladesh. It shows that our 
understanding of economic policy and institutional reform can be augmented by 
locating this analysis within a broader framework of evolving political settlements 
and the limits they place on the implementation and effective management of 
particular institutional arrangements. Institutional innovations are important for 
overcoming particular contractual (market) failures and in general, the problems of 
financing learning-by-doing constitute an important area of contractual failures in 
developing countries.  
 
We looked at the major success story of Bangladesh, the garments sector, which took 
off in the context of clientelistic authoritarianism and a favourable international rent 
environment that Bangladesh was lucky enough to be able to exploit. It had just the 
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right level of organizational capabilities amongst a broad-based group of potential 
entrepreneurs, a ruling coalition that had the self-interest and the political capability to 
enforce a small number of critical institutional innovations and a leading entrepreneur 
in Bangladesh and a collaborator in South Korea who both had the right incentive 
structure to finance and then put in very high levels of effort in learning. The lessons 
that we derive from this experience are that market opportunities are important but 
insufficient for explaining success or for creating the conditions for the next line of 
successful industries. Financing instruments that can help to finance learning-by-
doing are critical but they have to be designed such that the incentives for high levels 
of effort are maintained given the characteristics of the political settlement.  
 
A second sector that is emergent in Bangladesh and is likely to play a vitally 
important role in the future is the nascent electronics industry. This began its takeoff 
when the political settlement had already transformed into a competitive clientelist 
one and it did not enjoy the accidental international rent support of the type that the 
garments industry enjoyed under the MFA. Success here depended on another 
fortunate ‘accident’, the presence of a pioneering nationalist company that took the 
risk to single-handedly finance a significant amount of the initial learning-by-doing in 
refrigerator manufacturing because it wanted to build national productive capabilities. 
To a large extent, this forced a competitive clientelist government to become a 
follower. The government supported its success with policies that then helped the 
company to consolidate some of its investments and to trigger a number of traders and 
assemblers to move into manufacturing because their import-based businesses, 
particularly in refrigerators, were no longer viable in some market segments. Our 
analysis here shows that even in an overall context that is fairly unfavourable, 
learning-by-doing was still being financed in some sectors. An analysis of the 
prospects of the electronics industry in Bangladesh suggests that it should be possible 
to design financing instruments to assist the development of manufacturing of 
selected components as a feasible long-term strategy.  
 
Finally we looked at the very serious crisis in power generation and the failure of 
successive governments to increase the generation of power in a sustainable and cost-
effective way. Here the political settlement has a different role to play in explaining 
these failures. The interdependent characteristics of the failure in the power sector 
have aspects which seem to fit a standard explanation based on the absence of ‘good 
governance’. The lack of transparency in the allocation of contracts, government 
corruption and the lack of accountability can appear to explain the failure to get 
serious bids. As a description of the problem this is not wrong, but many of these 
characteristics are themselves dependent variables which have to be located within the 
operation of a particular political settlement and a specific set of economic features of 
the power sector in Bangladesh. Our analysis explains both why the standard good 
governance reforms have had a very limited effect on the power sector and helps to 
identify a possible entry point for reform. The availability of moderately priced 
financing, ultimately sourced from international financial institutions, with dedicated 
governance capabilities could create a mix of incentives and opportunities that may 
allow its operation within a political settlement that continues to require rents for 
political allocation. The example of the more successful Indian power sector, though 
different in important respects, suggests that it is important to explore these 
alternative approaches to mitigating some of the constraints in the power sector. 
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